The Legacy of the Filibuster War: National Identity, Collective Memory, and Cultural Anti-Imperialism by Cabrera Geserick, Marco Antonio (Author) et al.
The Legacy of the Filibuster War: National Identity, Collective Memory, and 
Cultural Anti-Imperialism 
By 
Marco Antonio Cabrera Geserick 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2013 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
Lynn Stoner, Chair 
Victoria Thompson 
Martha Few 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
May 2013 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Legacy of the Filibuster War: National Identity, Collective Memory, 
and Cultural Anti-Imperialism is a dissertation project analyzing how the 
Filibuster War becomes a staple for Costa Rican national identity.  This work 
presents several challenges to traditional theories of modernization in the creation 
of nationalism.  By focusing on the development of cultural features defined by 
the transformation of collective memory, this project argues that national identity 
is a dynamic process defined according to local, national, and international 
contexts.  Modernization theories connect the development of nationalism to the 
period of consolidation of the nation-state, usually during the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century.  The Costa Rican case demonstrates that, 
while modernization coincides with the creation of symbols of official 
nationalism, the Filibuster War became a symbol of national identity beginning in 
the 1850s, and it has been changing throughout the twentieth century.  Threats to 
sovereignty and imperialist advances served to promote the memory of the 
Filibuster War, while local social transformations, as the abolition of the army and 
internal political conflict forced drastic changes on the interpretation of the war 
and the establishment of a national narrative that adjusts to social transformation.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 12
th
, 1860, William Walker stood in front of an execution 
squad on a desolate Honduran beach. He had just been found guilty of 
filibustering. For almost five years, Walker tried to conquer all of Central 
America with a mercenary army formed by adventurers hired in the United States. 
Influenced by the ideas of Manifest Destiny, they conquered Nicaragua in 1855, 
reestablishing slavery and developing an Anglo-controlled government. In 1856, 
Walker’s forces invaded Costa Rica. His dreams of conquest were represented in 
a flag he created; its motto was “five or none.” Costa Ricans rallied to defend 
their sovereignty, and along other Central American forces, defeated Walker. 
Before the firing squadron, Walker insisted that he was the legal President of 
Nicaragua. However,, of the five Central American republics he had conquered, 
he was president of none. 
Since then, the Filibuster War serves as a symbol of resistance and 
national unity in Central America and the source of romanticized tales of a lost 
empire in the United States. If Walker had succeeded, he could have annexed the 
region to the United States or at least have founded a Central American slave 
republic. This could have represented important support to the southern 
Confederate States during the U.S. Civil War. If annexed to the United States, 
Central America could have tipped the congressional majority in favor of 
southern slavery. Instead, an improvised army formed by small-land farmers 
under the leadership of an energetic Costa Rican president stopped the filibusters’ 
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advance. For Costa Ricans, defeating Walker generated a certainty about their 
ability to defend their homes, families, and national values. The memory of the 
Filibuster War continues to define the national identity of Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica. 
Costa Rica presents a unique case for the study of nationalism and national 
identity because it challenges the hegemonic Eurocentric models that discourage 
nuanced examinations and alternative interpretations. In Costa Rica, as in Latin 
America, national identity does not precede the nation, which already challenges 
theories of ethnonationalism. Instead, it is generally accepted that, in the 
Americas, the state was created and only then a national identity followed.
1
 In 
Costa Rica, national identity developed with the nation, and not as a product of it. 
That is, national identity reinforced the consolidation of the state at the same time 
that the state created a national narrative. Another difference between Costa Rica 
and the rest of the Americas is that Independence Day is not the major holiday 
connected to the nation; instead, it is the Filibuster War which occupies the most 
important symbolic value for Costa Rican national identity. Commemorations of 
the Filibuster War also challenge traditional modernization theory, demonstrating 
that Costa Rican national identity has been defined both by the intervention of the 
                                                          
1
 Hebe Clementi.  Formación de la Conciencia Americana.  Buenos Aires: Editorial Pléyade, 
1972.  Sara Castro-Klarén and John  Charles Chasteen. Beyond Imagined Communities. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Universty Press, 2003.  Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona. 
Nationalism in the New World. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006.  Eastman, Scott.  
Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823.  Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 2012.  Enríquez Solano, Francisco, comp.  Fin de Siglo XIX e 
identidad nacional en México y Centroamérica.  (Alajuela: Museo Histórico Cultural Juan 
Santamaría, 2000).  Hobsbawm, Eric J.  Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, 
Myth,Reality.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.   
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state as much as by popular discourse, contesting the theories that national 
identity is the result of a top-down imposition. This is reflected especially in the 
celebrations of Juan Santamaría on April 11
th
. Finally, the victory over the 
filibusters not only helped Costa Ricans to establish the nation as a viable project, 
but it shaped its relationship with the hegemonic United States. While relations 
between Latin America and the United States usually fall into the categories of 
victim-perpetrator, Costa Rican national identity is based on successful resistance, 
establishing a discourse that does not fit postcolonial theory. Costa Rican active 
and successful opposition to U.S. hegemony allowed it to create a discourse of 
anti-cultural Imperialism, in which Costa Ricans are always in control of their 
own sovereignty.  
This dissertation analyzes the legacy of the Filibuster War, with a special 
focus on Costa Rica, the country in which memory of this war has developed like 
nowhere else. The main questions asked in this dissertation relate to the 
construction of national identity: How did the memory of the war influence the 
sense of collective identity of the participant countries? How has this war been 
remembered? Why, in Costa Rica, is the annual celebration of Walker’s defeat 
given greater importance than the commemoration of Independence Day? The last 
question is especially relevant when a comparison is made with almost all other 
countries in the Americas, where Independence Day continues to be the only basis 
of official national identity and a legitimizing element for the state. The 
underlying topic is the conceptualization of the nation-state in Costa Rica. The 
legacy of the Filibuster War presents a unique case that deserves study through 
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the theoretical lens of nationalism in general and national identity in Costa Rica 
more specifically.  
The study of national identity relates directly to the study of nationalism, a 
topic that deserves some analysis. For some of the more important authors on the 
topic of nationalism, national identity is in fact a prerequisite for the nation.
2
 
While there is a large body of scholarship in the area of nationalism, it is 
important to note that nationalism in the Americas developed in a context that 
contrasts with nationalism in other parts of the world.
3
 The traditional ideas of 
ethnonationalism espoused by Anthony Smith, and the modernist theories 
promoted by Ernst Geller and Eric Hobsbawm, derive from a Eurocentric 
understanding of nationalism, and therefore do not fit the model created in the 
largely multicultural and immigrant nations of the Americas.
4
 For these authors, 
language and ethnicity are the basis for national identity. According to these 
theorists, nations create states based on an allegiance derived from common 
language, common ethnic background, or common cultural features. But 
                                                          
2
 Among those who argue that national identity promotes the establishment of a nation are: Ernest 
Renan, Ernest Gellner, Michael Hechter, Miroslav Hroch, and Eric Hobsbawm. See: Ernest 
Renan. Ernest Renan. “What is a Nation?” In: Geoff Eley and Ronadl Grigor Suny. Becoming 
National: A Reader. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 41-55. Ernest Gellner. Nations and 
Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Michael Hechter. Containing Nationalism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Eric Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Hroch, Miroslav. "From National Movement to 
the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe," in Balakrishnan, Gopal, ed. 
Mapping the Nation. New York and London: Verso, 1996. 
 
3
 Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona. Nationalism in the New World. (Athens, GA: The 
University of Georgia Press, 2006), 2. Nicola Miller. “The Historiography of Nationalism and 
National Identity in Latin America.” Nations and Nationalism, 12 (2), 2006, 201-221.  
 
4
 Anthony Smith. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986. Also see: 
Gellner Nations and Nationalism, and Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism... 
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ethnonationalism does not apply to the Americas, where a multitude of languages, 
ethnicities, and cultural orientations existed since the colonial period. During the 
late colonial period, the colonizer’s allegiance responded to Europe, since the 
legal and political core of the empire was located there. For most creoles, identity 
also resided on their birth place in the American periphery. While there are some 
signs of identification with the Americas during the colonial period, it was clear 
that Latin Americans considered themselves primarily part of the Spanish Empire. 
Therefore, it was the creation of a state that was able to develop national identities 
in the region. As Hobsbawm recognized in a later study about Latin American 
nationalism, when it comes to the traditional European model of nationalism, 
Latin America “is somewhat anomalous.”5 Hobsbawm reflects here a traditional 
view that contemplates the concept of nationalism as a reflection of European 
development, unable to recognize that there is not a unique or prevalent form of 
nationalism. What he called anomalous is in reality normal in the Latin American 
context.
6
 
The above Europeanist discussion centered on enthnonationalism proposes 
that national identity preceded the creation of the nation. Scholars of Latin 
American nationalism have established the opposite for the region, where the 
                                                          
5
 Eric Hobsbawm. “Nationalism and Nationality in Latin America.” In: Bouda Etemad, Jean Batou 
and Thomas David. Pour une Histoire Economique et Sociale Internationale. Mélanges Offerts à 
Paul Bairoch/Towards and International Economic and Social History. Essays in Honour of Paul 
Bairoch. (Genève: Editions Passé Présent, 1995), 313-323. Also, Nicola Miller, 201. 
 
6
 Nation is defined here as the specific community for which an individual feels an allegiance and 
sense of belonging. The state is the social, economic, and political structure that controls a 
territory. Nation-state is a specific kind of liberal state representative of the Modern period that by 
definition (although not necesarilly by practice) encompasses one nation.  
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nation was created during the process of independence, and national identity came 
later.
7
 Certainly, there are some pre-national features in the Costa Rican case that 
can be perceived as foundational elements of a national identity, but such studies 
prove to be anachronistic, since national identity is a phenomenon that can be 
studied only a posteriori. To search the past for precedents of now commonly 
accepted values of, say, Costa Rican anti-militarism, is to try to distort the past. 
Instead, if we study the effect of the abolition of the army in relation to anti-
militarism, we can establish if there is such a connection. Still, some Costa Rican 
scholars have ventured on the terrain of proto-nationalism, arguing for the 
existence of an identity that predates the nation. Juan Rafael Quesada talked about 
the existence of a Costa Rican proto-nationalism, arguing that some features of 
Costa Rican nationalism predate the nation.
8
 Quesada does not take into account 
that there cannot be a Costa Rican national identity until there is a consciousness 
of it existing as a separate nation. During the colonial period Costa Rica formed 
part of the Kingdom of Guatemala and responded to its authorities. After gaining 
independence, a short two-year hiatus was followed by the inclusion of Costa 
Rica in the newly created Central American Federation. The adoption of 
September 15
th
 as Independence Day in Costa Rica is an acknowledgment of its 
belonging to a larger nation. Therefore, Costa Rica was not an independent nation 
                                                          
7
 Miller. “The Historiography of Nationalism…,” 201. Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 
1780..., 68. Doyle and Pamplona. Nationalism in the New World…, 6. This means that the process 
of creation of the state was reflected in the creation of a territory that considered all its inhabitants 
as members of the new nation. The process of creation of national identity was therefore a political 
tool directed to standardize the meaning of being a member of the new nation. 
 
8
 Juan Rafael Quesada. Clarín Patriótico: la guerra contra los filibusteros y la nacionalidad 
costarricense. (Alajuela: Museo Histórico Cultural Juan Santamaría, 2006), 64. 
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until 1838, when the federation collapsed, and more specifically, until 1848, when 
the republic was finally declared. Before those dates there was no clear 
consciousness of Costa Rica as a separate nation. It is important to note that 
during the colonial period, Costa Rica, as Spanish America, had a dominant 
Spanish identity.
9
 This identity was not easily erased. Borders and divisions that 
separated each new state in Latin America did take the same shape of the 
provincial divisions of the former Empire. As soon as the state was created, it 
engaged in a process of establishing a unique identity to differentiate the new 
nation from other Latin American nations.
10
 
While it is agreed that states in Latin America preceded national identity, 
perhaps it is better to think of Costa Rican national identity as developing along 
the process of construction of the nation-state. In Oscar Ozlak’s words, “as a state 
comes into existence, a dynamic process of social creation takes place in which 
other social entities and actors come into existence and acquire their own distinct 
character.”11 Modern social values can have ancient roots, but the introduction of 
the state created a new structural framework that redefined social and cultural 
dynamics, preventing the continuation of traditional pre-national social relations. 
                                                          
9
 Kagan, Richard L.  Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern 
Spain.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.  Eastman, Scott.  Preaching Spanish 
Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823.  Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 
2012. 
 
10
 Earle, Rebecca.  The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810-
1930.  Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.  Sommer, Doris.  Foundational Fictions: The 
National Romances of Latin America.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
 
11
 Oscar Ozlak. “The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and 
Methodological Guidelines for Its Study,” in: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 16, No. 2. 
(1981), pp. 3-32. 
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Modernists may argue that national identity is as product of the modernizing 
liberal project of the late nineteenth century, similar to the French modernization 
process of building an officially sanctioned, unifying national identity.
12
 In Costa 
Rica, the development of national identity symbols was a process initiated by the 
creation of the current national flag at the same moment of the foundation of the 
Republic in 1848. The creation of official symbols of nationalism based on the 
Filibuster War started during the war itself, including a decree to build statues 
commemorating the war as early as 1858. The creation of national identity along 
the social, political, and economic changes of the state explain the transformations 
and the changing relevance of the Filibuster War as part of the national narrative 
in moments of national crisis. This dissertation demonstrates that Walker’s 
invasion provoked official and popular unity and a cultural understanding of 
unification that was both positive and assertive. This new stance distinguished 
Costa Rica from other Central American nations in two ways: First, citizens, 
regardless of class or race, viewed themselves as contributors to state and cultural 
formation, and therefore empowered themselves to participate in a democratic 
system. Second, national identity did not include the victim myth about the United 
States being the inevitable and implacable hegemon so prevalent in other parts of 
Latin America. These arguments will be analyzed in chapters 4 to 7. Third, the 
Costa Rican experience amends the Eurocentric model of nation-buiding and 
national identity formation. To understand this point, it is important to explain the 
                                                          
12
 Eugen Weber. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. Venita Datta. Heroes and Legends of Fin-de Siècle 
France. Gender, Politics, and National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
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main historiographical schools of nationalism and how they relate to the subject 
of this dissertation. 
According to Anthony Smith, scholars of nationalism are divided into four 
schools of thought: nationalists, perennialists, modernists, and postmodernists.
13
 
Nationalists and perennialists believe that the nation always existed, and that each 
nation has a clear identity. In the Costa Rican case, some scholars have proposed 
the existence of an intrinsic identity since colonial times that differentiated Costa 
Ricans from the rest of Central America.
14
 The problem with this approach is that 
it applies contemporary notions of identity to the past, forcing false and 
anachronistic equivalents. A clear example of how a commonly accepted 
contemporary feature of national identity can be erroneously described as an 
ancestral national characteristic would be to look to the colonial past to find 
examples to support the argument that Costa Ricans have always been peaceful 
and anti-militaristic. Also, as Gellner notes, we should consider that for a nation 
to exist, it has to fulfill the basic conditions of having a territory and an 
independent government that correlates to it. Under these terms, we cannot talk 
with confidence about the existence of Costa Rican nationalism until 1848, when 
                                                          
13
 Anthony D. Smith. Myths and Memories of the Nation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 180-181. 
 
14
 An example is: José Luis Vega Carballo. Orden y Progreso: La formación del estado nacional 
en Costa Rica. San José: ICAP, 1981. 
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the Republic was finally founded, even if Independence from Spain was acquired 
in 1821.
15
  
 The importance of Costa Rican participation in the Filibuster War (1856–
1857) is that this event finally showed Costa Ricans that their nation was a viable 
project. Sovereignty was successfully defended by a massive mobilization of its 
inhabitants united by a sense of belonging to the same community. While Costa 
Rica declared its independence from Spain in 1821, it did so only to join the 
Mexican Empire of Iturbide. Even if this union was no more than a nominal 
event, the fact that Costa Rica relinquished its independence became clear by 
1823, when it joined the Central American Federation. The dissolution of the 
Federation in 1838 and the final Costa Rican declaration of an independent 
Republic in 1848 were the first serious attempts to create a Costa Rican nation. 
Therefore, the foundation of the republic and the Filibuster War are the moments 
in which Costa Rica finally established a clear national project. Before 1848, 
Costa Rica was unable to define an identity clearly independent and separate from 
Central America, Mexico, or even Colombia, all countries to which Costa Rica 
was annexed or asked to join after Independence.
16
 Also, since a national 
                                                          
15
 “Nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent.” In: Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1. Quoted in: Hobsbawm: Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780, 9. This does not disregard the need to study pre-1848 nationalistic claims. 
During the colonial period, as well as during its belonging to the Central American Federation, 
inhabitants of the province or State called themselves Costa Ricans, showing a distinct identity. 
Also, between 1821 and 1823, Costa Rica ruled itself by its own constitution. While still very 
unstable and immature, the existence of a temporary national framework in those years cannot be 
denied. 
 
16
 David Díaz Arias, “La Invención de las Naciones en Centroamérica, 1821-1950,” Boletín 
AFEHC N°15, published on December 4, 2005. Available at: 
 http://afehc-historia-centroamericana.org/index.php?action=fi_aff&id=367, 22.  
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economy did not start to develop until the expansion of coffee plantations during 
the 1850s, we can say that before 1848 there was no Costa Rican project of a 
nation, because since 1823, energies were directed toward the creation of a 
Central American national identity.
17
 The adoption of September 15
th
 as the 
national holiday that celebrates Independence is a good example of an effort of 
Centralamericanization of Costa Rica. This holiday does not celebrate the 
moment in which Costa Rican achieved its Independence, but the day in which 
the Guatemalan town council declared its separation from Spain. September 15
th
 
was adopted by all members of the Federation as a sign of belonging to the 
Central American nation.  
 The approach used in this dissertation resembles the modernist approach 
that establishes that the nation is a product of the modernization process typical of 
the nineteenth century. Modernization theory establishes that nations are a 
modern phenomenon, and that they are intrinsically connected to the process of 
industrialization, expansion of capitalism, secularism, and, most importantly, the 
consolidation of a bureaucratic state.
18
 In this sense, a modern nation is the 
product of the twin revolutions: the industrial revolution in its economic aspect, 
and the French revolution as its ideological framework. My approach varies 
                                                          
17
 Iván Molina Jiménez. Costa Rica (1800-1850): El legado colonial y la génesis del capitalismo. 
Colección Historia de Costa Rica. San José: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 2002, (295). 
Arturo Taracena Arriola. “Nación y República en Centroamérica (1821-1865).” In: Arturo 
Taracena Arriola and Jean Piel, comps. Identidades nacionales y Estado moderno en 
Centroamérica. San José: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 1995, (52). The hiatus 1821-1823, 
when a glimpse of national spirit can be perceived, will be analyzed on chapter 4. 
 
18
 Umut Ӧzkirrimli. Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010 (second edition), 72.  
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slightly in that I do not define the nation as an exclusively modern phenomenon. 
Instead, I acknowledge that in Latin America, and of course, in Costa Rica, the 
process of nation formation coincides with the modernization process, and 
develops according to the features of modernization. The formation of the modern 
nation-state is a phenomenon occurring in Europe and the Americas mostly 
during the late nineteenth century when positivism and ideas of order and 
progress became the hegemonic ideology. This demonstrates that modernization 
shaped the development of these nations, but not that modernization created them. 
The Costa Rican case shows that the Filibuster War became a national symbol 
before the state had introduced the institutions that modernization theory requires 
for the dissemination of national identity. 
I also contest some of the postmodernist understandings of national 
identity. Postmodernists agree with modernists on the importance of 
modernization as the moment in which the nation was possible. Anthony Smith’s 
definition of the postmodernist school in nationalism studies establishes that a 
nation is a product of modernization, a process in which intellectual elites are 
responsible for selecting, inventing, and mixing past events in order to create an 
image that reflects contemporary ideals.
19
 In Costa Rican historiography, Steven 
Palmer and Díaz Arias follow this argument and assert that Central American 
liberal elites of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the past to 
                                                          
19
 Smith. Myths, 180. 
13 
 
fit their ideological project.
20
 In this dissertation, I study the creation of Costa 
Rican national identity not as something invented, but as something imagined, a 
subtle differentiation between Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s views.21 
Postmodernist theories study national identity as an artificial product defined by 
the governing elites in order to reshape society according to their own goals. I 
contend that it is a stretch of the imagination to believe that presidents, ministers, 
and newspaper owners held closed-door meetings to create a national hero who 
would inspire the population to support a war.
22
 Instead, I propose that the 
Filibuster War derives its status as the main event promoting official nationalism 
from its symbolism as well as from its real value. The Filibuster War was a real 
event that began to shape Costa Rican national identity from the battle, at Santa 
Rosa. Therefore, it was not an artificial event redefined as an ideological tool, it 
was an event that shaped Costa Rican consciousness. Changes to the meaning of 
the Filibuster War were certainly influenced by the state and the economic, 
political, and intellectual elites, but also by popular culture in a more organic 
development. 
I argue here that Costa Rica, as a nation, would simply not exist without 
the defeat of Walker. His invasion of Central America posed the greatest threat to 
                                                          
20
 Díaz Arias. La Invención de las Naciones en Centroamérica, 33. The modernist approach is 
strong among Costa Rican historians, based on Steven Palmer’s pioneer work.  
 
21
 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983. 
 
22
 Steven Palmer. “El Héroe Indicado (o un Estado en Búsqueda de su Nación): Juan Santamaría, 
la Batalla de Rivas y la Simbología Liberal, 1880-1895.” In: Iván Molina Jiménez. Industriosa y 
Sobria: Costa Rica en los Días de la Campaña Nacional (1856-1857). (South Woodstock, VT: 
Plumrock Mesoamerican Studies, 2007), 110-129. The scene is described on page 119. 
14 
 
Costa Rican nationhood and identity before or since 1856. Therefore, it is normal 
to think of the influence and inspiration this historical event has caused on Costa 
Ricans every time they learn about it. It is true that the current image of 
Santamaría, Mora, and the Filibuster War is in general a product initiated by 
intellectuals belonging to El Olimpo, but this only reflects the small access the 
liberal elite provided to the general public to achieve positions from which to 
influence the rest of the country. I argue that the construction of the nation had to 
use the Filibuster War because it was the only event in Costa Rican history that 
was able to coalesce the nation, enforcing a perception of unity. The modernist 
project of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century needed a narrative on 
which to base the image of the nation; it is simply impossible to imagine a Costa 
Rican national identity without the Filibuster War. 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, several events were 
used in Costa Rica to build the image of the nation: Independence, the Filibuster 
War, and the arrival of the Conquistadors are just some of them. Of these, only 
two were successfully implemented: Independence Day and the Filibuster War. 
Independence Day is a problematic holiday in the sense that it was an artificial 
construction, reflecting similar celebrations used on the rest of the 
Americas. While its implementation was successful, Independence Day falls into 
the area of invented traditions. The date it is celebrated, September 15
th
, 1821, 
reflects an event without connection to Costa Rica and without any input or 
involvement of Costa Ricans at all. It commemorates the signing of the 
Guatemalan Independence Act, not Costa Rican Independence. Costa Ricans 
15 
 
signed their Independence Act weeks later, and after doing so, declared December 
1
st
 as the date that commemorated this event. Only after its incorporation into the 
Central American Federation did Costa Rica establish September 15
th
 as its 
Independence Day, following the suggestions of the Federal Congress. Also, by 
1821, Costa Rica did not have a centralized entity that could make a decision for 
the whole province. This lack of a central authority is reflected on the fact that the 
city of Heredia declared its political adhesion to León, Nicaragua, for several 
months after independence was declared. Finally, to declare independence from 
one country (Spain) and in the same document declare annexation to another one 
(Mexico), and later become a minor province of a third country (Central 
American Federation) contradicts any claim of being an independent country 
between 1821 and the final collapse of the Central American Federation years 
later.  
The Filibuster War, on the other hand, was not an invented tradition. 
Instead, it defined the identity of Costa Ricans in such a way that it was 
impossible to live without recognizing its importance. The Filibuster War brought 
together the nation as one body, while at the same time established the idea that 
Costa Rica was a viable project of a nation that could defend itself and therefore 
deserved a place among modern nations. The fact that in 1858 president Mora 
declared May 1
st
 as a national holiday to celebrate the war and ordered the 
construction of a monument remembering it tells us how important this event was 
for Costa Rica. The liberal elites of the late nineteenth century applied another set 
of ideals, that of modernization, to express what they imagined their country 
16 
 
should look like. They did not invent the Filibuster War, they only followed a 
successful narrative that preceded them and built on it.  
The images of the Filibuster War, in summary, should not be considered 
as a liberal elite conspiracy directed to create a fictitious narrative in order to 
justify their rule and their project of a nation. The memory of the Filibuster War 
has developed from different directions, both organic and institutional, as well as 
in the shape of pro-localist and nationalist forms, and it has not been free from 
debate and scandal. More than 150 years later, passing through the crisis of the 
liberal project, reformist governments, civil war, and social democrat and neo-
liberal administrations, the Filibuster War continues to be a source of inspiration 
for Costa Ricans and a proud symbol of their national identity.  
This study adds to Latin American nation-building historiography 
analyzing the consequences of the Walker invasion in Central America and on the 
assertive spirit that grounded Costa Rican national identity after the Filibuster 
War. By doing so, it will demonstrate that both official and popular opinion 
converged to make the victories over Walker a declaration of Central American 
and especially Costa Rican self-determination. The Filibuster War, in 1856, 
became the symbol of the Costa Rican nation-state for two reasons: first, victory 
over the filibusters showed Costa Ricans that their country was a viable project. 
Second, it became associated with the expansion of the nation-state, which 
created the political, social, and economic structure that defined the nation. The 
process of modernization was not one of transforming peasants into Costa Ricans, 
but of establishing institutions that regulated the relations between the elites and 
17 
 
small farmers.
23
 The idea that the Central Valley equated to the national territory 
was challenged by the Filibuster War, which forced the mobilization of twenty 
percent of the population to leave their towns in order to join the national effort 
that took them for the first time to the Pacific coast, the northwestern province of 
Moracia (today Guanacaste), and the San Juan river. This allowed Costa Ricans to 
develop an identity that equated to its official territory, and not only to the cities 
inside the Central Valley.  
Canadian historian Steven Palmer was the first one to present an argument 
connecting the process of modernization in Costa Rica with the development of a 
national identity based on the Filibuster War. In 2007, he argued that Costa Rican 
national identity was spontaneously created in 1885, when the state was mature 
and modern enough to develop, control, and deliver a national narrative based on 
the glories of the Filibuster War that served the purposes of the liberal elite.
24
 This 
dissertation demonstrates, instead, that the Filibuster War, as a staple of Costa 
Rican national identity, has been a constant feature since 1856. As a symbol, it 
has suffered changes due to national and international affairs: at the national level 
it was influenced by inter-elite factional conflict, localism, and civil war, while 
U.S. Imperialism and the spread of socialist ideas are international aspects that 
promoted revisions on the commemoration of the Filibuster War. The fact that the 
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meaning and interpretation of the Filibuster War and its uses has changed can be 
only attributed to the dynamic features of society. Since the Filibuster War was 
not an invented tradition, I disagree with Palmer in his assertion that the memory 
of the war was a late nineteenth century invention. Instead, I argue that the war 
was a traumatic event that defined the generation that lived its consequences. 
Therefore, the Filibuster War was a real event that established a specific image of 
what it meant to be a Costa Rican. The legacy of this imagined identity has, since 
then, been transformed according to social, political, and cultural changes the 
nation has suffered. 
Theory and methodology 
The questions presented above, including those related to the creation of 
national identity and the consolidation of the Costa Rican nation-state can be 
answered by the use of theoretical tools developed on the area of collective 
memory. Concepts like imagined communities, lieux de mémoire or sites of 
memory, invented traditions, cultural imperialism, national identity, and popular 
culture are the main substance of this study. These theories reveal the 
interpretations given to the Filibuster War, and the political uses of the past in 
Costa Rica, and it is no surprise that I rely heavily on these authors and theories. 
A little explanation of their relevance to my work follows. 
The now classic word by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 
supports the theoretical background of this work as well as its methodology.
25
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Anderson’s theory focused on the concept of national identity. Instead of 
classifying what makes a nation and which features are necessary for a nation to 
be called as such, Anderson reversed the attention, directing it to the idea that a 
nation is created when the nation considers its own existence. In order to do so, a 
community has to recognize itself as a cohesive entity, with particular 
characteristics that makes it different from others. By following Anderson’s 
approach to written nationalism we can argue that a nation becomes a reality once 
it appropriates a name for itself. This name is not only a geographical, linguistic, 
or ethnic identifier, it has to be charged with several layers of symbolism and 
interpretation. The name corresponds to a specific, although dynamic, identity. 
This identity is dynamic because societies are in constant flow. An imagined 
community is therefore an artificial and biased interpretation of reality, and as 
such no less real than any other interpretation. National identity, in this manner, is 
supported by a national narrative, and this narrative becomes the basis in which a 
society is structured. By analyzing the transformation of the national narrative 
associated with the Filibuster War we can discover the changes Costa Rican 
society experienced. 
Anderson’s contribution to this dissertation also comes in terms of 
methodology. His work emphasizes the use of written works that spread visions 
of the nation. Newspapers and books, because of their broad and constant appeal, 
are perfect instruments to disseminate values and ideas of the nation. They are 
broad because they can travel and reach different geographical areas with ease. 
They are constant because written words carry with them a sense of fixity, and 
20 
 
therefore of continuity and certainty. This dissertation relies heavily on historical 
works and newspapers as instruments that spread interpretations of the Filibuster 
War, as well as mirrors in which societies see their beliefs reflected and 
confirmed. 
The importance Anderson gave to printed culture in order to support his 
argument explains the influence of the press in developing images and narratives 
of the nation. His view of a Creole nationalism promoted by an imagined 
community of readers of local newspapers certainly applies to the research 
approach used in this dissertation. It is important to note that during the nineteenth 
century, Latin American newspapers (as in Europe and the United States) had a 
limited circulation, and the influence of the press varied also according to each 
country in the region.
26
 For example, while there are arguments that demonstrate 
how the press in Mexico played an important role  in promoting the struggle for 
independence, Rebecca Earle argues that the same cannot be said in the cases of 
Colombia, Chile, or Peru.
27
 On the other hand, according to Carmen McEvoy, the 
pre-independence newspaper Mercurio Peruano, while not necessarily promoting 
independence, asserted a strong republicanism and civic nationalism showing the 
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writers’ understanding of the social influence of the press.28 In fact, newspapers 
served not only a political purpose, but also a didactic one, as Serrano and Jaksic 
show in the case of Chile in the early 1840s, which can be extrapolated to the 
Costa Rican case, where an explosion of newspapers coincided with the 
Education Reform promoted by the state during the 1880s.
29
  
Likewise, Venita Datta bases her study on late nineteenth-century French 
nationalism on the influence of newspapers as cultural shapers, stating that the 
“press had the power to create a public out of disparate individuals who shared a 
common sense of belonging,” contributing to a “homogenization of the public.”30 
In her study, the press played an important role in the construction of a national 
community. This is also present in the Costa Rican case. There is proof that, as 
early as 1834, newspapers were publicly read and discussed during Tertulias or 
salon-like meetings.
31
 This coincides with Maurice Halbwachs’ theory on how 
social frameworks create a sense of communal identity. The discussion of ideas 
inside a social environment establishes specific narratives that consolidate a 
collective memory, the basis for a sense of belonging to an imagined community. 
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Narratives of the nation, therefore, help to develop a national community. 
One of the main goals of the press, especially the one connected to the 
government, was to spread the official discourse, and with it, official nationalism. 
As an instrument of official nationalism, the press has been always extremely 
helpful. In Costa Rica, there was a government monopoly of information through 
La Gaceta and a few other official newspapers during the 1860s and 1870s, which 
helped to consolidate a common national narrative. My use of newspapers is 
based on the idea that they have some educational purposes, especially in relation 
to spreading values of citizenship and social order. Costa Rican journalist Carlos 
Morales argues that La Gaceta of the 1860s and 1870s was so influential that 
when Costa Rican independent journalism developed during and after the 1880s, 
it followed the same framework imposed by the government’s newspaper.32 
During the 1870s and 1880s, official propaganda was also imbued in non-official 
newspapers, as El Costarricense, El Ferrocarril, and El Diario de Costa Rica, all 
of them independent newspapers with strong connections to the state.
33
    
The influence of newspapers grew, of course, with the amount of potential 
readers. After the 1860s, the liberal project promoted levels of literacy never seen 
before. By 1870, the first Normal school was created. The amount of elementary 
schools tripled during President Guardia’s administration, from 80 elementary 
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schools in 1871 to 234 in 1882.
34
 The Education Reform of 1886, under President 
Soto, was responsible for the inauguration of several high schools and the 
expansion of elementary education. The census of 1883 showed a literacy rate of 
26% , which grew to  53% by 1896.
35
 In this manner, Costa Rica achieved the 
highest level of literacy in Latin America, providing also the larger ratio of 
teachers per student in the whole region.
36
 The liberal project used the school 
system to promote specific values to the population. Once students were able to 
read, they had an easier access to all printed material, newspapers being the main 
source. Since most newspapers had a strong connection to the government or to 
the liberal project in general, their reading reinforced the values taught in school, 
including, of course, a specific national narrative and the understanding of basic 
symbols of official national identity. 
This dissertation uses all Costa Rican newspapers available, focusing on 
the most influential ones. Some of the independent newspapers had strong 
connections to the government and were used in order to spread specific values 
and ideas. One of the most influential newspapers was El Diario de Costa Rica, 
which appeared for the first time on January, 1885. Its first publication coincided 
with the consolidation of daily instead of weekly newspapers. This newspaper 
was strongly influenced by the liberal groups in power, and in 1886 it was the 
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main promoter of Soto’s candidacy to president.37 Although it was not an official 
newspaper, its director, Joaquín Bernardo Calvo, had a close relationship with 
Próspero Fernández and Bernardo Soto. Both were elected presidents of Costa 
Rica during the liberal period. Calvo’s father had been a minister during the 
government of Mora, which explains the interest of the newspaper on promoting 
the memory of the Filibuster War. The newspaper disappeared in 1886, leaving 
the stage for other dailies to take over the position of Costa Rica’s most important 
sources of opinion. 
La República was another influential newspaper that also showed strong 
support for the liberal elite. Founded in 1886, this newspaper published the work 
of some of the most important intellectuals of El Olimpo.
38
 Another newspaper, 
La Prensa Libre, was born in 1889 to coalesce the opposition against the ruling 
party, and therefore, those opposing the political preferences supported by La 
República. Together, these newspapers became the most important ones during 
the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. According 
to Morales, this period demonstrates the undeniable power and influence 
newspapers acquired in Costa Rican society.
39
 After the 1914 crisis of the liberal 
state, other newspapers like La Información (1908-1919), La Tribuna (1919-
1948), El Diario de Costa Rica (under new administration, 1919-1965), and La 
Nación (1946-present), succeeded each other as the main daily, always showing 
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strong political preferences. All these newspapers are at the center of this 
dissertation, since the influence of their opinions shaped Costa Rican national 
identity.  
Another aspect of Anderson’s premise, in relation to printed culture, is 
also present in the form of novels. Doris Sommer’s work on nineteenth-century 
Latin American novels argues that these works of fiction created a connection 
between romantic adventures and romantic views of the nation, establishing a 
desire to belong to the national community following the goals of nation-building 
projects.
40
 The Costa Rican case is not different, although national literature did 
develop later than in other parts of Latin America. The first Costa Rican novel, El 
Problema, was not published until 1898. It was soon followed by a series of short 
stories and novels that reflected the interest on establishing a clearly defined 
national identity under the direction of a liberal project of nation-state.  
The intellectual elite behind El Olimpo produced important nationalist 
works as part of a continuous debate about the shape of Costa Rican national 
identity. Carlos Gagini, for example, focused on the anxiety produced by U.S. 
expansionism, and periodically referred to the Filibuster War as an example to 
follow and a reason for national pride. Others, like Ricardo Fernández Guardia, 
Cleto Gonzalez Víquez, and Pío Víquez, combined their interest on fiction writing 
with their profession as historians, politicians, and journalists in order to promote 
the liberal project of nation-building. As in the case of Gagini, the Filibuster War 
                                                          
40
 Doris Sommer. Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991. 
26 
 
was also one of the main topics used by these authors to cement a sense of 
national identity. These authors will also be analyzed as part of the influence of 
printed culture in the creation of Costa Rican national identity and its connection 
to the Filibuster War. 
There are other authors and theories that deserve some attention. The 
concepts of repetition and continuity basic for the formation of a sense of 
continuity with the past, as Eric Hobsbawm stated in Invented Traditions. Once a 
connection to the past is established, traditions are easier to accept, because they 
appeal to the core values of the nation. An important part of these traditions is 
their appeal to a communal sense of belonging, which reinforces identification. 
Narratives and symbols are created to support, interpret, and mark the values and 
ideals that help a nation to conserve the sense of a distinctive identity.
41
 In the 
case of the Filibuster War, I have established already that it is not an invented 
tradition, but instead an imagined framework for the nation. Notwithstanding, this 
process also needs a constant connection with the past, even while it is in constant 
flux. 
The fact that a nation uses symbols to be represented reveals the 
importance of French historian Pierre Nora and his study of lieux de mémoire, or 
sites of memory.
42
 According to Nora, these sites of memory supplant real events 
on which memory is based. Specific events become symbols and representations 
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of the ideals and values that define the nation. In the large collection of essays 
included on Nora’s edited work on lieux de mémoire, several ways of 
representation, or icons, are analyzed. Among them are myths and legends, 
statues, parades, street names, national figures, literature, and commemorations. 
The lieux de mémoire representing the nation are the main source of analysis in 
this dissertation. Their deconstruction serves to explain their importance for the 
definition of a national identity. In doing so, this dissertation will answer the 
following questions: Who thought certain symbols were relevant? When did they 
start to become a part of the national narrative? How long did it take for these 
symbols to be broadly accepted? Were they contested? Were there any other 
possible lieux de mémoire that were unsuccessful, or that existed only 
temporarily? By answering these questions, it is possible to understand how the 
nation has defined itself. Also, we can devise how the memory of the Filibuster 
War helped the nation to adapt to local and international circumstances. Finally, 
we can understand what the nation expects from its citizens, and what citizens 
expect from the state, as well as from themselves as a society. 
Another aspect studied in this dissertation is the concept of official history. 
This idea implies a top-down transmission of national narratives. That is, a 
unidirectional ideological imposition developed by the state and the governing 
elites in order to spread a specific set of values over the society they control. To 
understand how official history is used, it is also extremely relevant to study the 
reaction of the members of society that do not belong to the elite or to the circles 
of the state. Gramsci’s social division in dominant and subordinate groups serve 
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to explain the framework used here. It is important to warn the reader that the use 
of the terms dominant and subordinate are not developed without certain critique, 
the same kind already analyzed by Carlo Ginzburg on The Cheese and the Worms, 
to which Michel De Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life has a lot to add.43  
In his famous work on microhistory, Ginzburg states that sources from the 
medieval period represent the exclusive interpretation of the elites, since only 
those few that could write and read were able to control archives and official 
documentation. Therefore, understanding the ideas of common people is 
complicated by the filter the elites imposed on interpretation. There is one place, 
according to Ginzburg, in which the dominant and subaltern can be found, which 
is recorded in the questionnaires of the Inquisition. This is one of the few 
documents of the medieval period that allows us to take a look at what the 
subordinate thought. Ginzburg’s analysis allows historians to discern a clear 
subordinate ideology with significant contrasts to dominant thought, challenging 
Gramsci’s idea that subaltern ideology was basically a reflection of an imposed 
ideology by the dominant groups. The work of Michel de Certeau gives us a 
modern perspective to this same issue. He argues that there is currently a large 
silent majority that seems to have almost no input on the construction of society, 
leaving in a marginal ideological space. Still, this majority produces culture and 
art in a daily basis through individual actions of everyday life. Buying, cooking, 
walking, reading, or dwelling are forms to shape society and culture derived from 
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popular groups, Gramsci’s subordinate, or rather, Ginzburg’s assertion of an 
independent and creative subordinate.  
I use these concepts to explain the cultural dissonance produced after the 
abolition of the army and the popular relation to a changing national identity 
embracing anti-militarism while being stuck with the memory of a traumatic war 
and a military national hero. Since popular culture is dynamic, as De Certeau 
states, and its production is not always recorded, as Ginzburg asserts, I analyze 
celebrations and commemorations of the Filibuster War as the moment in which 
popular culture takes a preponderant position in the shaping of the meaning of 
national identity. The active participation of subordinate or marginal groups 
during the parades celebrating the Filibuster War provide a vantage point to 
observe how popular culture understands the event, and how close, or not, its 
interpretation is to official discourse. The nation, after all, as a social construct, is 
dynamic and ever-changing. The dynamic nature of society relies precisely in the 
encounter between a dominant and a subordinate narrative, especially in the 
adjustments both groups have to develop to establish a broadly accepted 
understanding of their own society.  
The national narrative developed in Costa Rica has been clearly shaped by 
the Filibuster War. While the national discourse is anti-imperialist, it is different 
from the traditional anti-imperialist discourses of colonized or occupied countries. 
The difference resides in that former colonies develop a discourse of resistance 
that defines the nation in opposition to an empire. Costa Rica, instead, defines 
itself as a modern nation capable to consummate its own project and its own 
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national identity. This capability was demonstrated when sovereignty was 
successfully defended during the Filibuster War. This national narrative is a 
product of what I call Cultural Anti-Imperialism, which opposes or contrasts with 
the theories of Cultural Imperialism presented by Postcolonial Studies.  
Postcolonialism studies present a well-developed theoretical framework to 
explain the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, or actually, 
between the empire and the former colony. The problem is that Costa Rica was 
not colonized or occupied by the United States. In fact, the Costa Rican national 
narrative is not based on a continuous dependency from the empire, but on its 
capability to negotiate a space for the development of a national project despite 
the imperial designs of the United States. The term Cultural Imperialism has been 
coined to describe the influence an empire asserts over formal and informal 
colonies through the consumption of cultural production. It explains the power of 
mass media and marketing, as well as economic intervention used by an empire to 
reshape the identity of its colonies, forcing them to consume and to become 
dependent on what the empire produces. I find a problem with both narratives, 
which lack the insight to explain the Costa Rican case. In this dissertation, I use 
the term Cultural Anti-Imperialism to explain how the Costa Rican national 
narrative based on the Filibuster War allowed for the construction of an active 
discourse for nation-building.  
 Postcolonialism is a concept derived from the vacuum created by the end 
of colonial rule in Africa and Asia. It represents a shift from direct rule by a 
foreign entity to internal colonialism. This process was characterized by the 
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alliance between small local elites and foreign corporations or governments to 
continue the economic exploitation and political domination of the colonial 
period, this time under the framework of an independent nation.
44
 In the Latin 
American case, postcolonial studies become problematic since the process of 
decolonization was not the same as in Asia and Africa. Its methodology needs to 
be redefined for its use on the Latin American context. First, the clear separation 
between the colonizer and the colonized, so obvious in the African and Asian 
case, but not so much in Latin America. In Asia and Africa, the colonizer was the 
elite and the only dominant group. The native was therefore the colonized. This 
circumstance continued even after independence, when foreigners allied with 
local elites to continue their social and economic control. In Latin America, 
instead, the colonizer mixed with the colonized. This mixture varied on each 
country, but always created a real melting pot.
45
 At the cultural level, this created 
an identity problem in which Latin Americans realized their connection to the 
colonized groups, and at the same time, to the colonizer.
46
 The continuous use of 
the term Madre Patria referring to Spain, for example, is a nostalgic remnant used 
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by creole population that easily extended to the mestizos, which also could 
recognize their strong western historical and cultural traditions.
47
  
Second, in Asia and Africa economic dependency is directly linked to the 
former colonizer, while in Latin America neither Spain nor Portugal remained as 
the core, in dependency theory terms, of a Latin American periphery.
48
 Instead, 
they were immediately substituted as economic powers first by the British, and 
later by the United States.
49
 The British Empire created a commercial system for 
Latin America that favored an agricultural exporting model, later complemented 
by the extraction of raw materials. At the same time, it eliminated local industrial 
production, creating a dependency on external industry and technology. Political 
interference at a large scale came later, with the arrival of the United States to the 
scene, produced mostly as a reaction to nationalist demands after the crisis of the 
liberal model in the early twentieth century. This system of economic dependency 
was internally criticized in Latin America after the crisis of 1929, which promoted 
import-substitution policies accompanied by the expansion of internal markets.
50
 
During the twentieth century, U.S. imperialism in Latin America was directed not 
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to the continuation of the colonial system under a national structure as was 
happening in Asia and Africa, but to the destruction of a nascent economic 
nationalism in the region. 
The Costa Rican case, in relation to U.S. expansionism, does not belong to 
postcolonial studies, neither to subaltern studies.
51
  The relationship between 
Costa Rica and the United States implies the regular complexity of international 
relations between economic-military powers and much smaller nations, where the 
smaller nation (Costa Rica in this case) constantly negotiates its position as a 
sovereign modern nation. Kyle Longley’s work on President Figueres points out 
this dynamic, noting how Costa Rica chose a path of non-confrontation with the 
empire, standing up on issues relevant to the Costa Rican social democrat project, 
while openly conceding on issues apparently irrelevant to national sovereignty.
52
 
The terms of this relationship and any possible sense of dependency or 
imperialism, therefore, reliy on the eyes of the beholder, in this case, Costa Rica.  
In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said analyzed the phenomenon of the 
nation as a narrative, and how the “power to narrate, or to block other narratives 
from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism.”53 His 
work analyzed the issue of resistance to imperial advances, but unfortunately Said 
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focused on resistance narratives present on imperial discourse, not on anti-
imperial narratives, basing his examples on the works of Shakespeare, Conrad, 
Dickens, Gide, and Mann. This analysis on Cultural Imperialism is also present in 
Latin America, as is the case of Ariel Dorfman.
54
 This criticism against imperial 
design fits well when it comes to study imperial narratives, but it is not adequate 
for the study of national narratives. According to Said, nationalism is the 
“restoration of community, assertion of identity, emergence of new cultural 
practices.”55 The Costa Rican case presents the opposite, a literature and 
newspapers containing anti-imperial narratives that differ from resistance culture 
in that they create a community instead of restoring it, because they are part of a 
process of nation building that does not define itself in opposition to its former 
colonial power.
56
 
My analysis does not focus on the Filibuster version of the events, neither 
on how narratives in the United States continue to emphasize the role of Walker’s 
mercenaries and allies instead of giving voice to Central American narratives. By 
doing that I would be analyzing the process of cultural imperialism instead of 
studying a national narrative. Following Said’s connection between narratives and 
nations, I argue that to understand the development of Costa Rican national 
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identity it is necessary to focus exclusively on Costa Rican narratives of the war. 
Cultural Anti-Imperialism is presented here as an active and purposeful creation 
of a narrative that promotes the development of national identity and a national 
narrative consistent to values of sovereignty as a natural right, not as a 
concession. Cultural Anti-Imperialism does not respond to discourses or actions 
of cultural domination, but to perceived threats against cultural sovereignty. 
Therefore, it is an organic creation that does not confront but instead disregards 
the imperial narrative. It takes away the imperial power of defining identity, 
making relevant the issues that concern the periphery, not the center. 
The concept of cultural imperialism has been criticized precisely because 
its focus on a supposedly omnipotent influence by the empire over the countries 
that receive its cultural products. Homi Bhabha, for example, argues that the 
influence of imperial cultural produces a hybridity in which both the dominant 
and subordinate cultures are affected by the exchange and adoption of each 
other’s cultural features.57 Similarly, on his study of the influence of U.S. films 
shown during the Cold War in Mexico, Seth Fein denies the influence assigned to 
cultural imperialism “based simply on the aggregate presence of U.S. mass 
media… ignoring national and local factors” of “political and cultural 
reception.”58 The issue of perception is also present in the study of Rockefeller’s 
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health initiatives in Central America.
59
 According to Emily S. Rosenberg, 
acceptance of these initiatives in Costa Rica are related to a lack of suspicion of 
U.S. actions, and that in other countries, like Nicaragua, they would have been 
harder to develop.
60
 While Rosenberg puts emphasis on local perception, it 
continues to assign importance on imperial power, and not on local culture. 
Cultural reasons for acceptance of U.S. influence are not related to a lack of 
suspicion. It would have been too naïve to disregard history and not being 
suspicious of U. S. intentions, especially during the early twentieth century, a 
period of strong U. S. imperial design in Central America. The answer relies on 
the local perception of what could be perceived as an imperial advance and what 
was international collaboration. Once again, Costa Rica, and Latin America in 
general, do not have a natural anti-western suspicion because they consider 
themselves to be part of the western cultural framework. In summary, cultural 
imperialism considers the influence of cultural features produced by a hegemonic 
nation and consumed by a subordinate nation. Cultural anti-imperialism analyzes 
instead the cultural production of a sovereign nation directed to reinforce its 
national identity against a perceived imperialist threat. 
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With these concepts in mind, this dissertation is divided into six chapters. 
While there are plenty of works describing the events of the Filibuster War, they 
tend to be biased, romanticized, and incomplete. Most books published in English 
do not use Central American sources at all, and in general are based, and therefore 
support, the Filibuster’s point of view. Chapter 2 is a summary of the war, 
focusing on those events that later became either a lieux de mémoire or a 
contested ground for collective memory. Chapter 3 presents an extensive analysis 
of the historiography of the Filibuster War. It studies the development of the topic 
published in the United States, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, France, and Germany. The chapter analyzes how the narrative of the 
Filibuster War has been shaped and reshaped according to the specific narratives 
of each nation. It analyzes the political uses of scholarship in the United States, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, and how each work reflects the historical moment in 
which it was written, and how this narrative shaped the understanding of the past 
according to the needs of the present. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the political developments of nineteenth 
century Costa Rica and explains the rise, fall, and resurgence of the memory of 
the Filibuster War. Internal elite disputes, localism, and a struggle for the 
consolidation of the nation-state serve as the context in which the memory of the 
Filibuster War became the main significant for Costa Rican sovereignty. Since 
independence was acquired without armed conflict, the Filibuster War became the 
moment in which the existence of the nation was put to test. After 1856, the war 
became a symbol of Costa Rica’s right to exist as a country that can defend its 
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principles and its place as a free nation. This moment coincides with the first real 
efforts to establish the presence of a strong nation-state and the institutionalization 
of Costa Rica. The first obstacle was localism, a typical Latin American issue 
during the nineteenth century. The political structure, based on liberal ideas 
promoted in the capital, San José, in close alliance with Alajuela, suffered 
constant pressure from the conservative stronghold of Cartago, the old colonial 
capital. This confrontation defined the Costa Rican nineteenth century. The 
consolidation and use of the memory of the Filibuster War as a symbol of the 
nation-state serves as a parameter to measure the success of the struggle to create 
a centralized state and an institutionalized nation. This chapter also includes an 
analysis of the process of nation-state formation in the region, which brings a clue 
of the particularities of Costa Rican nationalism. 
The Filibuster War, as a traumatic event, has haunted Costa Ricans since 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The unexpected appearance of the 
filibusters, the sudden mobilization of the whole country to defend its 
sovereignty, the cholera epidemic that decimated the population, and the brutal 
end to President Mora’s life after the war ended deeply marked Costa Rican 
collective memory. One of the legacies of the war was a constant fear that these 
events might repeat. Any kind of external intervention or threat to sovereignty has 
been immediately answered by a rise of nationalism and calls for mobilization 
against the invader. The phenomenon dates as far back as 1873, when the 
government of Tomás Guardia confronted the possibility of an invasion from 
Nicaragua. This fear created the Myth of the Return of the Filibuster, which 
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continues to be used constantly in Costa Rican politics. Chapter 5 analyzes the 
initial uses of collective fear to filibusterism from the late nineteenth century to 
the middle of the twentieth century. While in most cases this myth has been 
associated with real organized invasions, as in 1873, 1878, 1885, 1921, and 1955, 
it has also served as a warning alert against non-military interventions. The rise of 
U.S. expansionism, for example, was considered a threat to Costa Rican 
sovereignty, and promoted the reaction of unions, newspapers, and student 
organizations against the imposition of cultural imperialism. It is important to 
note that this dissertation analyzes these reactions from the standpoint of cultural 
anti-imperialism, a term used here to describe a response against perceived threats 
to sovereignty. This concept separates itself from cultural imperialism since it 
analyzes real and non-real threats in the same manner. Perception, not reality, is 
what motivates reaction. Therefore, whether certain actions taken by the United 
States or other agents were directed to influence or not Costa Rican politics, 
economy, or culture is irrelevant. What is important is how these actions were 
interpreted. In any case, the Filibuster War was successfully recalled many times 
to awaken awareness of possible perils for the nation. This chapter analyzes 
several of these cases.  
Chapter 6 analyzes the conflict between official history and popular 
culture. Juan Santamaría, the Costa Rican national hero, symbolizes the struggle 
of the common citizen that rises to protect the nation. Because he was not a 
president, or a general, Santamaría is a unique hero in that he does not represent 
the elite or the state, but the effort of the community and the value of the most 
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humble of its members. Therefore, Santamaría is a popular hero par excellence. 
The abolition of the army in Costa Rica, in 1948, created a conflict in the 
symbolism of the Filibuster War. How to celebrate a war in a country without 
army? How to celebrate a military national hero in a country without soldiers? 
While the government continued to appeal to military images during the speeches 
delivered each April 11
th
, changes in the celebration of traditional parades unveil 
the development of a new discourse created by the subordinate groups. To find 
meaning in the commemorations of the Filibuster War outside of its anachronistic 
military symbolism, popular culture imposed its views during the annual parades 
of April 11
th
, one of the few arenas where common citizens can express 
themselves without much government intervention. The result is a transformation 
of the way Santamaría is celebrated. 
The centenary of the Filibuster War was an important event in Costa Rican 
history, solidifying national identity through the narrative of the Filibuster War. 
The civil war of 1948 was the result of a radical polarization of politics during the 
1940s, and it marked the behavior of a whole generation. In 1955, exiled Costa 
Ricans, and members of the opposition, organized an invasion to Costa Rica, 
counting on the support of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. A battle 
around the Santa Rosa hacienda was decisive to defeat the invaders. In 1956, the 
government used the centenary of the Filibuster War to hold the first celebration 
of March 20
th
, the anniversary of the original battle of Santa Rosa in 1856. The 
goal was to establish a connection between the events of 1856 and the invasion of 
1955. Chapter 6 analyzes the attempt by the government to create an invented 
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tradition, and the resistance it confronted from different social actors as 
newspapers, opposition parties, and common citizens. It shows how the 
commemorations were build, as well as the government’s inability on trying to 
impose values on a society heading in a different direction. As Nora, Halbwachs, 
and Hobsbawm asserted, the creation of new traditions is possible especially 
when society faces an identity crisis. When a community has a strong 
understanding of itself it becomes really hard to impose new values and ideals. 
After 1956, Costa Rica experienced a period of stability and growth. The 
Filibuster War was commemorated every year, and new symbols as Francisca 
Carrasco, a female hero, were added to the pantheon of Filibuster War figures. 
Fervor diminished and commemorations became mostly a repetitive 
circumstance. The fact that the army was abolished also stripped the Filibuster 
War of its military importance, leaving a half-empty commemoration. The 1970s, 
a period of strong anti-imperialism in Latin America saw a resurgence of 
nationalism based on the images of the Filibuster War and its struggle against 
U.S. expansionism. This became even more evident during the first decade of the 
twentieth century with the political polarization produced by the signing of 
CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement). The commercial agreement 
between Central America and the United States was considered by large sectors of 
Costa Rican society as a violation of the constitution, a threat to sovereignty, and 
a sell-out of the country’s resources. The first decade of the twentieth century 
witnessed the resurgence of Juan Rafael Mora as hero and leader during the 
Filibuster War, as well as a defender of Costa Rican national sovereignty. Recent 
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conflicts with Nicaragua related to border disputes have also helped to revive the 
myth of the Return of the Filibuster.  
The political use of the past and the enforcement of official nationalism 
have a long story.
61
  They show that national identity is the product of state 
officers developing narratives that favor the head of the state or the state itself. 
The goal is to create official narratives to spread specific values or ideas in order 
to define and redefine a society’s understanding of itself. As Maurice Halbwachs 
demonstrates, collective memory is a dynamic process that constantly forms and 
reforms meanings for the individuals that are members of a society. The 
advantage of official history is that it can permeate more than one of the 
communities in which an individual participates, and therefore influences 
individuals by using multiple sources. What is lost on the analysis of official 
history is that the individual is influenced by all and each of the communities that 
s/he belongs to. If only one of these communities does not share the official 
narrative we have to recognize that alternative versions can spread from the 
bottom up, and that small non-official communities also have a say on how 
history is interpreted. Chapters 2 and 5 analyze examples of moments in which 
official history had to concede that other groups were also able to transform and 
define the interpretations of history. 
The memory of the Filibuster War in Costa Rica shows exceptional 
features that deserve further analysis. It is the only case in the Americas in which 
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Independence Day is not the most important holiday of the nation. It is also the 
only case in which the birth of the nation is not derived exclusively from its 
founding moment. The case of Santamaría as national hero also contrasts with 
most national heroes in the West, which are always representatives of the elites, 
either political or military leaders (Washington, Bolívar, San Martín). Finally, the 
fact that Costa Rica won the Filibuster War shows an exceptional case in which a 
small country was able to defeat imperial advances. The Costa Rican state had 
always tried to ingratiate itself with the countries considered powers, especially 
with the United States. Still, the war is not forgotten, and it definitively shapes 
Costa Rica’s view of itself. The victory over Walker did not only establish the 
right of Costa Rica to exist as a nation, it also gave the country sufficient 
confidence to demand world recognition. This process translates also to 
international politics and to the attitude of Costa Ricans toward foreigners. While 
seeking to avoid conflict, Costa Rica has always established its own position and 
sense of place, asking (and receiving) equal treatment in the international arena.
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Chapter 2 
 
SCHOLARS, MYTH, AND INTERPRETATION 
The events of the Filibuster War have awakened the interest of scholars 
and writers from all around the world in the last hundred and fifty years.  
Publications on the topic come mostly from the United States, Nicaragua, and 
Costa Rica, and on a much smaller scale also from Mexico, Argentina, France, 
and Germany. Most accounts show a bias and a need for interpreting the 
Filibuster War according to local or national discourses. During the nineteenth 
century, for example, most books about the Filibuster War were published in the 
United States. These publications were a product of the connection between the 
Filibuster War and a romanticized revival of Manifest Destiny, U.S. 
expansionism, and a nostalgic approach to antebellum society. Walker’s failure 
also served as a mirror to look into the growing myth of the Lost Cause. After the 
year 2000, instead, most publications came from Central American sources, 
which coincided with the commemorations of the 150th anniversary of the 
Filibuster War, as well as the development in the late twentieth century of 
museums and other institutions that support research on the topic. This chapter 
analyzes the most important works on the Filibuster War, unveiling trends or 
specific ideological agendas. It also explains the changing or biased 
interpretations of the war developed since 1856. The analysis of each work and 
each author help to establish a clear periodization of the tendencies in the 
literature of the Filibuster War. 
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Filibuster War Period (1855-1860) 
This first period is characterized by publications coming exclusively from 
the United States. Their emphasis is on presenting Walker as a visionary part of a 
civilizing mission, following the then fashionable ideology of Manifest Destiny. 
The first work written about the Filibuster War was published in 1856, while the 
war was still in progress.
63
 Walker’s Expedition to Nicaragua was written by a 
witness and actor of the Filibuster War, William Vincent Wells. Both Walker and 
Wells worked together as journalists at the Alta California newspaper of San 
Francisco. Later, Walker became the editor of that paper. The Alta California did 
in fact finance the publication of Wells’ book. In 1854, Vincent Wells visited 
Honduras to acquire rights for gold exploitation.
64
 His adventures and the 
establishment of business connections in Honduras gained him the support of the 
U. S. government, which granted him the position of Consul-General in 
Honduras.
65
 This appointment did not deter Wells from taking sides during the 
Filibuster War. He openly supported Walker’s endeavors. Wells also had a close 
friendship with Byron Cole, another friend of Walker, who convinced Castellón, 
leader of the Liberal party of Nicaragua, to sign the contract that brought Walker 
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to Nicaragua.
66
 Wells’ book starts by describing Walker’s early life, including his 
failed filibustering attempt in Sonora and Baja California in 1853. Further 
chapters expand on the figure of Walker, describing Walker’s arrival to Nicaragua 
and his transformation into the “Liberator of Central America.”67 The book ends 
abruptly, just after the second battle of Rivas, on April 11
th
, 1856, due in part to 
the fact that Wells wrote the book in less than two weeks, finishing it in June 
1856.
68
  
The book is mostly a propagandistic pamphlet. In it, Wells admits that 
most of the material was provided by Walker himself. The goal was to gain 
support for Walker’s cause, using racist ideas connected to Manifest Destiny and 
an Anglo-Saxon sense of superiority. This is reflected in several passages, in 
which he explains that “the decadent descendants of the early Spanish colonists 
must succumb and give place to the superior activity and intelligence of the 
Anglo-Saxon.”69 For him, the term Manifest Destiny was not just a myth; it was 
an honorable objective he hoped would become a reality, especially in Mexico 
and Central America, following the examples of Florida (1812), Texas (1836), 
and California (1848).
70
 Wells makes clear that Walker was inspired by Narciso 
Lopez’s failed expedition to Cuba and the slaveocratic elite of the southern United 
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States. With their support, Walker wanted to transform Central America into a 
slave state; annexing it to the United States, and with that, gaining the upper hand 
for the anti-abolitionists.
71
  
Wells’ book represents the archetypical Filibuster War period account: 
romantic, pro-Manifest Destiny, adventurous, and presenting clearly biased 
sources for its propaganda. Wells’ battle accounts are in general a little sketchy. 
In the case of the first battle of Rivas, Wells mentions the burning of a house by 
the Legitimists, which corresponds to Emanuel Mongalo’s feat, but most of the 
information given is not based on facts and, instead, takes the rather romanticized 
style of a novelistic account. The battle of Granada, for example, in which Walker 
was able to capture the Legitimist capital, is described as the “Sebastopol of 
Nicaragua,” comparing it to recent events during the Crimean War.72 About the 
connection between the filibusters and the United States, Wells describes the help 
given by the CAT (Compañía Accesoria del Tránsito, or Transit Accessory 
Company) to Walker to reinforce and arm the mercenaries. According to Wells, 
the CAT offered its steamers to Walker to transport new recruits from the United 
States to Nicaragua, and, at least in one case, allowing for the shipment of large 
quantities of weapons and ammunitions.
73
 Wells also assures that no attempts 
were known “to have been made on the part of the United States Government to  
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search the steamers,” showing the support given by the government for the 
Manifest Destiny mission in Central America.
74
 
After a couple of chapters focusing on the implementation of Walker’s 
policies, Wells moves to an outcry against the British government, accusing it of 
wanting to intervene against the design of Manifest Destiny, much in the same 
way U.S. newspapers were representing Central American affairs during the years 
before and after the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Also in connection to the British, Wells 
mentioned the exchange of letters between Lord Clarendon and the Costa Rican 
government, especially in relation to any possible British support for Costa Rica, 
as well as an inquiry into the acquisition of weapons by Mora’s government in 
1854. The narrative then jumps to the Costa Rican declaration of war and the first 
confrontations between Costa Ricans and filibusters. 
The account of the battle of Santa Rosa is very picturesque. Instead of 
starting with the analysis of military movements or with possible consequences of 
the battle, Wells begins by chastising Colonel Schlessinger, the commander of the 
filibusters, predisposing the reader to blame him for the defeat. Schlessinger’s 
appointment as commander in charge of the invasion of Costa Rica is described as 
“a most unfortunate one.” The reason given for the defeat at Santa Rosa was that 
Schlessinger was not part of the Anglo-Saxon race destined to triumph. “In the 
first place,” says Wells trying to explain the defeat he is about to narrate, “he was 
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a German… in the next, a Jew.”75 Wells’ romanticized version of the battle of 
Santa Rosa described all attempts made by the filibusters as noble and valiant. 
When it comes to the result of the confrontation, Wells does not hide his 
impression that the battle of Santa Rosa was “the most disgraceful contest 
connected with the American name, or known in the history of arms in this 
continent.”76  
The romantic approach reflecting the viewpoint of the filibusters was 
commonplace in the book. When describing the second battle of Rivas, Wells 
defined the filibusters as having “some of the noblest spirits, in the exhibition at 
this point of fearless and undaunted courage, (who) fell martyrs in the cause of 
Democracy.”77 As in his account of other battles, Wells personalizes the heroism 
of the filibusters using their names to commemorate their courage, while the 
enemy is always displayed as an indistinguishable mass. This style allows Wells 
to dehumanize the Central Americans. Also, whenever Central Americans were 
able to execute a successful movement, or to hold the filibusters, it was because 
they “were evidently Englishmen and Germans,” unable to recognize any positive 
feature of the locals. Strangely enough, the second battle of Rivas was described 
by Wells as a filibuster victory, announcing that April 11
th
, 1856 would always 
live in the mind of Costa Ricans. The date has been remembered, only not in the 
way Wells predicted.  
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An interesting detail in the account is Wells’ admission of having carried 
letters of introduction to Castellón, which demonstrates the disregard he had for 
his position as representative of the U.S. government, a supposedly neutral actor 
during the Nicaraguan civil war. The support for the filibusters by known 
politicians as Pierre Soulé, Lewis Cass, Courtland Cushing, and John B. Weller, 
Wells argues, justified Walker’s actions.78 Wells lauded Walker as the Liberator 
of Central America, a grey-eyed man destined to bring progress and democracy to 
the region. In his book, Wells hoped that Anglo-Saxon Manifest Destiny would 
enlighten and regenerate the people of Central America, and called for new 
recruits for the Filibuster War. A few years later, Wells retracted, stating that his 
support for Walker was a mistake, and that he wished he could burn all the copies 
of his book in existence.
79
 
Support for Walker was not lacking in the United States during the 
Filibuster War. Newspapers such as the New York Daily Times (which changed its 
name to New York Times in 1857), Frank Leslie’s Weekly, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, and the San Francisco Herald, as well as several independent authors, 
wrote propaganda pieces based on racial and religious diatribes in favor of the 
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filibustering adventure, definitely imbued by Manifest Destiny’s ideology. Wells’ 
work was just the first of many bombastic proclamations in favor of filibustering. 
One example is Anna Ella Carroll’s book The Star of the West, published also in 
1856. Her book compiles a series of essays against the Catholic Church, and in 
support of Protestant ideals.
80
 Touting the glory of Protestantism, Carroll was not 
shy about the goals she saw fit for her countrymen, stating that “we, then, my 
countrymen, have a mission to perform, out of our country; we have to throw our 
weight…over the countries of the world, and to guard with a vigilant eye the 
principles of Protestantism and Americanism, that our own strength shall increase, 
our own resources expand…”81 According to Carroll, Protestantism had an agent, 
a savior, “a light from heaven has now guided a son of our American republic…to 
deliver that misguided people.” No other than “General William Walker…has 
commenced…to renovate that land.”82 Carroll’s account of Walker’s upbringing 
is extremely romantic, describing him as a precocious fighter for freedom and 
religion. As part of the idea of Manifest Destiny, the author believed that 
individual adventures were a representation of real freedom, and that the 
government of the United States could not be trusted, since its goal was to cut the 
aspirations of regular people, which contravened Providence’s designs of mission  
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and destiny. The interference of the government, according to the author, was the 
only thing responsible for Walker’s failure in Mexico in 1853.83 
What Walker found in Central America was chaos, according to Carroll. 
She described the internal wars in Central America as proof of their inability to 
self-govern, which represented the perfect excuse for intervention. Also, she 
misrepresented the situation as a war between Spaniards or whites against a Black 
and Indian enemy. Typical of her anti-Catholic discourse, she claimed that the 
Church sided with anti-democratic forces in Nicaragua. The first battle of Rivas is 
depicted as an unfair battle, where the ability of the filibusters was just too much 
for their enemy. The account describes Rivas as an absolute victory for Walker, 
contradicting all other historical accounts.  
It is clear that Carroll was following Wells’ account, while adding her own 
style to the interpretation of the events. She mentioned the existence of a gold 
exploring company that served as a liaison between Walker and the Nicaraguan 
government, which could only be taken from Wells’ account. Also, Carroll’s 
naming of the battle of Granada the “Sebastopol of Nicaragua” is not a mere 
coincidence.
84
 Her description of the battle of Santa Rosa also plagiarizes excerpts 
of Wells’ account. In the second battle of Rivas, she also follows Wells’ account, 
including the fictional existence of German and French forces on the Costa Rican 
side. Her approach is even more ideological than Wells’. About the supposed 
French siding with Costa Rica, she stated that “it was by those foreign Jacobins, 
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who had joined the despot’s army in Central America to put down liberty and 
trample upon human rights, that most of our American citizens were killed.”85 To 
be fair, the Costa Rican government did in fact receive support from the German 
community residing in Costa Rica, mostly in economic terms, but also with the 
presence of a physician and an engineer among the troops. Only a few German-
Costa Ricans participated actively during the war, most of them of civilian 
background.
86
 Carroll’s work is representative of several similar accounts during 
the period of the Filibuster War.
87
 These books are valuable as sources of myths 
in the United States about the justification and attitudes toward the war.  
The figure that inspired the former two books, William Walker himself, 
did not publish an account of the war until 1860, just months before his fatal 
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adventure in Honduras.
88
 For any researcher interested in the Filibuster War, 
Walker’s book is one of the most important sources, not only because it presents a 
firsthand account of the events, but also because the filibuster ideology is 
reflected in his work. It is so far, the most republished book related to the 
Filibuster War. After being published for the first time in 1860, Walker’s book 
was reprinted in the United States in 1971, and again in 1985.
89
 The book was 
translated into Spanish as early as 1883, by Fabio Carnevalini, and was published 
in the Nicaraguan newspaper El Porvenir. His translation is more of a summary of 
Walker’s book than a real translation. Carnevalini, an Italian immigrant living in 
Nicaragua since 1856, admitted in the preface that he lacked enough knowledge 
of both English and Spanish to present a coherent rendition of the work, which 
did not stop him in his effort to bring the book to Spanish readers.
90
 Years later, in 
1924, Costa Rican historian Ricardo Fernández Guardia, considering that 
Carnevalini’s work was not sufficient for a serious study of the Filibuster War, 
published a complete translation of Walker’s book.  Since then, both works have 
been reprinted several times.
91
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With some imprecision and biases, The War in Nicaragua is an account of 
the Filibuster War that serves as propaganda for Walker’s cause. Walker’s clear 
writing chronicles the period of the war from his arrival in Nicaragua in June 
1855 up to his surrender on May 1
st
, 1857. Walker uses a strange third person or 
omniscient approach to his writing, revealing a psychological detachment with the 
events of the war, and even with himself, preferring to talk about Walker as if he 
were a recent acquaintance. This psychological dissociation has been mentioned 
by several authors, although Alejandro Bolaños Geyer has been the only one to 
present a study of his personality.
92
  
Walker gives the impression of being fair on his account, especially when 
accepting his defeats, both during the first battle of Rivas as well as during the 
battle of Santa Rosa, although he is fast to balme others as cowards. In both cases, 
he justifies the result of the battles on the desertion of an important commander. 
According to Walker, filibusters native from the United States were always the 
only ones to stand the attack and behave gallantly and bravely during the 
confrontations, while Nicaraguan allies and French and German filibusters are 
responsible for most failures. At the same time, when Central Americans were 
successful against the filibusters, he described Germans and Frenchmen recruited 
by his enemy as the only ones able to defeat him. The reasoning behind some of 
his most important decisions, such as the executions of Mayorga and Corral, 
showed an impulsive behavior and lack of preparation, although they were 
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disguised as needed in order to show military and leadership skills in front of his 
subordinates.  
The most important chapter, and the one that deviates a little from other 
accounts, is the one related to his administration as President of Nicaragua. 
Chapter eight describes Walker’s main goal as the introduction and consolidation 
of an Anglo elite in Central America.
93
 For that purpose, Walker decreed the use 
of both English and Spanish in his official newspaper. The decree “tended to 
make the ownership of the lands of the State fall into the hands of those speaking 
English,” Walker states.94 The new laws established under Walker gave a clear 
advantage to those used by the legal system in the United States, especially when 
it came to registration of property. Walker’s purpose was to reorganize labor and 
society. Therefore, on September 22
nd
, 1856, Walker issued a decree making 
slavery legal in Nicaragua. This confirmed the Central American belief of 
Walker’s intentions. For Walker, the main purpose of the decree was to bring to 
the attention of the slaveocracy of the southern United States the hope of a new 
slave state. He wanted the South’s support for his cause. His argument was that 
“for the re-establishment of African slavery there depended the permanent 
presence of the white race in the region.”95 As a justification, Walker presented 
the Cuban case, which, according to him, owed all its prosperity to the institution 
of slavery. In a clash between two worlds, Walker explained that the order and 
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progress of a civilization was based on the control it had over a subjugated group. 
In his defense of capitalism, Walker presented slavery as the main institution to 
foment the creation of elites who would support the clear organization of a 
society. For him, freedom and democracy were pure so long as they were relative. 
In Walker’s mind, “it is difficult to conceive how capital can be secured from the 
attacks of the majority in a pure democracy unless with the aid of a force which 
gets its strength from slave labor.”96 For Walker, as for many members of the 
Southern slaveocrat elite, a democracy that allowed for universal suffrage and 
civil rights was flawed. 
So, if African slavery was to provide the labor force needed for white 
capitalism, the majority of the Latin American population, people of mixed race, 
was irrelevant. The only solution for Walker was to eliminate the mestizos from 
the region. The indigenous people were, according to Walker, similar in many 
ways to the Africans and would be easily forced into slavery.
97
 Walker was aware 
of the conflict between free labor supporters and slaveholders that had existed for 
some decades in the United States. A moment of crisis was approaching as each 
new state of the Union had to confront the problem of selecting which kind of 
economic (and human) system it would endorse. Nicaragua and Central America 
represented the opportunity for Southern expansion before the beginning of the 
inevitable civil war in the United States. Walker understood that the South needed 
additional slave states to gain the upper-hand over non-slave representation in 
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congress. Failing to achieve this, the plantation states in the South would either 
have to emancipate the slaves or go to war with the North. The decree of 
September 22
nd
, 1856, only confirmed the worst fears of the Central American 
states. After all, imposed slavery violated an important principle upon which their 
national independence and identity rested. 
 After Walker’s execution in September, 1860, publications about the 
Filibuster War ceased.
98
 The filibusters’ defeat was one reason for the lack of 
interest in the United States for topic, although there were still some small efforts 
to revive the Nicaraguan adventure.
99
 A more important reason was the Civil War, 
promoted precisely by the lack of success of the southern states to incorporate 
new slave states into the Union. The failure to incorporate Nicaragua or any 
Central American nations led to the South’s decision to sever ties with the North 
to protect slavery as an institution. Walker’s defeat was a very important factor 
that influenced the beginning of the Civil War in the United States.  
First Central American accounts (1865–1889) 
In Central America, meanwhile, political factors influenced the decision to 
bury the memory of the Filibuster War. In Costa Rica, President Mora established 
a holiday and promoted the building of a monument to celebrate the victory over 
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the filibusters. He was overthrown in 1860,which interrupted these projects. His 
political enemies decided to erase all traces of Mora’s greatness by silencing all 
references to him and the Filibuster War. In Nicaragua, the opposite reason, 
national unity, made silence necessary. On September 12
th
, 1856, Conservatives 
and Liberals signed a treaty that put aside their differences to unite against the 
filibusters. After the war, and in order to keep internal peace based on national 
unity, references to the war were considered unpatriotic, since it kept the memory 
fresh of the initial Liberal responsibility for bringing Walker and his filibusters to 
Nicaragua. To keep unity and peace, the Filibuster War had to be overlooked. 
After the war, Nicaragua created a provisional consensus government, 
with a co-joined presidency, formed by Máximo Jeréz representing the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and Tomás Martínez for the Conservative Legitimist Party. 
After approving a new constitution in 1858, Martínez was elected president, and 
he was reelected in 1862 for a second term.
100
 In 1865, Jerónimo Pérez published 
his Memorias para la Revolución de 1854, the first Central American history of 
the Filibuster War.
101
 Pérez, a journalist and writer, placed the Filibuster War 
within the context of the Nicaraguan Civil War. For that reason, the title of his 
book refers to the beginning of the conflict between Conservatives and Liberals, 
                                                          
100
 Xiomara Avendaño Rojas. Elecciones Indirectas y Disputa de Poder en Nicaragua: el lento 
camino hacia la modernidad. (Managua: Lea Grupo Editorial, 2007), 83, 102–104. Arturo Cruz 
Sequeira. La República Conservadora de Nicaragua, 1858–1893. ( Managua: Fundación Vida, 
2003), 73–80. 
 
101
 Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Zelaya, ed. Obras Históricas del Licenciado Jerónimo Pérez. 
(Managua: Banco de América, 1975), vii. The book was published in 1865 as Memorias para la 
historia de la Revolución de Nicaragua y la Guerra Nacional contra los filibusteros: 1854 a 1857. 
Managua: Imprenta del Gobierno., and 1871 (Managua: Imprenta del Orden), and then, under the 
supervision of Chamorro, reprinted in 1928 and 1975. 
60 
 
which led later to the Filibuster War. His work is divided in two sections, the first 
from the beginning of the Civil War to Walker’s consolidation of power, and the 
second from the Central American intervention to Walker’s defeat in May 1857. 
Perez’s work is not commonly used as a reference for scholars interested in the 
Filibuster War. Pedro Chamorro, who edited Perez’s work in the twentieth 
century, attributed this to the fact that the book presented personal and biased 
views of the events.
102
 The critique is unfair, though. Pérez used several primary 
documents for his work, including publications for the Costa Rican Boletín 
Oficial, as well as letters and other documents he collected while being part of the 
Septentrion Army under General Martínez during the Filibuster War. His position 
as editor of the Conservative newspaper El Telégrafo Setentrional, and his 
appointment as President Martínez’s personal Secretary and War auditor during 
the Filibuster War gave him access to sensitive documents.
103
 His work is reliable, 
and there is little trace of an expected Conservative bias in his book. His 
accusations against Liberals focus mostly on the figure of Máximo Jeréz, blaming 
him for the fall of Nicaragua at the hands of the filibusters. The critique is 
certainly justified, although a little risky because of the strong sense of national 
unity developed at the time of the publication of his Memorias. His attacks against 
Jeréz were certainly also related to the Liberal leader’s  
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conspiracies against his former co-president, General Martínez, including a failed 
armed insurrection in 1865.
104
 
After Pérez, the next effort to remember the Filibuster War was made by 
an Italian immigrant to Nicaragua, Fabio Carnevalini, who in 1883 translated 
Walker’s War in Nicaragua into Spanish.105 This makes Carnevalini’s work the 
first translation to Spanish of any work related to the Filibuster War originally 
published in English. Also, it is the first time that an original pro-filibuster book 
published in the United States was available to the Central American public. 
Interestingly enough, no translation to English of any of the Central American 
versions of the war have ever been published in the United States or translated 
into English. This forms part of the traditional self-centered approach of most U. 
S. scholars when it comes to analyzing topics that involve research in other 
languages or the study of versions provided by sources outside of the United 
States. Carnevalini recognizes the limitations of his work, mainly due to his lack 
of complete fluency in English. Still, he was able to understand most of Walker’s 
account, and with that, produced a book that summarized the main parts of the 
War in Nicaragua in general terms. Carnevalini’s book provoked a reaction 
among Central American scholars that led to increased analysis of the war and 
greater attention to the regional defeat of the interloper. 
In Costa Rica, the oligarchic elite that overthrew Mora in 1860 held power 
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for ten years, until General Tomás Guardia, a former hero of the Filibuster War 
(see chapter 2) and a morista (follower of Mora) took control of the government 
after a military coup on April 27
th
, 1870. Guardia stayed in power until 1882, and 
his ascension marked the arrival of a liberal elite that governed for the next 
seventy years. Guardia was the first veteran of the Filibuster War to become 
president of Costa Rica, but not the only one. Próspero Fernández, president from 
1882 to 1885 and Guardia’s successor, was also a veteran of the war, and a 
military man. After his death, Bernardo Soto became the next president. Soto was 
not a veteran, being too young to have participated in the war, but he was a 
military man, and part of a younger generation of the Guardia-Fernández clique. 
Soto was the son-in-law of Próspero Fernández, and the widow of Fernández was 
the younger sister of Tomás Guardia. The three leaders insisted on rescuing the 
memory of the Filibuster War and of President Mora, a memory they sometimes 
used for their own benefit. 
The Costa Rican government received Carnevalini’s publication of 
Walker’s book in 1884 as an affront.106 On April 9th, 1886, and as part of the 
official efforts to consolidate the memory of the Filibuster War, President Soto 
signed a decree charging historian Lorenzo Montúfar with writing a Costa Rican 
version of the war.
107
 Soto’s interest in promoting a Costa Rican interpretation of 
events is obvious in the decree: 
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“the national wars from the years 1856 and 1857 against the filibusters 
constitute one of the most notable periods in the political life of Costa 
Rica, and one of the periods in which the patriotism of its sons reached 
great recognition. For this reason, the State is interested in conserving its 
memory free of errors and distortions. Taking into account, moreover, the 
urgent necessity to write the historia patria in order to save it from 
oblivion, the recent translation and publication of The War in Nicaragua 
by William Walker, being a product of biased criteria unfavorable to our 
cause, containing errors and opinions prejudicial to the memory of those 
campaigns, show the need to immediately start the writing of its 
history.”108 
 
Montúfar based his work mostly on Pérez’s Memorias and Carnevalini’s 
translation of Walker’s book, as well as a broad use of archival documents 
provided by the Costa Rican government: letters, proclamations, treaties, military 
reports, decrees, etc. This is the first book to use sources from both U.S. and 
Central American accounts, although it is important to note, once more, that 
Carnevalini’s translation did not reflect all the details of Walker’s account. 
Montúfar’s book differs from Pérez also in that it is mostly concerned with the 
incidents related to the Filibuster War, and not the Nicaraguan Civil War. From a 
total of fifty-three chapters, only nine are dedicated to the situation in Central 
America before the arrival of Walker. 
Montúfar was a Guatemalan Liberal. For that reason he went into exile in 
Costa Rica several times during his life, whenever political turmoil affected his 
native country. In his book, titled Walker en Centro América, the author shows his 
preference for a united Central America, a traditional dream of liberal Federalists 
opposed to conservative Localists. In fact, Montúfar identified Nicaragua’s 
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separation from the Union in 1838 as the cause for all the internal problems that 
country suffered.
109
 With regard to the Nicaraguan Civil War, he blamed the 
Legitimists for several irregularities and for trying to perpetuate themselves in 
power, a position opposite to Pérez’s version. 
Concerning the main events of the Filibuster War, Montúfar does not 
deviate significantly from the account given by Pérez and Walker. He makes no 
mention of Mongalo, the Nicaraguan hero during the first battle of Rivas, and his 
description of the Santa Rosa battle confirms previous depictions of a cowardly 
and undisciplined Schlessinger and a fast and decisive Costa Rican victory. In the 
case of the second battle of Rivas, Montúfar is the first historian to express doubt 
about Juan Santamaría’s feat, a controversy that continues to be present in Costa 
Rican historiography.
110
 The lack of battle reports mentioning Santamaría by 
name made the author take a conservative approach about elevating the Alajuelan 
soldier to the level of hero. The rejection of Santamaría by Montúfar was 
responsible for most of the Costa Rican work on the Filibuster War during the end 
of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, raising an 
interest in that country to clarify the history of the war. The publication of Walker 
en Centro América also matches an important moment in which the Costa Rican 
government, as part of their projects of consolidation as a nation-state, 
emphasized the cult of heroes. In 1885, Juan Santamaría became the key figure of 
the Filibuster War in Costa Rica. After that year, statues and new holidays 
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inspired by the Filibuster War made his heroism the most important event for the 
Costa Rican national narrative. 
 In the meantime, in Nicaragua Conservatives were still in power, as 
mentioned above. This was not an obstacle for the publication of a liberal version 
of the history of the Filibuster War. In 1889, José Dolores Gámez published his 
History of Nicaragua, which included a large volume on the Filibuster War.
111
 
His approach is very similar to Montúfar’s account. An important fact is that 
Gámez takes a new and more nationalistic point of view. According to Aldo Díaz 
Lacayo, editor of the 2006 version of Gámez’s work, the traditional Nicaraguan 
term applied to the war against Walker, La Guerra Nacional, used to describe the 
Central American alliance against Walker, the region becoming a mythical single 
nation to symbolize a total rejection of Walker’s invasion. National divisions were 
suspended as Central Americans confronted the immoral assault of a pro-slavery 
mercenary. In his book, Gámez alters this symbolic understanding and centers 
exclusively on the dismemberment of Nicaragua.  For Gámez, Guerra Nacional 
referred only to his nation, Nicaragua, reflecting its struggle for national unity and 
survival.
112
 
 As in the case of Montúfar, Gámez’s book also responded to the 
intervention of the state as promoter of the writing of historia patria. As part of 
the process of building a Nicaraguan nation-state, in 1888 President Carazo called 
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for a contest to promote the creation of a book on the history of Nicaragua, which 
Gámez won. His main sources are letters, Central American, U.S., and other 
international newspapers, and archival documents he was able to collect, some of 
them never having been published before. In his account, the actions at Santa 
Rosa and Rivas are barely mentioned, focusing instead on the events that 
portrayed Nicaraguan actors. While these works about the Filibuster War were 
important, they did not constitute a body of work that could compete with the 
twentieth-century Central American historiography of the Filibuster War. 
Rescuing Walker: The Romantic Filibuster and U.S. renewed expansionism 
(1886–1919) 
 While Central American governments were involved in the process of 
nation-state consolidation, the United States was in a decades-long process of 
recovery from the Civil War. The 1860s and 1870s were mostly silent about the 
Filibuster War, but the 1880s and 1890s was a period in which expansion was 
seen again with favorable eyes in the United States. This trend was confirmed 
during the period that includes the war between the United States and Spain in 
1898 to the occupation of the Panama Canal in 1903. The tendency of publishing 
romantic stories of bravery and gallantry in the name of democracy and freedom 
under Anglo-Saxon dominion became popular once again.  
In 1886, C. W. Doubleday published his memoirs of the Filibuster War, 
being the first of a long list of publications on this topic to emerge during the late 
67 
 
nineteenth century.
113
 In his Reminiscences of the Filibuster War, Doubleday 
presented himself in idealistic terms, defining his filibustering adventure as a 
“Quixotic espousal of the people’s cause.” His enthusiasm to see the people freed 
from the tyranny of a dominant ecclesiasticism is described much in the same way 
Carroll did thirty years before.
114
 A review of Doubleday’s book published in 
1886 by the weekly literary supplement The Nation, described it as 
“fascinating…full of the spirit of adventure and recklessness of danger of a born 
fighter…”115 Indeed, behind the classic diatribe of Manifest Destiny, Doubleday 
made clear his support for U.S. involvement in Latin America, especially for the 
construction of an interoceanic canal for the exclusive benefit of U.S. commerce 
“combined with the implied though unwritten code of American sentiment 
commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine.” To accomplish this, a United States 
protectorate should be created in the land where the canal should be built, 
meaning an exclusive control of the canal by the U.S. military and for commercial 
expansion.
116
 The message of the book was clearly a part of a larger narrative the 
press, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, tried to promote, as it is shown by the fact that the last 
pages of the book were dedicated to advertisement for other books of the same  
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series, The Naval War of 1812, and Hunting Trips of a Ranchman, both by 
Theodore Roosevelt.
117
 
 About the Filibuster War itself, Doubleday gives us an interesting account 
of Walker’s imperialist plans, which are absent in all other works. Doubleday 
remembers taking a walk on a Nicaraguan beach with Walker during the days 
before his takeover of Granada. In a long conversation, Walker told Doubleday 
that his goal was first to convince the Nicaraguan oligarchy of the need for 
Walker’s presence. Then, once in control of the country, create an alliance with 
the Church in order to gain the support of the common people. His next step was 
to conquer the rest of Central America, and once this was achieved, move on 
toward Mexico. The Central American Empire, created by Walker, would then 
ask for support from the Southern states in the U.S. to impose the Monroe 
Doctrine to avoid any European intervention against Walker’s empire. The 
imposition of slavery and a strong connection with the Church were Walker’s 
main economic and political objectives.
118
 It is not clear if this account is fictional 
or based on a real conversation, but in any case, Doubleday’s account presented 
Walker’s real goals. 
 The 1890s were a prolific period for this kind of account, and other works 
soon followed Doubleday’s publication. In 1891, for example, James Jeffrey 
Roche published The Story of the Filibusters, a book that also included an account 
of the life of David Crockett, which exemplifies, once again, the production of 
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myths by pro-filibuster writers.
119
 Roche’s book was not exceptional, except in its 
popularity, and his account was based mostly on Walker’s and Wells’ accounts, 
and followed their style and opinions.  
In 1896, Virginian judge Daniel Bedinger Lucas published a book titled 
Nicaragua, the War of the Filibusters.
120
 His account is, again, mostly based on 
Walker’s War in Nicaragua. In his book, Lucas shows some sympathy for 
Walker, although there is also some criticism against the filibuster. The judge 
acknowledges that Walker was originally a hero of Manifest Destiny and U.S. 
expansionism, but states that after his takeover of Granada, he decided to forgo 
any idea of annexation, betraying in this way his original goals. Lucas also asserts 
that while Walker professed democratic republican ideals, his final goal in 
Nicaragua and Central America was to impose a military republic. Finally, Lucas 
argues that Walker’s justification of slavery fell into legal problems, since on one 
hand he supported the Nicaraguan constitution of 1838 because it granted him and 
his filibusters automatic Nicaraguan citizenship, but at the same time the 
document prohibited slavery, which presented a contradiction in the adoption of 
that constitution.  
 A renewed interest in expeditions against Cuba during the late nineteenth 
century was responsible for the return of a romanticized version of the filibusters’ 
story. The new spirit of imperialist expansionism in the United States started just 
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before the Spanish-American war in Cuba (1898). It then continued until the 
creation of Panama as an independent republic, the construction of an interoceanic 
canal there, and the imposition of a U.S. protectorate status over the Canal Zone. 
The publication of fiction books romanticizing the image of the filibusters was 
common during his period.
121
 Even greater was the amount of memoirs written, 
both fake and real.
122
 
 The most interesting case is the story of the filibuster Clinton Rollins, 
whose adventures were published by the San Francisco Chronicle each Sunday 
between October 31st, 1909 and February 6th, 1910. Rollins’s story, pubished in 
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fifteen articles, describes his participation on William Walker’s filibuster army in 
Nicaragua, and is one of the very few personal accounts by a filibuster published 
in both Spanish and English.
123
 In the newspaper series, Rollins described in 
detail his arrival with Walker to Nicaragua, his fighting in the battles of Rivas and 
Granada, and even the end of Walker’s adventures. The only problem with 
Clinton Rollins is that he never existed. The articles were written by Henry Clint 
Parkhurst, who was never a filibuster, and was only a child living in Iowa when 
Walker’s expedition invaded Nicaragua. The detailed research by Alejandro 
Bolaños Geyer proves that although several scholars considered Rollins’ story as 
a reliable source, the account itself is mostly plagiarized from Walker’s own 
book, as well as from Doubleday’s and Roche’s versions.124 
U.S. academic works (1905–2002) 
 While both fictional works and eyewitness accounts continued to be 
published, an academic tradition emerged in the United States in the early 
twentieth century. This tradition is characterized by a serious attempt at exploring 
the reasons that promoted the development of filibuster adventures, how Walker 
was able to become a serious threat to Central American and Latin American 
sovereignty, his connections in the United States, and the consequences of his 
intervention. 
 In 1905, during the euphoria in the United States over Spain’s defeat in the 
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Spanish-American War and the 1903 takeover of Panama’s canal zone, William 
O. Scroggs published his first article describing Walker’s connections to 
steamship capitalists in New York and San Francisco. Scroggs, a sociology and 
economics professor at Louisiana State University, recognized the romantic view 
of Walker’s adventure prevalent in the United States and decided to analyze the 
topic. According to Scroggs, Walker’s ideals were influenced by “the Anglo-
American’s love of excitement and adventure, (the) belief that it is the manifest 
destiny of his race to control the whole American continent, and the desire of the 
slave states for a southward expansion of American territory.”125 But Scroggs’ 
main argument and the basis of his research was that Walker’s campaign would 
have been impossible without an army, and that his army would not have existed 
without the support of an economic group that could transport soldiers, weapons, 
and goods to Nicaragua.
126
 Scroggs revealed that Charles Garrison, manager of 
the Transit Accessory Company (CAT) in San Francisco, granted free passage 
and loans to the filibusters. He also found that Garrison’s agent, C. J. McDonald, 
was authorized to give Walker a loan of $20,000, a deal approved by Charles 
Morgan, manager of the company in New York. Cornelius Vanderbilt, another 
colluder and member of the company’s board, approved an open recruiting of 
soldiers for the service of Walker. Also, he approved a lower-than-normal price 
for steamer tickets –sometimes free-, that went to filibusters destined to join 
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Walker. Scroggs downplays Vanderbilt’s involvement, justifying his actions on 
his ignorance of Walker’s real goals. But Vanderbilt did not oppose the filibusters 
until Walker, Garrison, and Morgan worked against Vanderbilt’s economic 
interests. Vanderbilt only reacted when these three men joined to destroy the 
CAT, takeover its grants, and create a new company of steamers in Nicaragua 
with them as owners, which tells us that his interest was focused exclusively on 
financial, and not moral, concerns. One of the main consequences of Scroggs’s 
article was the creation of a myth that still prevails among some scholars in which 
Vanderbilt is considered directly responsible for the fall of Walker.
127
  
Scroggs’ academic interest in Walker continued with the publication in 
1909 of an article titled “William Walker’s Design on Cuba,” in which he 
analyzed what Walker’s ultimate goal would have been had he successfully 
conquered Central America. According to Scroggs, this was the annexation of 
Cuba to his Anglo-Saxon dominated slave republic.
128
 In 1916, Scroggs published 
a book, titled Filibusters and Financiers, an account of Walker’s filibuster 
adventures.
129
 Scroggs cited the works of Pérez and Montúfar, the most important 
Central American sources at the time, but he did not use any Central American 
newspapers or archival sources. While Scroggs’ work hads an academic ring to 
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itl, he failed to exscind himself from some of the Manifest Destiny’s ideas of 
Anglo-Saxon superiority expressed in the romantic books he criticized in his first 
article. The reason given by Scroggs for supporting the filibusters is that with 
Walker’s death, Central America lost its chance of becoming an Anglo-Saxon 
dominated republic, since its “heterogeneous population had demonstrated its 
inability to govern itself or prevent its own political dissolution, (it) certainly 
needed the introduction of a new element to set things in order.”130 
 It took several years for another serious study of the Filibuster War to be 
published in English. In 1937, journalist and writer Laurence Greene published 
his book The Filibuster, a biography of Walker that did not offer much new to the 
literature.
131
 His heavy reliance on Walker and Scroggs, and his use of Wells, 
Doubleday, and other filibuster accounts contrasts with an absolute absence of 
Central American sources, and a clear bias against Central American characters in 
his version of the story. His account repeats some of the concepts presented by 
Scroggs, including Vanderbilt’s intervention as the main force able to defeat 
Walker, and an open antipathy against the British and French governments for 
their diplomatic support for Costa Rica. 
 Some decades later, Albert Z. Carr wrote one of the most relevant books 
on Walker. In 1963, he published The World and William Walker, a book that 
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analyzes Walker in his context as well as his mindset.
132
 The first half of the book 
focuses on Walker’s life before his arrival to Nicaragua, as well as some of the 
personal issues that influenced his thought. The second part focuses on the events 
of the Filibuster War. Carr’s research is detailed, acknowledging Walker and 
Scroggs as his main sources, but including various Central American sources as 
Montúfar and Pérez, but also some more recent ones, as Obregón Loría, 
Rodríguez Beteta, and Alemán Bolaños.
133
 Still, his narration of the events of the 
war follows closely the erroneous political understanding of the region expressed 
by Walker and Wells. An example is the use of terms like serviles to describe the 
conservative forces in Central America, a term related to the Independence 
period, not to the 1850s. Another mistake was to consider the Salvadorian and 
Costa Rican governments as conservatives, or as mere tools of the British Empire, 
when in fact they were the only two liberal governments during the war. Carr also 
follows Scroggs’ lead on giving too much weight to Vanderbilt’s actions in the 
result of the Filibuster War. While Walker and Scroggs are important sources that 
inform scholars in the United States, some of them are unable to transcend their 
concepts. Although he employs Central American sources, Carr delivers just 
another account of William Walker’s adventures, instead of writing a history of  
 
the Filibuster War itself. His work, though, provides some important explanations 
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of the political, cultural, and diplomatic context of the war.
134
 
 Finally, the work of Robert E. May shifted the focus, in U.S. scholarship, 
from Walker as an adventurer to an analysis of the context that made him partially 
successful. In 1973, May published The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 
and in 2002, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld.135 May was able, in The Southern 
Dream, to expand on Scroggs’ work, analyzing Walker’s financial connections in 
the United States, while also presenting an examination of the political and 
cultural context of the southern United States before the Civil War. For May, this 
period is important to understand how Walker’s adventures were seen as the hope 
for a possible expansion of slave societies. Also, the filibustering invasion 
promoted the idea of the creation of a slave Confederation that would include the 
Caribbean and Central America in case of Southern secession. In Manifest 
Destiny’s Underworld, May expands on this topic and delivers an outstanding 
work, locating the filibuster phenomenon in its own cultural, political, and 
economic context, as well as establishing its connections with the war between 
the United States and Mexico, and the U.S. Civil War. His work explores the  
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general filibuster problem, not only in Central America, but also in Cuba and 
Mexico. 
Central America, commemoration and national identity (1895–1958) 
 Central American scholarship of the Filibuster War is strongly attached to 
commemorations. A large majority of the Central American publications related 
to the war have been released in direct connection to the celebrations of the first 
centenary of the war, in 1956, and the commemoration of the 150th anniversary in 
2006. Relevant are the constant translations to Spanish from U.S. sources, 
showing a greater interest to explore foreign perspectives of the war than the one 
demonstrated by most scholars in the United States.
136
 As in the United States, 
though, most works are romanticized versions, not of Walker and the filibusters, 
but of the Central American effort to defeat the invaders, with a clear intention to 
reinforce a sense of national identity.  
 Serious scholarship about the Filibuster War started much earlier than in 
the United States, as we saw in the cases of Jerónimo Pérez and Lorenzo 
Montúfar. Both historians used archival sources, documents, and newspapers, 
memoirs of Central American soldiers, and even, in the case of Montúfar, a 
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translation of Spanish of Walker’s version to support their accounts.137 It is 
noticeable that Pérez’s book has a strong bias in favor of the Conservative Party 
of Nicaragua, which was the governing entity during most of the second half of 
the nineteenth century in that country. Montúfar’s, instead, has a strong liberal 
bias, due to his own ideological preferences, but also because this was the 
dominant current in Central America, with the exception of Nicaragua, at the time 
publication. Even so, the main reason behind Montúfar’s work on the Filibuster 
War was the reaction of the Costa Rican government against the publication of 
Walker’s account in Spanish by Carnevalini. Taken as an affront, Costa Rica 
commissioned the work to Montúfar as part of an effort to counter the filibuster’s 
version of the war. 
 In 1895, as part of the ceremonies related to the unveiling of a statue 
commemorating the Central American victory over William Walker and his 
filibusters in San José, Costa Rica, the first purely Costa Rican accounts of the 
war were published.
138
 First, Francisco Rodríguez Camacho published a short 
book that presented three vignettes focusing on the battle of Santa Rosa, the battle 
of Rivas, and the Transit Route campaign.
139
 This book was followed by a 
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memoir of the celebrations, which included documents related to the war, as well 
as a small account of the war written by Joaquín Bernardo Calvo, then Costa 
Rican Ambassador in the United States.
140
 Calvo’s work was republished in 1909, 
this time in a book format.
141
 In it, the author wrote a short summary of the main 
events concerning Costa Rica during the war, as Walker’s takeover of Nicaragua, 
the Costa Rican declaration of war, the battle of Santa Rosa, the battle of Rivas on 
April 11
th
, 1856, the cholera epidemic, the campaign of the Transit Route, and the 
final siege of Rivas and surrender of Walker. Calvo’s work concludes as it starts, 
with a call for Central American and Latin American union. His sources include 
the classics, such as Montúfar, Gámez, and Pérez, as well as Carnevalini’s 
translation of Walker’s book, and James J. Roche’s Soldiers of Fortune. Calvo 
also provides information extracted from the diary of two Costa Rican soldiers. 
One of them was José María Bonilla, whose account was published in the local 
newspaper El Comercio as a series of articles between April and May of 1887. 
The other diary belonged to Major Máximo Blanco, not yet published at the 
time.
142
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 An early Central American interest in U.S. sources of the war produced a 
series of translations to Spanish of these works, starting with Carnevalini’s work 
on Walker’s War in Nicaragua. In Costa Rica, this had to wait until 1908, when a 
translation to Spanish of James Jeffrey Roche’s Story of the Filibusters, translated 
by Manuel Carazo Peralta, was published.
143
 The introduction, written by 
historian Ricardo Fernández Guardia, reflects the Costa Rican concerns at the 
time in relation to the myth of Vanderbilt’s supposed decisive action against 
Walker created by Scroggs and reproduced by others. Also, Fernández Guardia 
shows the controversy ensuing in Costa Rica at the time in relation to the real 
existence of Juan Santamaría. In 1924, Fernández Guardia published another 
important translation to Spanish from a filibuster account, the War in Nicaragua. 
The Costa Rican historian decided that it was necessary to have a real translation 
of Walker’s book, since Carnevalini’s had always been sketchy and incomplete.144 
 Other works during the first half of the twentieth century include two short 
accounts about Walker in Nicaragua, and another one about the priest Augusto 
Vijil, a controversial figure because of his support for Walker’s government. It is 
important to note that during this period Costa Rica was constantly involved in 
commemorations related to the Filibuster War, which promoted most of the 
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publications related to that topic in the first decades of the twentieth century.
145
 
The year 1914 celebrated the centenary of the birth of President Juan Rafael 
Mora. In 1915, April 11
th
 was designated as an official holiday to celebrate the 
battle of Rivas in 1856, and the figure of Juan Santamaría. In 1929, the statue of 
Juan Rafael Mora was unveiled. In 1931, Costa Rica celebrated the 100th 
anniversary of Juan Santamaría’s birth. Finally, in 1941, a book commemorated 
the 50
th
 anniversary of the unveiling of Juan Santamaría’s statue. At the same 
time, this period also marked a strong controversy related to the existence of Juan 
Santamaría, whom some have accused of being a mere legend without archival 
evidence. Of special significance is Teodoro Picado Michalski’s book, the first 
one to approach the conflict from the point of view of diplomatic efforts, as well 
as Manuel de Jesús Jiménez and Faustino Víquez’s compilation of primary 
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documents, which made accessible to the general public a series of important 
letters, official documents, newspaper cuts, and other archival documents related 
to the war. During this period the first book related to the Filibuster War 
published outside the United States and Central America appeared. Published in 
Argentina, it was also clearly inspired by the commemorations of 1931.
146
 
 Faithful to its commemorative approach, the proximity of the year 1956, 
centenary of the war against the filibusters, promoted a vast and important series 
of publications related to the topic of the Filibuster War across Central America. 
As a prelude to the commemorations of the centenary of the war in Nicaragua, a 
controversy about the figure of Máximo Jeréz drew a lot of attention.
147
 Jeréz was 
a liberal who originally supported the arrival of the filibusters in 1855, but he was 
also one of the first members of the Democratic Party to denounce Walker and 
sign the patriotic treaty of September 12
th
, 1856, uniting liberals and 
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conservatives against the filibuster threat.
148
 
Back in Costa Rica, in 1952, President Otilio Utae ordered the creation of 
the Comisión de Investigación Histórica de la Campaña Nacional de 1856–1857 
in order to publish archival documents and recent research related to the Filibuster 
War. Starting in 1954, the Comisión published a series of booklets that described 
the most important military events of the war in Costa Rica. The first volume of 
the series was a reprint of Joaquín Bernardo Calvo’s work published originally in 
1897, La Campaña Nacional.
149
 The second was dedicated to Juan Santamaría, 
including documents already known and extracted from Dobles Segreda’s El 
Libro del Héroe, published originally in 1926.
150
 The third booklet is arguably the 
most important, since it is a collection of archival documents about the war, most 
of them, though, already published elsewhere. The next three booklets follow the 
same format, basically putting together documents already published, one for the 
battle of Santa Rosa, another one for the battle of Rivas, and finally one for the 
campaign of the Transit Route of 1856 and 1857.
151
 The Comisión was also 
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responsible for two compilations of documents titled Crónicas y Comentarios, 
and Proclamas y Mensajes, as well as a reprint of two more books presenting 
documents and comments related to the Filibuster War, and, finally, a book 
dedicated to exploring the figure of President Juan Rafael Mora.
152
 
 Beside the Comisión’s efforts, independent scholars published other books 
related to the war.
153
 From this period, two works are important to note. Armando 
Rodríguez Porras published in 1955 a book on President Juan Rafael Mora, 
focusing on the president as a historical figure, instead of serving as an elegy like 
most works before.
154
 At the same time, Rafael Obregón Loría published an 
account of the Transit Route campaign, much more extensive than the one 
published by the Comisión. These two works show the development of a maturing 
scholarship on the Filibuster War in Costa Rica. 
 The centenary commemorations promoted a renewed interest, in 
Nicaragua, to publish on the topic of the Filibuster War. This started with the two 
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books studying the life of Máximo Jeréz.
155
 They were followed by a large work 
by Ildefonso Palma Martínez titled La Guerra Nacional, the first extensive 
Nicaraguan work to focus exclusively on the Filibuster War. Although it often 
reveals the aficionado spirit of its author, it is an important effort, especially 
because it uses both pro-liberal and pro-conservative sources.
156
 Palma Martínez 
is also author of the Oda a San Jacinto, an epic poem to the battle of September 
14
th
, 1856.
157
 This poem fits into the common approach of many works during 
this period, being heavily influenced by historia patria and written to present a 
political opinion or an elegy celebrating a hero.
158
 
The centenary also promoted publications in other Central American 
countries that had traditionally not shown much interest in commemorating the 
Filibuster War. In Guatemala, Marco Soto Valenzuela won second place in a 
national contest promoting the history of the Filibuster War, resulting in the 
publication of his book.
159
 Also coinciding with the centenary, Gustavo Alemán 
Bolaños and Virgilio Rodríguez Beteta published each a book on the allied armies 
of Central America during the Filibuster War, work sponsored by the Guatemalan 
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army in a conscious effort to congratulate itself on an environment of Central 
American unity.
160
 In El Salvador, Angelita García Peña published an important 
series of documents that complemented those already in circulation.
161
 Also a 
Salvadorian contribution, and also coinciding with the centenary, Dueñas Van 
Severen authored a book on the filibusters in Nicaragua.
162
 Honduras, showing an 
even smaller interest than the rest of the Central American republics, also joined 
the centenary commemorations with a short account of the war emphasizing the 
contributions of Honduran General Florencio Xatruch.
163
 Out of Central America, 
the centenary promoted a work on the battle of San Jacinto, published in 
México.
164
 Finally, the centenary also promoted the translation of filibusters’ 
accounts into Spanish.
165
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Institutional efforts in Nicaragua and Costa Rica: Research and publications 
(1965–present) 
After the celebration of the centenary, the production of works related to 
the Filibuster War continued, but at a much slower rate, showing how 
commemorations provided an incentive for research and publication on the topic. 
In Nicaragua, the support of the Banco de América, and the interest on the topic 
developed by Alejandro Bolaños Geyer, were the most important promoters of 
research in Nicaragua after 1956. In Costa Rica, it was the creation of the Museo 
Juan Santamaría that established the institutional framework needed for the 
continuous support to research and publication.
166
  
The Banco de América, under a series titled Colección Cultural, sponsored 
the publication of a large series of books about Nicaragua, especially in the 
historical field. The serie histórica starts with the translation to Spanish of 
William O. Scroggs Filibusters and Financiers. The series also includes the 
Historia de Nicaragua, by José Dolores Gámez, the complete works of Jerónimo 
Pérez, Carnevalini’s old translation of Walker’s account, and La Ruta de 
Nicaragua by David Folkman, a book that analyzes the importance of the Transit 
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Route in the history of that country.
167
 Another series important for our study is 
the serie fuentes históricas, a publication dedicated to primary sources. Some of 
the titles include the first translation into Spanish of the diary of John H. Wheeler, 
U.S. ambassador in Nicaragua during the 1850s and an open supporter of Walker. 
It also includes the diplomatic documents of José de Marcoleta, Nicaraguan 
ambassador in Washington during the Filibuster War. Finally, the Banco de 
América reproduced a bilingual facsimile edition of entries for Nicaragua and the 
Filibuster War originally appeared in the Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 
and the Harper’s Weekly Journal of Civilization for the years 1856 and 1857.168 
The effort of the Banco de América was one of the most ambitious in the area of 
Nicaraguan history, and the documents and books it published are of vital 
importance to the study of the phenomenon of the Filibuster War. 
 As director of the Colección Cultural of the Banco de América, Alejandro 
Bolaños Geyer was able to accumulate a large quantity of archival documentation 
from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the United States. Although a physician by 
profession, and therefore without the academic background of a historian, 
Bolaños Geyer produced the most important individual research in the field so far. 
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His work is reflected in the Banco de América collection, but also in other 
personal publications. Among them is a five volume work on William Walker, a 
translation of James Jamison’s With Walker in Nicaragua, and a study that 
unmasked the account of the fictional filibuster Clinton Rollins. He also edited a 
bilingual facsimile version of William Walker’s newspaper, El Nicaraguense, 
published originally in Granada between 1855 and 1856.
169
 
 A similar effort has been developed in Costa Rica since 1980, when the 
Museo Histórico Cultural Juan Santamaría, located in the city of Alajuela, Costa 
Rica, opened its doors in its new location. Since then, it has become the single 
most important institution focused exclusively on the preservation of the 
collective memory of the Filibuster War. The institution was originally created 
after the commemoration of Juan Santamaría’s 100th birthday, in 1931, and 
survived for a few years in a small classroom ceded by the Instituto de Alajuela, 
the main high school in the city. It was not until 1974 that the institution was 
formally created with the support of the national government. Currently, it 
occupies a large building that once served as a fort when Costa Rica still had an 
army. Since its formal creation, a budget has been assigned for the purpose of 
divulgation and research. The museum includes an extensive library, the best one 
when it comes to the Filibuster War. It has also promoted the publication of 
several books on  
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the topic, including a reediting of the classic works by Montúfar, Obregón Loría, 
and Carlos Meléndez, as well as more recent works by Alejandro Bolaños Geyer, 
Iván Molina, and Patricia Fumero.
170
  
Among new publications from the Museo, Elite, negocios y política en 
Costa Rica, by Carmen Fallas Santana is one of the most important.
171
 This book 
is representative of the best Costa Rican scholarship in connection to the 
Filibuster War. In it, Fallas Santana analyzes the figure of Juan Rafael Mora from 
an economic and political standpoint, leaving the military aspects aside. Fallas 
studies the formation of the nation-state in Costa Rica during the times of 
President Juan Rafael Mora, between 1849 and 1859. Costa Rica was then 
governed by an elite group associated with an agro-exporting liberal economy, 
dedicated mostly from coffee production. Mora, in his attempt to consolidate a 
central government, established a state monopoly of liquor production and 
distribution and promoted the creation of a central bank. As part of this process, 
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Mora modernized and expanded the army, which became handy once the danger 
Walker and his filibusters represented became obvious. Due to the expenses of the 
war, and the sacrifice imposed on the elite, some of its members created political 
instability for Mora’s government, which ended with his overthrow. After trying 
to recover power, Mora was executed, an abnormal and traumatic event in Costa 
Rican history.
172
 Carmen Fallas Santana’s book is somewhat controversial, 
especially among admirers of Mora and those who prefer the immaculate image 
of the hero over the complexities of real life. In her book, Fallas Santana exposes 
a problematic political elite more interested in power and money than in the 
fatherland, but also a Mora who could be selfish, a little authoritarian, and 
possibly even corrupt.  
 A recent book that expands on the analysis of the Filibuster War is 
Filibusterismo y Destino Manifiesto en las Américas, edited by Víctor Acuña 
Ortega.
173
 The book, published in 2010, compiles articles by some of the most 
important current authors on the topic of the Filibuster War, including Frances 
Kinloch, Carmen Fallas Santana, Víctor Acuña Ortega, Antonio de la Cova, 
Michel Gobat, Amy Greenberg, and Justin Wolfe. The articles, a result of a 
symposium celebrated in 2007, present a variety of topics. Carlos Granados 
promotes the idea of the Filibuster War as having three layers: the global context, 
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the U.S. context, and the Central American context, and that it is necessary to 
understand all three in order to explain what the Filibuster War really represented. 
Granados makes the same assumption as Raúl Piedra, thinking that U.S. 
historiography is less local than the one created in Central America. As it will be 
demonstrated later, U.S. sources show no interest at all in Central American 
sources, nor do they understand the consequences of Walker’s invasion in Central 
America in the global context. Antonio de la Cova, on the other hand, analyzes 
the figure of Coronel Henry Titus, and his adventures as filibuster and pro-slavery 
fighter in Cuba, Kansas, and Nicaragua. Other aspects of the war are also included 
in the book, such as common daily life in Nicaragua during Walker’s occupation, 
public health during the war, and Walker’s reception in New Orleans after his 
defeat in 1857.  
More commemorations (2005–2007) 
 The Banco de América and the Museo Juan Santamaría have provided the 
institutional support needed for the development of a history that deviates from 
historia patria. But commemorations feed the Historia Patria and vice versa. For 
the 150th anniversary of the Fillibuster War in 2006, a large number of works 
were published. Some of them returned to the romantic and patriotic style of 
historia patria, while others continued the new path of academic discipline and 
research that became the norm a few decades before. 
 Reprints were one of the main results of the commemorations, in both 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The University of Costa Rica Press released a large 
collection of books between 2005 and 2007 directed to commemorate the 
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Filibuster War. Some of the most important works reprinted include Dobles 
Segreda’s book on Juan Santamaría (originally published in 1926), Calvo’s work 
on the filibuster war (1909), including the first translation to Spanish of Roche’s 
Story of the Filibusters (1891, 1909), as well as Carlos Jinesta’s Epinicio (1931). 
The UCR Press also published the campaign diary of Faustino Montes de Oca, an 
officer during the Filibuster War.
174
 The Universidad Estatal a Distancia 
sponsored a collection titled Biblioteca del 56. The books published were all new 
additions to the historiography of the war. From this collection it is important to 
acknowledge the work of Rafael Angel Méndez’s Imágenes del Poder, an 
analysis of the image of Juan Santamaría and the controversy about his 
existence.
175
 In it, Méndez traces the story of how Santamaría became the main 
symbol of the war, the controversy about his existence, and the validity of his 
legend. Méndez concludes that there were several Juan Santamarías from Alajuela 
in the Costa Rican army, a common name at the time, which sparked confusion 
since there was no archival information about any of them dying during the battle 
of Rivas. His most important contribution is the finding of new evidence that 
demonstrates the existence of more records that mention a Juan Santamaría who 
died during the battle.  
Another important book of the collection is Raúl Arias Sánchez’s study of 
                                                          
174
 Clotilde Obregón Quesada, ed. Diarios de Faustino Montes de Oca Gamero. San José: 
Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 2007. 
 
175
 Rafael Angel Méndez. Imágenes del Poder: Juan Santamaría y el ascenso de la nación en 
Costa Rica, 1860–1915. San José: EUNED, 2007. 
94 
 
the Costa Rican soldiers.
176
 He presents data that helps to understand the structure 
and dynamics of the Costa Rican army, its size, weaponry, and the composition of 
the army. The Editorial Costa Rica also joined the commemorations with the 
reprinting of Proclamas y Mensajes and Crónicas y Comentarios, two volumes of 
archival documents originally published for the centenary commemorations. The 
same press also published a new compilation of accounts of the war and campaign 
diaries by Elías Zeledón Cartín. All these documents had been published before in 
newspapers, journals, and magazines, but it is of great value for researchers and 
the general public to have them reprinted and compiled in a single volume.
177
 The 
150
th
 anniversary also allowed for independent publications, including a 
controversial book on Juan Rafael Mora, and a study about Karl Hoffmann, 
general surgeon of the army, and the support for the war received by the 
government from the German-Costa Rican community.
178
 
 In Nicaragua, the 150
th
 anniversary marked the return to an exclusively 
commemorative kind of publication, with the reprinting of some classic works, as 
those by Palma Martínez and Gámez. Gámez’s book is in fact an excerpt of his 
History of Nicaragua, from which the editor, Aldo Díaz Lacayo, published only 
the chapters related to the Filibuster War. Lacayo also reprinted some of Sofonías 
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Salvatierra’s works, and a booklet about Walker’s surrender.179 In 2006, 
Francisco Bautista Lara published a book celebrating the 150
th
 anniversary of the 
battle of San Jacinto.
180
 This publication includes a series of articles analyzing the 
war from various aspects, including some fictionalized accounts. The 
commemorative productions include a narration of the war in CD format.
181
 
Finally, the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica, an institution 
under the auspice of the Universidad Centroamericana, in Managua, published a 
special edition of the Revista de Historia commemorating the 150
th
 
anniversary.
182
 Most of the articles by Robert E. May, Víctor Acuña Ortega, 
Frances Kinloch, and Justin Wolfe were early versions of those published in 2010 
in Filibusterismo y destino manifiesto en las Américas. 
New historical approaches (1972–present) 
 The study of the Filibuster War has experienced a shift connected with 
changes in the field of history. Starting in the 1970s, there was a shift toward 
interest in historical aspects outside the realm of the military, as well as an 
abandonment, although not absolute, of both the romantic views of Walker’s 
adventures and the nationalistic uses of figures like Santamaría, Mora, Dolores 
Estrada, and Andrés Castro. These contributions continue to define the field of 
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study of the Filibuster War. In 1972, Hebe Clementi, an Argentine historian, 
published an analysis on the formation of Latin American national identity. She 
found three moments in which the sovereignty of Latin American nations was put 
to test, provoking a reaction to external attack that resulted in the creation of a 
sense of national identity. Her argument is clearly based on the idea that identity 
exists when we are able to create the image of the other. Clementi presented the 
war against Walker and Manifest Destiny as the first of those three moments, 
signaling the war as a moment of Latin American unity.
183
 
 In the United States, the work of Robert E. May on southern expansion 
and its goal of creating a slaveocratic empire opened the doors for a study on 
filibustering beyond the mere retelling of the story.
184
 May’s work envisioned 
new approaches that could explain the importance of Walker’s adventure in the 
destiny of both Central America and the United States. Recently, other works, 
centered on aspects of cultural history, have taken new and different directions to 
understand Walker and the filibusters. Using the approach of gender studies, Amy 
Greenberg presented in 2005 a study of the U.S. nineteenth-century macho ideals, 
and the use of discourses of masculinity to promote ambition and recklessness in 
the adventurers.
185
 Another optic of the cultural influence that promoted 
filibustering is provided by Brady Harrison, who in 2004 published an analysis of 
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U.S. literature and the influence of the pro-Manifest Destiny writings of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, and others on the filibusters.
186
  
 In the Central American case, Clotilde Obregón Quesada wrote in 1993 an 
interesting study that analyzed the strategic importance of the San Juan River and 
the Transit Route in the geopolitical disputes between the United States, Great 
Britain, and to a lesser degree, France and Spain. Her work is essential for 
understanding the Filibuster War in its global context.
187
 The political conflicts 
and dynamic of the Costa Rican elite during and after the war was the main topic 
of Carmen Fallas Santana, as mentioned above. In 1993, Canadian historian 
Steven Palmer awakened interest on the topic of the invention of the figure of 
Juan Santamaría as a Costa Rican national hero.
188
 This article produced serious 
thinking and discussion, especially in the area of cultural history of the Filibuster 
War, promoting a still growing body of publications on the topic.  
Historiographical works 
The first effort to categorize the literature related to the Filibuster War was 
done in 1933, when Hermann Bacher Deutsch created a rather simple annotated 
bibliography of the Filibuster War, possibly more as an attempt to catalog the 
sources than as a real analysis. Still, it can be considered as the first effort directed 
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to study the historiography of the war.
189
 The works of María Molina de Lines 
and Francisco Núñez, both published in 1955, as well as Enrique Chávez Zelaya’s 
work from 1956 continued to develop a deeper analysis of the sources.
190
 Their 
works are partial and focus exclusively on Nicaraguan and Costa Rican sources. 
Also, they are fairly incomplete since they do not include the large quantity of 
publications produced after the commemoration of the first centenary of the 
Filibuster War. 
 Recently, Costa Rican authors have established a more reliable structure 
and analysis to the historiographical development of the Filibuster War. First, 
Raúl Aguilar Piedra, historian and former director of the Museo Juan Santamaría 
in Alajuela, published in 2005 a long article focusing on the general sources 
extant for the study of the Filibuster War.
191
 Aguilar Piedra establishes the first 
detailed historiographical study of the Filibuster War, and includes both Central 
American and U.S. sources. The relevance of his work relies on the creation of a 
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structure that allows for the understanding of the tendencies of each publishing 
tradition. Aguilar Piedra divides the works related to the Filibuster War into three 
categories: the filibuster tradition, the U.S. tradition, and the Central American 
tradition. The first one is memorialist and testimonial, the second is academic and 
scientific, and the third one is fragmentary and nationalistic. The filibuster 
tradition, according to Aguilar Piedra, includes the memoirs of the filibusters and 
other participants of the war, like the works of Wells and Walker, and the 
publications of Oliphant, Jamison, and Doubleday. Aguilar Piedra includes in the 
list the work by Jeffrey Roche, who did not participate in the war, nor was he a 
witness of it, but the former director of the Museo Juan Santamaría considers him 
as a pro-Walker voice, and his work as a history of the filibusters from the 
filibuster point of view.
192
 
 For Piedra, Roche’s book also works as a link between the filibuster and 
U.S. traditions. The U.S. tradition, according to Aguilar Piedra, is mainly 
academic and scientific. He divides this tradition into three more sections: a 
memorialist-filibuster tradition, an aficionado tradition, and a professional 
tradition. In the United States, he says, both aficionados and professionals have 
based their studies on the filibuster tradition, which influences both their work 
and interpretations. Although Aguilar Piedra mentions important authors, such as 
William Scroggs and Robert May, it is not clear who he considers as being part of 
the aficionado tradition, and who can be considered a professional, and how much 
each of them is influenced by a pro-filibuster narrative. His assertion of the U.S. 
                                                          
192
 Aguilar Piedra, Revista de Historia, 470. 
100 
 
tradition as being academic and scientific relies on the fact that many scholars 
during the twentieth century added archival research to the known sources. But, 
while some scholars definitely deserve Aguilar Piedra’s praise, for example 
William Scroggs, Albert Z. Carr, and Robert May, in reality only a few of them 
presented serious research and significant results. Most of them simply repeated 
Walker’s story, including its original romantic style, while others continued to 
support a pro-filibuster or pro-Anglo myth.  In any case, the constant and 
purposeful ignoring of Central American sources can only result in biased and 
incomplete works. 
 Finally, Aguilar Piedra analyzes the Central American tradition, 
considering it fragmentary and nationalistic. That is, a scholarship that does not 
take into account the larger context and that is interested mostly in the local or 
national aspects of the war. Montúfar’s work is saved from this accusation, but 
Aguilar Piedra does not recognize the effort of Central American scholars. As 
shown in this chapter, both U.S. and Central American traditions have an 
extensive amount of sources that are fragmentary, nationalistic, and romantic. 
Both traditions, as well, have seen a recent effort to diversify and broaden their 
approaches. In the Central American case, it is important to note Clotilde 
Obregon’s study of the San Juan River as an example of works that analyze the 
events in a global context.
193
 Bolaños Geyer’s books on Walker also present the 
most extensive analysis on the subject ever published.  
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 A second historiographical work of importance is the one developed since 
2006 by Víctor Acuña Ortega, a Costa Rican historian, and professor at the 
University of Costa Rica.
194
 Acuña Ortega is aware of the theories related to the 
concept of collective memory and establishes a division of the historiography of 
the war in those terms. Using a geographical division, the author explains that 
U.S. historiography should be divided into five periods. The first one corresponds 
to the period of the war during the 1850s. The second reflects the work of former 
filibusters at the service of Walker. The third consists of books published during 
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
the United States took the role of a world power. These works usually have a 
propagandistic purpose. The fourth period includes the works published between 
World War I and the 1970s, when Walker became the example of U.S. thirst for 
adventure, courage, and ambition. Finally, the fifth period starts during the 
Vietnam War, when academic studies began to appear. 
 For Acuña Ortega, Central American historiography is limited to 
Nicaraguam and Costa Rican scholarship. He argues that both nationalist 
traditions should be divided into two periods. The first one corresponds to works 
published by witnesses or participants of the war, while the second period is 
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defined by those considered to be secondary sources.
195
 What differentiates the 
Nicaraguan from the Costa Rican historiography is the local and regional 
urgencies to enter the war, the nationalist intentions of the authors, and the stories 
selected to create nationalist images. 
 In 2010, Acuña Ortega presented a study that focused exclusively on U.S. 
historiography, established a revised new periodization.
196
 According to his new 
analysis, Acuña Ortega argues that the historiography of the Filibuster War 
produced in the United States should be divided into three periods. First, there are 
those books published during the war, between 1856 and 1860; second, the 
memoirs written after the war by those present during the conflict; and third, all 
studies published by historians, aficionados, journalists, etc. In the same study, he 
presents a second possible division, based on the intention of the author. First, he 
establishes a period of propaganda and justification. Second, a period in which 
publications tried to rescue the memory of the events. Third, he describes a period 
of imperial propaganda, between the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century. A fourth period starts after World War I and 
ends in the 1970s, being characterized by romantic accounts that have 
entertainment as their primary goal. Finally, the last period is defined by works of 
historical research, mostly academic in nature. It is noticeable that the latter 
periodization is basically a slight revision of his original division published in 
2006 and 2009. A problem with this analysis is the use of the time periods, 
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instead of traditions, as Aguilar Piedra does. This is due mostly to the fact that 
some of the divisions used are not defined by a clear chronological period. For 
example, the academic tradition in the United States starts, according to Acuña 
Ortega, during the 1970s. This leaves out the work of William Scroggs, published 
between 1905 and 1916, a problem that Acuña Ortega acknowledges but does not 
resolve.
197
 
 Finally, there is a third historiographical work connected to the Filibuster 
War by another Costa Rican historian, Iván Molina Jiménez.
198
 In 2008, he 
published an article that explores exclusively the Costa Rican tradition. Molina 
Jiménez establishes a thematic analysis, finding three main currents. First, he 
describes a group of publications that focuses specifically on the Filibuster War of 
1856 to 1857. A second group of publications that referes to social, economic, 
political, or cultural aspects of the war. The third group studies the war as the 
basis for the creation of the Costa Rican national identity, and therefore is 
interested in the process of nation-state formation and consolidation, as well as 
the invention of the nation. Molina Jiménez presents a detailed, critical, and well 
analyzed work. A problem with the article is its unexpected inclusion of works 
from the U.S. tradition, such as those by Robert E. May and Michel Gobat, that 
are out of place and do not belong in his article. On the other hand, his analysis of 
unpublished works, especially Costa Rican theses and dissertations, is extremely 
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helpful and relevant. 
 As seen above, this chapter feeds on the historiographical tradition of 
Aguilar Piedra, Acuña Ortega, and Iván Molina, with clear variations. Presenting 
a clear periodization of the works related to the Filibuster War is difficult, since 
sometimes there is no clear chronological separation. Instead, I divided the 
historiography of the Filibuster War in two currents, one in the United States and 
the other one in Central America. In the United States, the Filibuster War period 
(1856–1860) presents a series of books that serve mainly as propaganda, 
describing Walker and his filibusters as agents of the ideals and values associated 
with Manifest Destiny. A second period can be established between 1886 and 
1919, when most accounts are romantic reminiscences about the filibusters, seen 
as an inspiration for the renewed expansionist attitude of the United States, which 
included the takeover of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, and the threat of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s administration to Central American and Caribbean 
sovereignty. Finally, the academic period in the U.S. tradition runs from 1905 to 
the present, including the early works of William Scroggs, which coincide 
chronologically with some of the most recalcitrant and chauvinistic publications 
of the expansionist period. 
In contraposition to the tradition of the United States, the first Central 
American  publications about the Filibuster War (1865–1889) are serious works 
that present a strong historical analysis as well as the use of archival sources. A 
second division includes the works published in connection to commemorations, 
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starting in 1895 and continuing to the present. This chapter divides them in two 
periods both for the sake of style as well as due to the gap established between the 
commemorations of 1956 and 2006. It is clear that during the period 1895–1956 
the Filibuster War was taken seriously as a symbol of national identity. During 
those years, especially in Costa Rica, any date was used to commemorate the war, 
including the centenary of the birth of President Mora, the centenary of the birth 
of Juan Santamaría, and the anniversarires of the unveiling of statues. Between 
1956 and 2006, commemorations were reduced to the annual parade of April 11
th
, 
which is reflected in the much smaller number of publications on the topic. The 
exception becomes the third division in the Central American tradition, which 
includes the publication of works sponsored in Nicaragua by the Banco de 
América and Bolaños Geyer’s efforts, and in Costa Rica the works sponsored by 
the Museo Juan Santamaría. The institutional tradition started in 1965 is a 
constant intellectual effort to reprint old and valuable sources, some of them 
translated from English, and also the publication of new important research and 
analysis on the topic of the Filibuster War. 
It is important to note that both currents tend to be localist in their 
analysis, although Central America has shown more interest in studying the 
versions published in the United States than vice versa. Some academic works on 
both traditions show some interest in the international and global context of the 
war, as is the case of Scroggs and May, but also of Montúfar and Clotilde 
Obregón. There are still many gaps to study regarding this aspect, and certainly 
there is no comprehensive account written yet. Finally, it is important to note that 
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fictional and romanticized versions have been continuously published in both 
traditions since the nineteenth century. Since they do not pretend to be real 
accounts, they have not been included in this chapter, deserving instead a separate 
literary analysis.  
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Chapter 3 
THE FILIBUSTER WAR 
 One of the goals of this dissertation is to explain the development of 
collective memory and its importance in the construction of national identity. 
Before doing so, an explanation of the main events of the Filibuster War is needed 
to preface why particular heroes were chosen and national narratives rearranged. 
This chapter presents a summary of the Filibuster War, from the arrival of 
William Walker to Nicaragua, in June 1855, to his initial surrender in Rivas, on 
May 1
st
, 1857. It will also include a short background of the period analyzed as 
well as a little epilogue about filibustering in Central America. Collective memory 
in general, and official memory in specific, are selective. The story described 
below focuses on the events and people that have been aggrandized to serve 
national narratives. While the events of the Filibuster War have been told many 
times, this chapter helps the reader to focus only on the events exalted in national 
memories, avoiding the need to consult other sources while reading this 
dissertation.
199
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  In 1823, two years after independence from Spain, the Imperial provinces 
of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica united under the 
framework of the Central American Federation. The republic lasted less than two 
decades, started its collapse in 1838 when Nicaragua decided to separate. By the 
1850s, Central America had been independent from Spain’s authority for about 
thirty years. The memory of the short-lived Central American Federation created 
after the colonial debacle was still fresh. In fact, some Central American leaders 
sought to reunite the region. At the same time, the issues that destroyed the 
federation were still reason for conflict. Nicaragua was involved in a civil war 
between Conservatives (Legitimist Party) and Liberals (Democratic Party), a 
remnant from the days of the Central American union. 
 Contemporaneoulsy in the United States, the glories of Manifest Destiny 
were still celebrated, especially since the conquest of half of Mexico in 1848. The 
frontier ideology prevalent at the time allowed for Anglo-Saxon descendants to 
view other ethnic groups as subhuman, justifying violence and the takeover of 
land. After all—they argued—Mexicans were not better than indigenous peoples, 
they were all greasers, and would be better served if Anglo-Saxons took control 
of their territory.
200
 The discourse of Manifest Destiny insisted that progress could 
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not be stopped, and that Providence had called the Anglo-Saxon race to dominate 
the world: Anglo-Saxons were the only ones that could regenerate the races and 
cultures considered to be in decay, and bring civilization to those that never saw it 
before.
201
 
 As a concept, Manifest Destiny has been a very malleable 
ideology. Due to its clear racist framework, it became a justification for the 
expansion of slavery in the United States. The crisis that promoted the Civil War 
in the United States was the result of a clash between expansionist slaveholders 
and those whot supported the creation of a large free labor force. The balance of 
power could only be tipped in favor of slaveholders by the annexation of new 
slaveholding territories. This strategy was used to annex Texas and had proven 
extremely successful. In the United States more generally, a political clash 
between abolitionists and slavers was reaching its peak in an uneasy Congress. 
For every new state that joined the Union, a conflict rose to decide whether it 
would be a Free State or a Slave State, as happened in Kansas in 1856. Each 
newly established state would also add representatives to Congress, which made 
the issue even more important. 
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A strong believer of Manifest Destiny, William Walker, a native of 
Tennessee, earned his epithet as “King of the Filibusters” from his adventure in 
Baja California and Sonora in 1853, when he invaded Mexico and called for the 
creation of an independent republic under the protection of the United States. His 
intention was to become a new Sam Houston, but Mexican militias forced him out 
of the country. Walker returned to the United States defeated, where he was tried 
for breaking the neutrality laws that forbade U.S. citizens from invading any 
country with which the United States was at peace. However, the trial was merely 
a farce, Walker was acquited.  
 At the same time, Nicaraguan political affairs were also at a standoff and 
civil war confronted two parties struggling for power, the Democratic or Liberals, 
and the Legitimists or Conservatives. The Legitimist government of Fruto 
Chamorro was confirmed in power after the approval of the new constitution of 
1854. During the process of establishing the new constitution, prominent 
members of the Democratic Party were arrested or sent to exile. On May, 1854, 
liberal forces returned from exile and disembarked at the port of Realejo with the 
goal of overthrowing the conservative government. Democratic leaders, like 
Máximo Jeréz, Máximo Espinoza, and Francisco Castellón were convinced that 
the only way for them to win the civil war was to introduce an outside element to 
the strife.
202
 This coincided with a recently awakened filibuster interest in Central 
America. Adventurers such as Henry L. Kinney and Joseph W. Fabens were 
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actively trying to conquer the Nicaraguan Atlantic region, a disputed area where 
the Nicaraguan state was unable to excise control. At the same time, Byron Cole, 
a friend of Walker, arrived in 1854 to survey the situation in Nicaragua and 
possibly hire mercenaries for any of the belligerent forces. He was approached by 
Francisco Castellón, a leader of the Democratic Party in Nicaragua and both men 
signed a contract in which Cole promised to provide three hundred mercenaries 
for the liberals. The reward was a monthly salary for each soldier of fortune 
during the length of the war and some acres of land once the liberals won.
203
 Cole 
returned to California and offered the contract to his friend, William Walker.
204
 
Walker did not immediately accept the offer, since the contract violated the 
stipulations of his bête noire, the neutrality law. Therefore, Cole returned to 
Nicaragua to sign a new contract. The new dispositions established the filibuster 
enterprise as a colonizing concession. Instead of mercenaries, the filibusters were 
considered in this document as colonizers. For that purpose, the new contract 
established that each filibuster would receive the same land promised in the first 
contract, but now, instead of interpreted as a reward for military services, the land 
was granted in advance as personal property. To avoid the neutrality laws, the 
contract gave Nicaraguan nationality to the mercenaries along with the right to 
bear weapons.  
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 Walker also wanted to secure his position due to the strong competition he 
had. Not only was Kinney already operatin in Nicaragua, but other Democratic 
leaders had also signed similar contracts. Máximo Jeréz and Thomas Fisher 
signed a contract that promised five hundred mercenaries. Máximo Espinosa 
signed another contract with C. C. Hornsby and Julius De Brissot that ceded 
control of the Castillo de San Juan, a fortress that controlled the San Juan River 
and the transportation route in the country. These two contracts were also offered 
to Walker, but due to legal reasons, he decided to agree only with the colonization 
concession provided by Cole.
205
 
 On May 4
th
, 1855, Walker and fifty-eight filibusters left San Francisco, 
California, on board a brig called Vesta. Most of the mercenaries had important 
military experience. Some of them participated as filibusters under Narciso 
López’s expeditions to Cuba; others were veterans of the war against Mexico. 
Some had even been under Walker’s command during the 1853 filibuster 
adventure in Baja California and Sonora.
206
 The little army arrived on June 16
th
 at 
the port of Realejo, Nicaragua. 
The first battle of Rivas. 
 Walker’s filibusters were organized as a separate division of the 
Democratic army, and on June 27
th
, left Realejo with orders to attack the southern 
city of Rivas. The importance of the city was clear: it controlled the Vía del 
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Tránsito (Transit’s Route), the most important trade and military route in 
Nicaragua. The route was mostly covered by water, and it connected the Pacific 
and the Atlantic oceans. With the California Gold Rush, there was a need for fast 
transportation that could connect both sides of the country. Since no railroad was 
yet available, the best east-west route was to take a steamer from either New York 
or New Orleans to the San Juan River that ran along the border between 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Devised as the best place to build an inter-oceanic 
canal since colonial times, the San Juan River could support mid-size vessels. The 
river entered into the Nicaragua Lake. Passengers then disembarked at La Virgen 
port, took a stagecoach to the port of San Juan del Sur, just a few miles away, and 
embarked on another steamer for San Francisco. To control Rivas was also to 
control the free arrival of filibuster reinforcements coming from the United States. 
Therefore, Walker’s first objective was to control the transit route.  
 General Trinidad Muñoz, Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic army, 
opposed the presence of Walker. It seemed that Muñoz thought that it was one 
thing to fight against the Conservatives, but an entirely different thing to give 
away the whole country to a foreigner. Initially, Muñoz tried to divide Walker’s 
mercenaries among the different batallions of the army, something Walker 
rejected immediately. Later, while Walker waited for Nicaraguan forces to join 
him for the attack on Rivas, Muñoz sent information of Walker’s presence and 
plans to the Legitimists. When Walker arrived to the city of Rivas, the local 
authorities, having been forewarned, had organized their defense and were 
expecting reinforcements from San Juan del Sur. 
114 
 
 The first battle of Rivas, on June 29
th
, 1855, was Walker’s first 
participation during his Central American campaign. Also, it was Walker’s first 
defeat. A specific act of heroism by a young teacher named Emanuel Mongalo 
became a symbol of resistance, gaining a place both in history and the collective 
memory associated with the war. There is, however, one controversial issue 
relating to this battle. The first battle of Rivas was part of the civil war between 
Nicaraguan conservatives and liberals, and not necessarily a confrontation 
between nationalists and filibusters. The danger that Walker posed for Central 
American sovereignty was not yet clear for Nicaraguans. For this reason, the 
battle is not often celebrated and possesses only a marginal place in the memory 
of the Filibuster War. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Transit Route. Includes Costa Rican and Nicaraguan most important cities  
  and sites during the Filibuster War. 
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 For this battle, Walker’s strategy was to push forward to take the main 
Plaza of Rivas,
207
 located in the center of the city. In Latin American cities, the 
main plaza is usually connected to power and authority, since the main official 
and religious buildings are always located around it. When Walker entered Rivas, 
the local forces retreated to the plaza to defend the town. While Walker advanced, 
Conservative reinforcements arrived from San Juan del Sur, attacking him on his 
left flank. The Democratic regiment abandoned Walker and escaped to the south, 
looking for asylum in Costa Rica. The filibusters looked for refuge behind the 
strong adobe walls of the houses, and the decision was taken by the Legitimists to 
burn them down to force the filibusters’ retreat. Nicaraguan historian 
 Jerónimo Pérez described the battle in the following terms:  
 
“Walker showed up on the early morning of the 29th, achieving some 
advantages at the beginning and caused a noticeable damage to the 
Legitimist forces, particularly when he enclosed himself on the house of 
Máximo Espinosa, from where he was expelled only after many valiant 
efforts, especially those of the distinguished young men Manuel Mongalo, 
who, without any kind of protection, approached the house applying the 
fire that would burn it down.”208 
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The fact that the feat of a common soldier was registered, and his name 
remembered, exemplifies the importance this event held for the Legitimists. 
While the first battle of Rivas created the first hero of the Filibuster War, the 
consolidation of the memory of the event took some time to become recognized 
by the Nicaraguan State.
209
 The rise of the figure of Mongalo will be analyzed 
later in detail. For now, suffice to say that his feat was remembered and kept alive 
by local memory in Rivas, and possibly by his association with a later hero of the 
war, the Costa Rican Juan Santamaría. Currently, his name resonates as one of the 
greatest Nicaraguan heroes of the Filibuster War. 
The rise of Walker 
When Walker arrived at the port of El Realejo on June 16
th
, 1855, he and 
all his filibusters immediately received a naturalization document that granted 
them Nicaraguan citizenship, as stipulated in the contract signed with 
Castellón.
210
 His first encounter with the Conservatives resulted in a defeat, 
known as the first Battle of Rivas, on June 29
th
, described above. Walker found 
some internal resistance from General Trinidad Muñoz, who seemed to know well 
the real intentions of the filibuster. Muñoz in fact had tried to divide Walker’s 
forces and divide the mercenaries among the different battalions already existing. 
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If Muñoz would have succeeded, Walker would have been unable to control his 
own army and decide his own strategy. Castellón, acting with an extreme interest 
in Walker, allowed him to keep his forces intact and even strengthenws them with 
constant reinforcements coming from the United States.  
 Interested exclusively on keeping the Transit Route open for the arrival of 
more filibusters, Walker concentrated on taking Rivas. Therefore, after his defeat, 
he moved to occupy the two ports that allowed the arrival for reinforcements, San 
Juan del Sur, on the Pacific coast, and La Virgen, a port that looked into the 
Nicaragua Lake. Although Castellón insisted on Walker working with Muñoz in a 
joint attack against the Legitimist forces, the filibuster saw that “so far as the 
Falange (Phalanx) was concerned it was idle for them to waste their energies and 
strength on a campaign which did not bring them toward the Transit road.”211 
Walker arrived at San Juan del Sur on August 29
th
, and finding no resistance or 
even a sign of Legitimist forces, he took over the town. He then proceeded to the 
port of La Virgen, where, on September 3
rd
 and after defeating a small group of 
Legitimist forces in a skirmish, was able to occupy it. While Walker worked his 
way to take over the Transit Route, he was also released of the authorities that 
tried to control him. General Muñoz had died after a battle against the Legitimists 
in El Sauce, and Castellón fell victim to the implacable universal foe of the 
cholera epidemic. Walker bid his time, his forces growing in numbers with the 
arrival of more filibusters through the Transit Route. 
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 Before attacking Rivas again, Walker had to wait first for enough 
reinforcements from the United States.
212
  On October 3
rd
, the steamer Cortés 
brought thirty-five men to join the filibuster army. Most of them were veterans of 
the war against Mexico, others were with Walker on his failed attempt to conquer 
Baja California in 1853.
213
 These reinforcements were increased by the joining of 
a Democratic division under José María Valle. Then, Walker made his most 
audacious move. With the reinforcements, Walker took over a steamer property of 
the Accessory Transit Company (ATC). On October 13
th
, in a bold action, Walker 
navigated north through the lake and surprised the city of Granada, the capital of 
the Legitimists.
214
 Unexpectedly, even for Walker, the core of the Legitimist army 
under General Martínez had left the city to confront a Democratic division at 
Pueblo Nuevo, leaving the main Conservative city unprotected.
215
 
The abandonment of Granada by General Martínez was the result of 
General Ponciano Corral’s decision to move to Rivas to attack Walker and 
eliminate the threat the filibuster presented from the south. While Corral moved 
south, Martínez had to confront the threat of Democratic forces closing in on 
Granada. It does not seem plausible that Walker was aware of the situation, but 
his arrival to Granada coincided with the military abandonment of the city, 
making it easy prey for his filibuster army. His disembarking and advance to the 
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main square were totally unopposed. Three Legitimists and one filibuster death 
were the total casualties at the end of the scuffle.  
 Granada was taken and Walker took as hostages all the members of the 
elite of the most important city in Nicaragua, including the great majority of the 
Legitimist leaders. To make his intentions clear, Mateo Mayorga, Minister of 
Foreign Relations, was shot by a firing squad under Walker’s orders on October 
22
nd
, 1855. In this manner, Walker attempted to force the remnant of the 
Legitimist forces under General Corral to agree for a meeting and arrange their 
surrender. He did not have to wait long. Corral arrived in Granada the next day 
and signed a treaty that created a new government in Nicaragua, with Patricio 
Rivas as president and Walker as General of Division of the Nicaraguan army and 
its Commander-in-Chief. An article of the treaty confirmed the acceptance by the 
Conservatives of the Nicaraguan citizenship granted to the filibusters by the 
Liberals. Also, Corral had to relinquish all weapons and ammunitions.
216
 By 
November 4
th
, the remnant of the Legitimist army was disbanded, leaving the 
filibusters as the only military force in the country.
217
 The filibuster coup was 
accomplished. 
 Walker showed more concern about keeping the Transit Route than 
celebrating his recent military victory. After taking Granada, Walker admitted that 
“the possession of the Transit was intrinsically more important to the Americans 
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(filibusters) than the occupation of a town forty or fifty miles from the line of 
travel across the Isthmus.”218 This illuminates Walker’s plan of taking over 
Nicaragua and transforming it into an Anglo-Saxon dominated province.  
Control of the Transit Route served only as long as it permitted the arrival 
of more filibusters. Receiving more filibusters was part of the main plan of 
creating a larger Anglo-Saxon force that could topple the local elites, similar to 
the events that preceded the annexation of Texas in 1845. Walker twisted the 
meaning of the original contract signed with Castellón, which was directed to gain 
military support from a group of mercenaries, not for the occupation of the 
country by foreign elements. But according to Walker, the contract he signed to 
intervene in Nicaragua allowed him to indefinitely continue the “policy Castellón 
adopted of introducing an American element into Nicaraguan society.”219  
 During his occupation of Granada, Walker met some of his most important 
allies. Father Augusto Vigil, a liberal priest, later became a representative of 
Walker’s regime for the United States; Fermín Ferrer later became provisional 
president of Walker’s regime; and finally, U.S. ambassador John H. Wheeler 
worked to convince his government to recognize and help in any way possible the 
filibusters’ enterprise. In fact, Wheeler served as Walker’s agent in the 
negotiation with the remnant of the Legitimist army, led by Ponciano Corral, who 
was still stationed at Rivas.
220
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 On October 23
rd, Corral ceded to Wheeler’s arguments and arrived to 
Granada, where he signed a peace treaty with Walker establishing a new 
provisional government. Patricio Rivas, a moderate conservative, was handpicked 
by Walker as the new president of Nicaragua. The position was not new for Rivas, 
who had served for two short periods as president of Nicaragua in 1839 and then 
again in 1840. The real power, though, remained in the hands of Walker, who was 
designated according to the treaty as Commander-in-Chief of the new Nicaraguan 
National army and promoted to General of division.
221
 Part of the deal established 
retained an article of the 1838 constitution that allowed any foreigner to become 
citizen of Nicaragua with a simple expressed wish.
222
 Walker wanted to introduce 
as many filibusters as possible to Nicaragua, granting them the same rights to 
property and vote that the natives had. The agreement also established that the 
state had to pay all obligations of money and land to the filibusters according to 
Castellón’s contract. According to the treaty, both the Democratic and Legitimist 
armies were disbanded, and “the Americans thus remained the chief military 
defense of the government.”223  
 Suspicion about Walker’s real intentions continued to raise concerns in 
Central America. Ponciano Corral kept communication with representatives of the 
other Central American States, announcing the demise of Nicaragua, and the need 
for the region to unite in a common front to stop the invaders. Unfortunately for 
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the Legitimist general, on November 5
th, Walker captured some of Corral’s 
correspondence. One of the letters warned Honduran president Santos Guardiola 
of the danger the filibusters presented to the sovereignty of Central America. In it, 
Corral suggested that the presidents of the region should take immediate action: 
“if they delay two months there will not then be time…Nicaragua is lost; lost will 
be Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, if they let this get body.”224  
 It is important to note that nineteenth-century Central American politics 
was characterized by a constant conflict between conservatives and liberals. The 
strife was responsible for the demise of the Central American Federation, and it 
continued to pester the region for decades. Santos Guardiola had recently become 
president of Honduras with the help of Guatemalan conservative caudillo, José 
Rafael Carrera, who invaded Honduras to overthrow the liberal regime of 
Trinidad Cabañas. Therefore, Corral’s call for help could be interpreted as a call 
to help his conservative comrades. His letter, however, also mentions El Salvador, 
at that time a bastion of liberalism. Corral’s letter should be interpreted as a 
warning for all of Central America, regardless of  ideology.  
The discovery of Corral’s correspondence signaled his doom. Walker 
arrested him and a court composed in full by U.S. filibusters (Col. Hornsby, Col. 
Fry, and Col. French) sentenced Corral to death by a firing squad. Arguing a 
conspiracy, Walker rounded up and arrested most of the Legitimist leaders. A 
plead by the local elites moved Walker to soon release the majority of them, 
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keeping a citizen named Narciso Espinoza in prison, accused ironically, of 
plotting “to introduce foreign troops into the State.”225 On November 10th, John 
Wheeler, U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, officially recognized Walker’s regime, 
without having notified the U.S. government. 
 After these events, Walker worked on creating the conditions for the 
institutionalization of his transformation of Nicaragua. He established the first 
bilingual newspaper in the country, El Nicaraguense (sic), which became the 
official voice of the filibuster government. A decree of colonization was signed in 
November, 1855 granting two hundred and fifty acres to each new adult 
immigrant arriving from the United States. The next step was to secure the 
transportation of the new elements needed by Walker. With that in mind, he 
proceeded to abolish the original charter between the Nicaraguan government and 
the Accessory Transit Company (ATC) for the exploitation of the Transit Route. 
His justification was based on real issues, since the original ATC charter 
promised the annual payment of ten thousand dollars to the Nicaraguan 
government, plus 10% of all profits, which the Company had failed to do for 
years. The real reason, of course, was the establishment of a new charter that 
would grant the use of the Route to people close to Walker. This would also 
assure that the flow of filibusters would not stop.  After all, as Walker celebrated, 
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“the control of the Transit is, to Americans, the control of Nicaragua: for the 
lake…furnishes the key to the occupation of the whole State.”226  
 Walker’s policies were successful in attracting reinforcements from 
California. In his book, The War in Nicaragua, he mentions the constant arrival of 
new mercenaries. He reports that on October 3
rd
, 1855, 35 men arrived from San 
Francisco to join his forces.
227
 On October 17
th
, sixty more filibusters arrived.
228
  
In December, more than 300 filibusters arrived from California.
229
 According to 
Walker, by March 1856, his American Phalanx was composed by more than 600 
mercenaries.  This number increased to 850 on March 9
th
, 1856, when more 
soldiers arrived, led by Cuban mercenary Domingo Goicouria. Walker, however, 
had a tendency to minimize his numbers, maybe for dramatic effect. In reality, as 
scholars have proved, by March of 1856 there were more than two thousand 
mercenaries at his service. At least five thousand and possibly close to eleven 
thousand were brought to Nicaragua in the term of two years.
230
  
                                                          
226
 Walker, 157. 
227
 Walker, 106. 
228
 Walker, 120. 
229
 Walker, 151, 158. 
230
 Alejandro Bolaños estimates that 5.200 filibusters arrived to Nicaragua between June 1855 and 
May 1857, based on numbers mentioned by Walker and other authors. In: Alejandro Bolaños 
Geyer. William Walker: El Predestinado. (Alajuela: Museo Histórico Cultural Juan Santamaría, 
2003), 433-436. Joseph N. Scott, the main agent of the CAT in Nicaragua, estimates that twelve 
thousand volunteers arrived from New Orleans, New York, and San Francisco using the CAT 
steamers in order to join Walker’s efforts. From those, eleven thousand joined the army. In: 
Joseph Newton Scott. El Testimonio de Scott. (Managua: Banco de América, 1975), 141–142.  
126 
 
 During this time, Walker tried to consolidate his hold of Nicaragua. His 
Minister of Foreign Relations, Máximo Jerez, sent letters to other Central 
American countries asking for the recognition of Walker’s regime. El Salvador 
was the only replier, establishing some conditions for recognition, but 
conservative Honduras and Guatemala, and liberal Costa Rica kept silent. Walker 
had to admit that “it was clear that the clauses in the treaty which secured and 
encouraged the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua were not acceptable to 
the neighboring Republics.”231 
 Walker was considered a threat to sovereignty, and “the journals of Costa 
Rica were particularly virulent” against the filibusters, as Walker recognized.232 
Indeed, since September, 1855, the Costa Rican official newspaper Boletín Oficial 
had been writing incessantly against Walker. Only two weeks after Walker’s 
takeover of Granada, the Costa Rican newspaper declared Walker’s forces as 
being mere “adventurers,” led by an “annexationist caudillo.”233 There was a 
definitive fear of Walker, considered an agent of the U.S. government sent to 
conquer Central America to create a new state by annexing the whole region. The 
memory of what happened with Texas, and the expansionist attitude against Latin 
American territories demonstrated by the United States in 1848 was still fresh. 
OnSeptember 26
th
, 1855, a warning was uttered in the Boletín: “the tide is 
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growing and it threats with wrapping us all with its bloody waves.”234 On 
September 29
th
, the Boletín dropped the adjective of adventurers, exchanging it 
for “filibuster-annexationist,” and Walker was not depicted anymore as just a 
military commander of the Democratic party, but a filibuster, a word that 
negatively resounded in Latin American lore since pirates started to roam the 
Caribbean in the seventeenth century.
235
 
 The Costa Rican government was busy in their continuous efforts to 
modernize the country after its declaration as a Republic in 1848. As part of the 
consolidation of the Nation-State promoted by President Juan Rafael Mora, the 
government adopted a policy of solidification of the institutions, especially the 
army. For that, the Costa Rican government approached the British crown to 
purchase the most modern weaponry. In May of 1855, at the same time Walker 
left San Francisco, the Costa Rican ambassador in London informed the Minister 
of Foreign Relations, Joaquín Bernardo Calvo, that ammunition and parts were 
already on their way to Costa Rica.
236
  
 On May 19
th
, Luis Molina, Costa Rican ambassador in New York, sent a 
letter to his government quoting a note published in the San Francisco Placer 
Times three weeks before, stating that “the night before, celebrated colonel 
Walker embarked with 75 or 100 men in order to take part of the conflict in 
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Nicaragua.”237 Therefore, the Costa Rican government was well aware of who 
Walker was and what his intentions were. The fact that another filibuster 
expedition led by Henry L. Kinney had just failed helped the government to 
understand the threat of such adventures. 
Central America wakes up 
 The news of Walker’s takeover of Granada, and especially his military 
control of Nicaragua, were received with certain disbelief in the rest of Central 
America. The first denouncement came from Nicaragua on October 25th, when 
former president Estrada wrote an open letter to the Central American 
governments, assuring that “as long as the filibuster William Walker keeps the 
control of the armed forces of the Republic, independence, sovereignty, and 
freedom of Nicaragua and all of Central America will be seriously 
compromised.”238 Costa Rica put itself under alert. The following day, the 
Governor of Moracia (today Guanacaste, borders with Nicaragua), the 
northernmost province of Costa Rica, sent a note to San José, warning of the 
filibuster victory in Nicaragua and asking for instructions.
239
 
  The executions of both Mayorga and Corral were strongly chastised in 
Costa Rican newspapers. In the issue published on November 2
nd
, the Boletín 
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Oficial still had doubts about the news of the “barbaric execution of the 
distinguished Minister D. Mateo Mayorga.”240 On November 5th, the Costa Rican 
gazette was finally able to confirm the death of Mayorga. The sources described 
“his death as the most barbaric, the most iniquitous that could have been 
performed. His death was born from a moment in which filibuster rabies, mixed 
with liquor, promoted the ferocity of those soulless beings.”241 The death of 
Corral was not reported until November 17
th
, in an article warning that after 
eliminating any Nicaraguan that could represent a threat to Walker, Costa Rica 
would be next.
242
 
 Costa Rica was indeed the first of the Central American countries to take 
the news of the filibuster takeover of Nicaragua to the international diplomatic 
field. On November 8
th
, Foreign Relations Minister Joaquín Calvo sent a letter to 
his French and British colleagues, denouncing the barbarity of the filibusters and 
the danger of their existence for the continuous sovereignty of Costa Rica. In that 
letter, Calvo tried to convince the British and French governments to send at least 
one war vessel each to protect the Costa Rican port of Puntarenas. The request 
assured that this was the only way to ensure that manner the goods stored there 
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owned by French and British businessmen would be secure. The goal, however, 
was to secure Costa Rica from any naval incursion from the filibusters.
243
 
 The Costa Rican decision to intervene in Nicaragua was finally taken due 
to a November 14
th
 note sent to San José by the Governor of Moracia, detailing 
Corral’s execution. On November 20th, Juan Rafael Mora, president of Costa 
Rica, publicly proclaimed: 
 “Costa Ricans:  
 Peace, that venturous peace that joined to your persevering 
labor has increased our credit, our richness, and our happiness, 
is now being perfidiously threatened. 
 A band of upstarts, the scourge of all peoples, condemned by 
the justice of the American Union, not happy already with 
what they have to satiate their voracity, are planning to invade 
Costa Rica in order to find in our wives and daughters, in our houses and 
haciendas, joy for their ferocious passions, ailment for their unstoppable 
greed… 
 Alert Costa Ricans!, do not yet interrupt your noble deeds,  
but prepare your arms… 
Here, invaders will never find parties, spies, or traitors… Here they will 
only find siblings, real siblings, irrevocably resolved to defend the 
Fatherland as if it was the holy mother of everything they love, ready as 
well to exterminate up to the last of their enemies.”244 
 
 President Mora’s announcement is a clear indication of a developing 
nationalism in Costa Rica. The language used in his speech reflects the main 
concerns the filibusters represented for the sovereignty of the recently founded 
Republic. The invasion promoted a sense of union in what had been a loosely 
organized state, making regional inhabitants see themselves as citizens, soldiers, 
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and brothers in arms. Mora’s call to defend family and property appealed to the 
nature of the Costa Rican small farmer, inciting bravery among the soldiers in 
order to protect their homeland. Finally, by vilifying the foreigner, Mora creates a 
sense of the other as something opposite to the Costa Rican. By defining the 
filibuster, the President is intrinsically defining what the Costa Rican is not, and 
by consequence, what the Costa Rican is, stating the principles of a sense of 
national identity. 
 Mora’s proclaim of November, 1855, is not a call to arms, but a strong 
warning about the imminence of war. The goal is to allow time for the soldiers 
and the economic elites to create the social and economic background to support 
the war efforts. Scholars have observed that economic reasons were considered by 
Mora before his move against the filibusters. The main income for the State and 
for Costa Ricans in general was provided by coffee production, the months 
between November and February being used for the recollection and processing 
of coffee beans. Therefore, the future Costa Rican soldiers had to get their hands 
busy with coffee first, in order to provide the economic basis for the war.
245
  
 In the meantime, Walker continued his policy of “speedy increase of the 
American element in the government.”246 To ensure that the new arrivals from the 
United States promptly received their 250 acres, Walker appointed Joseph W. 
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Fabens as the person in charge of operations. Fabens had been a faithful ally in 
Walker’s former competitor filibuster, Henry L. Kinney.247 Either purposefully or 
by accident, the presence of Fabens sent a clear message: for Costa Ricans, it 
confirmed that Walker was just another filibuster, but one who accomplished 
what others had not, and therefore, very dangerous. For those in the United States 
who supported filibuster adventures, this represented a continuation of the 
expansionist plan. The colonizer decree of November 1855 attracted new recruits 
and by February Walker had tripled the size of his filibuster army.
248
 
 Costa Rican public opinion continued to attack Walker. He described, “the 
most violent invectives against the domestic policy of Nicaragua had been 
published in the official journal of Costa Rica.”249 Indeed, on November 14th the 
Boletín Oficial described the behavior of the filibusters in Nicaragua as something 
“unheard of: robberies, arson, assassinations, abuse of innocent women, barbaric 
rapes, persecutions, beatings, and a thousand other atrocities, without any respect 
for sex, age, class, or person.”250 According to the Boletín Oficial, the goal of the 
filibusters was to “found a new Republic in Nicaragua, substituting in that 
privileged soil one race for another, in order to add later, as it happened in Texas, 
one more star” to the U.S. flag.251 Behind this, the newspaper warned, there was a 
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more sinister objective: to “introduce in these (countries) the odious institution of 
slavery.”252   
 Aware of the growing tensions, Walker sent a representative to Costa 
Rica. On February 9
th
, 1856, Louis Schlessinger, a multilingual Austro-Hungarian 
with military experience in Europe, traveled to Costa Rica to talk to president 
Mora.
253
 Considering Schlessinger Walker’s agent, the Costa Rican president 
ordered the governor of the port city of Puntarenas to halt his or any other 
filibuster agent from disembarking. The rebutted Schlessinger returned to San 
Juan del Sur, swearing to take revenge on Costa Rica.
254
 Schlessinger evidently 
believed he had rights bestowed to him by the doctrine of Manifest Destiny to 
enter a foreign nation, manipulate or defeat it, and inflict retribution against 
resisters. This incident marked Costa Rica’s first taste of Manifest Destiny insult 
and promoted its own nationalist response. 
 It is possible that the news of Schlessinger’s attitude encouraged Mora to 
move his army, instead of waiting for a surprise attack from the filibusters. On 
February 25
th
, Mora convoked the Congress to a special session to discuss the 
filibuster problem. The next day, Congress decreed an authorization for the 
Executive to “take arms to the Republic of Nicaragua in order to defend its 
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inhabitants from the ominous oppression of the filibusters,” either by itself or in 
the company of the other Central American republics.
255
 
 On March 1
st
, Mora published a second proclamation, a declaration of 
war: 
 “Compatriots! 
To arms! The moment I predicetd has arrived. Let us march to Nicaragua 
to destroy the impious phalanx that has reduced that nation to  opprobrious 
slavery. Let us march for the freedom of our brothers… 
We will not fight for a piece of land, not for acquiring ephemeral powers, 
not for miserable conquests, nor for the sake of sacrilegious parties… 
 Brothers of Nicaragua, stand up, destroy your oppressors… 
 Peace, justice, and freedom for us all! War, only to the filibusters!”256 
 
 Mora’s second proclamation is more than just a call to arms. The Costa 
Rican President established in it the ideological framework for the war against 
Walker. Central American sovereignty, but especially Costa Rican sovereignty, 
were at the center of his message. The war was clearly directed to expel the 
common danger of Anglo American expansionism, along with its values of 
financial greed, chauvinism, and racism. The result was the military mobilization 
of the country, and its consequence, the development of the modern Costa Rican 
national identity. 
 
Battle of Santa Rosa, March 20
th
, 1856 
 Mora signed a decree raising the army to 9000 soldiers and imposed a war 
tax directed at property owners, most of them coffee growers.
257
 At the same time, 
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Walker prepared an assault on all conservatives in Nicaragua with the goal of 
stripping them of any privileged position, and appropriating all their lands. His 
plan was to accuse the Legitimist Party of treason and conspiracy, and take all 
property belonging to the most important members of that party. Instead, he was 
distracted by the news he received on March 11
th
 of Schlessinger’s treatment in 
Costa Rica, and started to prepare for war. Later that same day, Walker received 
Mora’s declaration of war and answered by immediately issuing his own 
proclamation of war against Costa Rica, calling for his army to prepare to invade 
that country.
258
 Walker appointed Schlessinger commander of the battalion that 
invaded Costa Rica. The forces led by Schlessinger were formed by the best of 
Walker’s forces, according to the filibuster’s own account of the events.259 The 
rest of the army was divided, sending some troops to Rivas, as well as to the San 
Juan River, to Castillo Viejo, and the mouth of the Sarapiquí River (see figure 1). 
Walker’s strategy was to hold the Costa Ricans south of the border, to secure 
filibuster reinforcements coming from the United States through the Transit 
Route.
260
 Schlessinger and his soldiers left thinking they would reach San José 
and take control over Costa Rica in a couple of weeks. 
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 The Costa Rican army vanguard, composed by 2500 soldiers, left San José 
on March 4
th
 led by the president’s brother, General José Joaquín Mora. On the 
12
th
, after leaving the Central Valley, they reached Liberia, the capital of the 
northern province of Moracia, today Guanacaste. By the 13
th
, Walker’s forces 
were already at San Juan del Sur. On March 16
th
, Schlessinger and his men 
crossed the border. At this point, in a place called Salinas de Bolaños, the 
filibusters attacked and massacred eight Costa Ricans working at the border 
control office, including a young woman who cooked for them. On the 18
th
, the 
Costa Rican troops stationed in Liberia received news of Schlessinger’s invasion. 
General Mora left the main body of his troops in Liberia and moved north with a 
small division. The next day, the filibusters arrived at the Hacienda Santa Rosa.
261
 
 Santa Rosa was a famous and old hacienda, dating from the colonial 
period. In the middle of a pasture stood a large complex of buildings called La 
Casona, which included the main house, a kitchen, and storage rooms, all built 
with thick adobe walls over a cement base several feet high, with a large walled 
patio in the center. These features made it a fortress especially suitable for its 
defense. In front of the house, looking to the south and to the main road, a series 
of small stone walls that served as corrals protected the entrance to the Casona. 
On March 20
th
, after by-passing the Hacienda, Costa Rican forces discovered 
footsteps with boot marks leading to Santa Rosa. Mora realized the marks 
belonged to the filibusters and retraced his steps for several miles. If not for the 
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discovery of the trail left by Schlessinger, the filibusters could have arrived at 
Liberia without a fight. 
 Once he entered the Hacienda, Mora ordered 100 men to take a small hill 
some yards away from the Casona. Once the hill was taken, another column, 
formed by 250 soldiers, started to move to the open field in front of the complex. 
At this point, one of Schlessinger’s guards saw the Costa Ricans and tried to shoot 
his rifle, sending the sign of alarm, but his weapon did not work. He ran back to 
the house shouting “The greasers are coming!”262 
 The filibusters organized their defense. A division formed by Frenchmen 
took the northwest corner of the Casona, the direction from which the Costa 
Ricans were advancing. Another division led by Captain Creighton took positions 
in the south and west of the complex, while those under the command of Captain 
Thorpe defended the back of the house. The Costa Rican attack focused first on 
the corrals, where a filibuster division under the command of Captain Rudler 
protected the position. After the first shots, the Costa Ricans stormed the walls 
with swords and bayonets, pushing Rudler and his soldiers back to the Casona. 
The Costa Ricans continued to push forward, and the filibusters retreated to the 
main building where they were already under artillery fire.  
 Captain Gutiérrez, stationed on the hill next to the hacienda to cover any 
retreat, could not wait any longer and ordered his troops to assault the Casona, 
engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the filibusters. After this, the Costa Ricans 
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stormed the Casona from all sides. The first to retreat was Schlessinger himself, 
who took with him the remnants of the French and German divisions. Gutiérrez’s 
actions were extremely important to end the battle, at the same time it left open 
the only section of the hacienda through which filibusters could escape. General 
Mora ordered a light cavalry division formed by lancers to pursue those in retreat. 
From the first shot to the last, the battle lasted only fifteen minutes. 
The result of the battle was of extreme importance. First, the military 
victory proved to the Costa Ricans that the state could field a military capable of 
defending them, a basic responsibility of a government. Conversely, on the 
filibuster side it created a sensation of panic. All manner of excuses were used to 
explain the defeat. After all, in their racist understanding of the world, it was 
incomprehensible that a group of “greasers” was able to defeat well-trained Anglo 
and European forces, especially in such an expedited manner. Some filibusters 
looked for an expiatory goat, and found it, as Walker did, in their leader, colonel 
Schlessinger. In his account of the War in Nicaragua, written four years after the 
events, Walker blamed Schlessinger for almost all the mistakes of the adventure. 
Before going into detail about the battle, Walker explained that the whole march 
south was full of irregularities, most notably Schlessinger behaving in arbitrary 
and strange ways that confused and infuriated his soldiers.
263
 Others blamed the 
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defeat on the great ability of well-trained and well-armed French and German 
soldiers fighting alongside the Costa Rican army, a statement that was not true.
264
  
 The battle of Santa Rosa anticipated the outcome of the Filibuster War. 
The defeat destroyed the morale of the filibusters, who could not stop talking 
about “the disciplined air, fine military conduct, and excellent arms and 
equipment” of the Costa Ricans.265 In fact, after the defeat “a general depression 
seemed to pervade officers as well as men. Applications were constantly made for 
furloughs to return to the United States.”266 The battle proved to the filibusters 
that the ideology behind Manifest Destiny was wrong in the sense that infallibility 
marked by providence was not on the side of the Anglos.  
 Strategically, its importance was even greater. The fact that filibuster 
troops were destroyed in Santa Rosa secured the sovereignty of Costa Rica. The 
armed forces could continue to prepare for the war without having to fight on its 
own territory. The result of the battle made Walker think twice about a direct 
attack on other Central American countries, realizing that his forces were not yet 
strong enough for a total takeover. For that reason, as soon as he was informed of 
the result of the battle of Santa Rosa, Walker and his mercenaries retreated to 
Rivas. Walker had to rethink his strategy. First, he moved the capital of Nicaragua 
from Granada to León in order to prevent a direct Costa Rican attack by water. 
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Second, he forced President Rivas to sign a decree that gave him absolute 
power.
267
 The defeated filibuster became the Dictator of Nicaragua. 
 In the memory of the Filibuster War, the battle of Santa Rosa currently 
only serves as a preamble for the celebrations of April 11
th
. There are no parades 
celebrating the battle, and for the most part, newspapers do not show interest in 
commemorating the event. In a later chapter, an attempt by the Costa Rican 
government to recover the date in connection to another military confrontation in 
the same hacienda in 1955 will be analyzed.  
Next Station: Rivas  
 After Santa Rosa, the victorious Costa Rican forces returned to Liberia to 
wait for the remnant of the army that was still marching north. Led by president 
Mora in person, the army was composed of about nine thousand men. Due to the 
lack of a clear supply chain, Mora decided to move to Nicaragua with only two 
thousand men. After all, outside of the Central Valley there were few inhabitants 
or urban centers that could provide food or other supplies the army needed.
268
 In 
Nicaragua, Walker tried to help his army recover from the psychological effects 
of Santa Rosa. On March 30
th
, his army paraded in Rivas, as a show of force, 
haranguing them in person after the military display. 
 After sending two proclamations in which President Mora made clear that 
the war was exclusively against the filibusters, the Costa Rican army started to 
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move north in order to cross the border.
269
  In the first proclamation, Mora 
asserted that any filibuster found bearing arms would be considered an enemy and 
executed on the spot, and those who decided to lay down their arms, presenting 
themselves to the Costa Rican army, would be pardoned. He directed the second 
proclamation to the Nicaraguans. Mora exhorted them to rise against the 
filibusters, and in victory together they would rebuild Nicaragua. 
 On April 7
th
, the Costa Rican army crossed the border and headed toward 
Rivas. Small units separated from the main body of the advancing army to take 
control of the Transit Route. Some soldiers were sent to La Virgen, others to San 
Juan del Sur. The Costa Ricans were able to easily take San Juan del Sur, without 
having to fire a single shot, capturing 7 filibusters. At La Virgen, combat was 
more difficult, ending with some filibusters dead and the rest escaping. To make 
sure this port would not be used to bring anymore additional reinforcements to 
Walker, the Costa Ricans burned the wharf. On April 8
th
, the larger part of the 
advancing army entered Rivas. Thinking possibly that Mora was ready to take the 
Transit Route, Walker moved part of the troops to Castillo Viejo and La Trinidad, 
taking the main body of his army back to Granada on April 8th. There, he learned 
of the Costa Rican entrance to Rivas, and knowing that Mora was part of the 
expeditionary army, Walker planned to take him a prisoner to force a Costa Rican 
retreat or at least a treaty that could benefit his expansionist goals.  
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 Knowing of the filibusters’ movements to Castillo Viejo and La Trinidad 
(Hipp’s Point), Costa Rica sent some troops to the San Juan River to prevent an 
invasion from those points. The strategy also included taking control of the river 
to avoid the arrival of reinforcements for Walker from New Orleans or New York. 
On April 10
th
, a battle in La Trinidad ensued. A column of the militia from 
Alajuela crossed the dense forests of the region, reaching the intersection between 
the Sarapiquí and San Juan rivers. The filibusters at La Trinidad were advised of 
the Costa Rican presence and surprised them at the convergence of the rivers. The 
filibuster disembarking was unsuccessful, and the Costa Ricans held off the 
attack. Walker claimed this as a victory, asserting that “the routed Costa Ricans 
did not stop in their flight until they had fallen back to San José.”270 On the Costa 
Rican side, official communications between the governor of Alajuela and Vice 
President Oreamuno talked about a total victory for the Costa Ricans.
271
 As Costa 
Rican historian Rafael Obregón asserts, there is not enough data to understand 
what really happened during that confrontation.
272
 
Second Battle of Rivas, April 11
th
, 1856.  
 Walker’s forces marched to Rivas. On the night of April 10th, they 
captured a Costa Rican spy, and after interrogating and torturing him, they 
executed him. The spy revealed Mora’s location and headquarters, as well as the 
size and location of the army in Rivas. Based on this information, Walker planned 
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to storm the city from different directions. A company under the command of 
Colonel Sanders entered the city from the north, marching directly to the house 
where Mora was staying, close to the main Plaza. Major Brewster was to enter 
from the south, also heading toward Mora. Two more companies, one lead by 
Machado, the other one by Natzmer, entered the city threatening the right and left 
flanks of the Costa Rican army. The goal was to distract them and engage those 
companies while leaving Mora unprotected.
273
 
 On April 11
th
, the plan was executed. Walker’s forces attacked around 8 
a.m., taking the Costa Rican forces by surprise. Their fast movement granted the 
filibusters the capture of a small cannon that was successfully used by Sanders 
against the Costa Ricans during the battle. The takeover of the cannon made 
Sanders’ company stop in their race for Mora, which allowed the Costa Ricans to 
counterattack and move Mora to a safer place. From the north, a division 
commanded by colonel Machado, a Cuban, found a strong Costa Rican army 
standing in his way. Machado was, in fact, one of the first to fall, raising 
confusion among his soldiers. While Machado’s men started to lose ground and 
retreat, the battalion Santa Rosa caught them from behind and dispersed the whole 
company. This battalion was just returning to Rivas, which they left only a couple 
hours before to make contact with a small reconoitering group that was thought 
lost. 
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 The Costa Ricans had taken the highest tower of the main Church of Rivas 
and put their best sharpshooters there. Their accuracy stopped the advance of 
Brewster and Natzmer. The two filibuster companies had to take cover, before 
they reached the Plaza. The shooters resisted so strongly that Walker could not 
believe them to be Central Americans, describing them instead as “French and 
Germans.”274 The Costa Rican ability to stop the filibuster advance deepened “the 
depression of the companies, blown by the first onset,” as Walker described.275 
  A stalemate ensued, both sides constantly advancing and retreating, 
taking a house after a hard struggle only to lose it again. It was during this 
stretching and shrinking that the most remembered event of the whole Filibuster 
War occured. A tactic that had been successfully used during the first battle of 
Rivas in June of 1855 was employed again. The idea was originated with General 
Cañas, brother-in-law of the president, and consisted of the application of fire in 
the corners of the houses where the filibusters were taking cover. By burning the 
dry canes that supported the ceiling structure, the roofs would collapse over 
Walker’s soldiers, forcing them to leave their hiding places and retreat. This was 
the moment that is remembered in Costa Rican history as the martyrdom of Juan 
Santamaría.  
 Walker, along with his best troops, took refuge in a large building called 
Mesón de Guerra. A mesón (from the French maison) was a large building 
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reminiscent of what is now a hotel, a refuge for travelers, and a place to eat out of 
the home. The name of the business, Guerra, represented the name of its. The 
mesón was located on one side of the main plaza. A group of Costa Rican soldiers 
concentrated in the building opposite to the Mesón de Guerra, most of them from 
the city of Alajuela. Among them was an army drummer by the name of Juan 
Santamaría.  
 General Cañas did not see any other option than burning down the 
buildings where the filibusters were hiding, and he asked for volunteers to cross 
the street with a torch and start the fire. Santamaría took a step ahead by wrapping 
up some cloths on a stick and immersing it in kerosene. With this torch, he 
crossed the street and started a fire while a filibuster bullet hit his right arm. The 
filibusters were able to put out the fire, but the Alajuelan soldier tried once again, 
this time finding a corner of the Mesón where a large amount of dry cane lay. The 
fire caught while under a rain of filibuster bullets and Santamaría exhaled his last 
breath. The building collapsed and forced Walker to retreat to another area of the 
city, allowing the Costa Ricans to take a better position. 
Although it is the most remembered event of the whole war, this action did 
not end the battle, which continued for hours. By the night of April 11
th
, Costa 
Rican reinforcements arrived from San Juan del Sur and La Virgen, making it 
impossible for Walker to achieve victory. After several hours, Walker decided to 
retreat, but first he poisoned the water supply by disposing the dead bodies of 
some of the filibusters’ bodies into wells, and then during the early hours of the 
146 
 
12
th
, his forces started to retreat in silence. In this way, the Costa Ricans defeated 
Walker once again and held on to both Rivas and the Transit Route.  
 The result of the second battle of Rivas was fatal for Walker’s ambitions, 
especially because it cut his source of reinforcements from the United States and 
pushed him out of the southern part of Nicaragua. However, his decision to 
discard the bodies of his soldiers into the wells bought him time. The waters in 
Rivas soon carried the Cholera Morbus bacteria, causingthe Costa Rican army to 
retreat days later and leave Nicaragua.  
 Mora ordered the troops to return to Costa Rica, abandoning Rivas and 
leaving the Transit Route open again for the filibusters. On the way back to San 
José, hundreds of soldiers died. The Costa Rican army returned victorious from 
Nicaragua, but it carried with it an even more dangerous enemy than the 
filibusters: an epidemic of Cholera Morbus. Over the next year, about 10% of the 
Costa Rican population died of this illness, including Vice President Francisco 
María Oreamuno, the chief engineer of the army Carl Alexander von Bulow, and 
the Costa Rican vice Chancellor, Adolphe Marie.
276
 The Costa Rican retreat 
allowed Walker to continue his developments in Central America for another 
year. After the defeat at Rivas, Walker returned with all his forces to Granada.
277
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Once he learned of the departure of the Costa Rican army, he sent troops to again 
occupy the Transit Route.  
Central America and the allied army 
Despite the widespread damage of the cholera outbreak, the Costa Rican 
victories may have triggered the confidence needed for other Central American 
governments to amass a joint Central American army against Walker. During the 
last months of 1855, the Costa Rican and Guatemalan governments exchanged 
several letters concerning the filibuster advances, and by April of 1856, it seemed 
like President José Carrera had finally developed a sincere interest in pushing 
them out of the region. El Salvador, on the other hand, sent a letter to the 
Nicaraguan government complaining about the size of the filibuster army. In a 
communication with President Patricio Rivas dated May 7th, the Salvadorian 
government declared that “the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua threatened 
the independence of Central America.”278 In June, the government of El Salvador 
sent another letter, asking for the number of filibusters that formed part of the 
Nicaraguan armed forces to be reduced to only two hundred soldiers in order for 
El Salvador to consider that the government in Granada was really Nicaraguan, 
and therefore, El Salvador could recognize it and establish relations.
279
 At the 
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same time, rumors of an inevitable Guatemalan attack on the filibusters started to 
spread.
280
  
 Distorting the values of democracy, as is typical in the Manifest Destiny 
discourse, Walker decided to put president Rivas aside. As Walker stated, “it was 
necessary for the welfare of the Americans that a new election should be 
called.”281 On June 10th, he signed a decreed calling for new elections.282 
President Rivas and some Democratic leaders, including Máximo Jeréz and 
Mariano Salazar, thought the moment had come to get rid of Walker, since the 
amount of power Walker concentrated on his handswas too dangerous for 
Nicaragua and for the Democratic Party that embraced him. For that purpose, they 
decided to contact the Central American governments for help. They sent a 
commissioner to Guatemala asking President Carrera to send troops.
283
 Also, 
President Rivas sent letters to Costa Rica, asking President Mora to accept a peace 
treaty.
284
 On July 12
th
, Walker became the new president of Nicaragua, in a 
clearly manipulated electoral fraud. Walker himself stated that the disturbed 
conditions of the country and the irregularities in the voting made any election at 
the time invalid.
285
 Of course, this situation did not affect his designation as 
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President of Nicaragua. A week later, U.S. Ambassador John Wheeler established 
diplomatic relations with the Walker regime in the name of his government, 
recognizing the filibuster‘s government as the legal one in Nicaragua.286 At the 
same time, Patricio Rivas continued to be recognized by Central American 
countries as Nicaragua’s only real and legal president. 
 On April 4
th
, while president Mora was still marching toward Rivas, 
Carrera appointed Colonel Víctor Zavala as a commissioner to San Salvador to 
convince that government to allow the passage of Guatemalan troops through 
Salvadorian territory.
287
 In El Salvador, the government allowed the passage of 
Guatemalan troops and at the same time it raised its own army to join the struggle. 
Honduras, in the meantime, did not participate, but allowed troop passage towards 
Nicaragua. 
 On May 5
th
, President Carrera published a proclamation to the Guatemalan 
people. In it, he explained how foreigners from California had been able to take 
over the Nicaraguan government since October of 1855, and that their presence 
threatened the independence and nationality of all Central American states. 
Carrera accused the filibusters of being “adventurers without motherland that do 
not recognize any law, either human or divine. Their goal is to take away the 
lands God gave us, they want to enslave us and destroy our holy religion.”288 
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“Soldiers!” he ended, “You will defend a holy cause: the cause of our religion and 
of our race… To our Costa Rican brothers went the honor of shedding the first 
blood on the defense of the fatherland. You will attest that in Guatemala we are 
ready to sacrifice everything.”289 Carrera’s speech presents an interesting 
counterpoint to Mora’s approach. While the Costa Rican president focuses on the 
sovereignty of Costa Rica and Nicaragua as separate states, Carrera continues to 
see the region as an undivided entity. The Guatemalan President also presents the 
struggle as one of race and religion, that is, a clash of cultures. In the Costa Rican 
case, while religion and race were mentioned as important factors to resist 
Walker, President Mora showed a bigger concern on saving the political structure 
of the state.   
 The Guatemalan army sent a vanguard force of 500 men, which crossed 
the Salvadorian border on May 11
th
, reaching Nicaragua on June 4
th
, and finally 
León, the second most important city of Nicaragua, and the capital of the Liberal 
Party, on July 18
th
. El Salvador sent 800 soldiers that left Cojutepeque on June 
15
th
. Following the same route of the Guatemalan army, but at a speedier pace, the 
Salvadorian army reached León on July 12
th
.
290
 Both armies occupied León 
unopposed, as Walker did not move his troops to stop the invasion. Also, as the 
stronghold of the Democratic Party, patriotic Nicaraguans had already started to 
denounce Walker. Honduras finally reacted, and on July 20
th
, some troops were 
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sent to reinforce the Nicaraguan town of Nacaome, close to the border between 
Honduras and Nicaragua.
291
  
 The problems that promoted the dissolution of the Central American 
Federation almost two decades before, though, still haunted the efforts of the 
allied army. Rivalry and jealously between the Guatemalan and Salvadorian 
armies increased with their inactivity at León, allowing Walker to grow stronger 
with the arrival of new recruits from the United States. More Guatemalan forces 
arrived at León in August, only to stay as stagnated as the rest of the Central 
American armies.
292
  
One reason given for the inactivity of the allied troops was the division 
still existent between Democratics and Legitimists.
293
 General Paredes, the leader 
of the Guatemalan expedition, and General Belloso, his equivalent from El 
Salvador, sent several letters to the Legitimists promoting a meeting with the 
Democratics for the sake of national unity. After a meeting of Legitimist leaders 
in Matagalpa, they decided to send General Tomás Martínez to negotiate with the 
Democratics in León. Once there, Martínez signed an agreement of cooperation 
with the Democratics on September 12
th
, 1856. Martínez and Fernando Guzmán 
signed for the Legitimists, and for the Democratics, Apolonio Orozco and 
Máximo Jérez. After seeing the results of foreign domination, Jeréz swore to 
atone for his error with his own blood if necessary. The national agreement 
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stipulated that Patricio Rivas would continue to be considered the president of 
Nicaragua by both parties until the filibusters were expelled. Rivas would call for 
new elections and Martínez would command the military forces as they pushed 
the filibusters out of the Matagalpa and Managua regions. The agreement also 
called for a general amnesty, voiding all responsibilities on both sides during the 
civil war. Guatemalan and Salvadorian military forces in Nicaragua served as 
guarantors of the agreement.
294
   
Battle of San Jacinto, September 14
th
, 1856 
 Before the signing of the September 12
th
 agreement, the Legitimists exiled 
at the beginning of the war returned to Nicaragua, forming a parallel government. 
Nicaragua consequently had three presidents: Walker was dictator in Granada, 
Patricio Rivas was president in León, and the Legitimists in Matagalpa elected 
José María Estrada as president, residing in Matagalpa.
295
  
One of the main Legitimist commanders, General Dolores Estrada, had an 
important tactical mission. His goal was to cut one of Walker’s main supply 
routes. The region between Matagalpa and Managua was extremely important due 
to its grassy plains, providing cattle to the rest of the country. From the haciendas 
in the region, Walker was able to gather meat for his troops.
296
 Therefore, Dolores 
Estrada’s mission was to scan the region in search of filibusters and to block their 
supply chain. 
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 Knowing of the Legitimist forces in the area, Walker sent forty men to 
scout the region to find and destroy Dolores Estrada, who had taken control of the 
San Jacinto Hacienda, some twenty miles to the east of Managua. On September 
5
th
, both forces engaged, and after a skirmish, the filibusters had to retreat. Walker 
decided to organize a larger attack against Dolores Estrada. On September 12
th
, 
120 filibusters left Granada, arriving at San Jacinto on the early morning of the 
14
th
. Dolores Estrada was not expecting the attack, and the initial surprise allowed 
the filibusters to take positions around the stone corrals and approach the large 
house where the Legitimists were holding their positions.
297
 According to 
Walker’s account, the attack was initially successful; his forces divided into three 
groups and were able to take the stone corrals without much loss. The charge to 
the house proved to be more difficult, with the filibusters losing all their leaders 
and a third of the troops trying to take the house. In a few minutes, the filibusters 
were in full retreat.
298
 
 The battle itself is full of symbolism, with the victory being only one of 
many reasons it is still remembered. In Nicaragua, the term used to call the 
Filibuster War is “The National War.” The term derives from the patriotic treaty 
signed on September 12
th
 between Democratics and Legitimists. This agreement 
ensured the creation of a united national front against Walker and the filibusters. 
Therefore, although the war started as a confrontation between Democratics and 
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Legitimists, with Walker an instrument to assure Democratic Party’s victory, the 
war acquired a new connotation after the agreement, affecting the collective 
memory of Nicaraguans. The current notion of the war is now presented as a 
Nicaraguan war against a foreign invader, forgetting the long strife and 
destructive civil war between the liberal Democratics, and the conservative 
Legitimists. 
 The victory at San Jacinto was reason for celebration in Nicaragua, and it 
may have affected the recruitment of new filibusters for Walker’s cause. One of 
the casualties on the filibuster side was that of Byron Cole, a close friend of 
Walker, who signed the original contract with Castellón that brought the 
filibusters to Nicaragua in 1855. As Nicaraguan historian Jerónimo Pérez stated, 
“the death of Cole resounded beyond our borders, and believing that the defeat (at 
San Jacinto) was of a greater magnitude, the hooking of (filibuster) adventurers 
became scarce, while before it was so frequent.”299 
 While Pérez states that the division of Democratics and Legitimists was 
clearly the reason for the Central American armies to hold their positions instead 
of advancing against the enemy, Dionisio Chamorro argues that it was the news of 
the victory on September 5
th
 reaching León that convinced the two parties to sign 
the agreement.
300
 The fact is that the Central American allied army left León on 
September 18
th, heading to Managua, where they expected to confront Walker’s 
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forces. A small filibuster detachment was defeated on their way, and when they 
reached Managua, the filibusters had already fled.   
 On September 24
th
, the allies occupied Managua, where they received 
news of the victory at San Jacinto from the 14
th
. Then, they advanced over 
Masaya, which was occupied on October 2
nd
. On October 11
th
, Walker attacked 
Masaya. While defending the city, Guatemalan troops under the command of 
General Zavala decided to attack Granada, the center of Walker’s power, which 
should have been weakly defended, according to Zavala. The Guatemalans 
entered and occupied Granada, defeating the filibusters there. The lack of 
discipline of the allied soldiers made them think that victory over the filibusters 
was secured. Walker retreated from Masaya and attacked Granada, finding most 
of the enemy drunk and unguarded. This was a hard lesson for the allied armies. 
Walker was not only able to expel the allies from Granada, but he also dealt them 
heavy losses. 
 Discipline was not the only problem Central American forces were 
plagued with.  They also lacked understanding and collaboration between their 
commanders. After all, the Guatemalan government had clear conservative ideas, 
while the Salvadorians had been ruled by a liberal party for years. Resentment 
based on the same struggle that had destroyed the Central American Federation 
was still alive. There was no clear leadership and decisions were taken separately 
and not as a real allied army.
301
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Costa Rica returns. The Transit Campaign. 
 By November of 1856 Costa Rica resumed its participation in the war. 
Once past the cholera epidemic, Costa Ricans expressed the desire to return to 
Nicaragua and defeat the filibusters once for all. In August, President Mora 
convoked Congress and delivered a speech recognizing the importance of 
continuing the war. This was followed by a dinner in honor of Mora in which 
congressmen continued to discuss a projected invasion against Walker. On 
October 5
th
, a special gathering of the most important members of the political 
elite of the country, including the president, congressmen, local governors and 
commanders, members of the Church, and other citizens declared the need for the 
continuation of the war against Walker and urged the government to take action. 
In previous months, Mora had approached the governments of Chile and Perú 
asking for economic help. Perú conceded a loan of 100.000 pesos, with very low 
interest.
302
 
 On October 16
th
, a decree approving the continuation of the war was 
published, including a requisition from all the Costa Ricans owning capital larger 
than a thousand pesos. On November 1
st
, Mora published a decree defining his 
initial strategy. Most of the ideas were a continuation of those designed and 
followed during the Costa Rican campaign of March and April, directed mostly to 
the occupation of the Transit Route. The decree ordered the blockade of the port 
at San Juan del Sur, as well as forbidding the use of the San Juan River for 
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navigation as long as the war against Walker continued. The decree included 
provisions allowing the destruction or takeover of any filibuster vessel. 
 On November 2
nd
, a vanguard division formed by 300 men, led by General 
Cañas, brother-in-law of president Mora, left Liberia and headed toward 
Nicaragua, reaching and occupying San Juan del Sur on November 7
th
. Cañas 
theno defeated a filibuster attack in a bridge between San Juan del Sur and La 
Virgen. On November 11
th
, Walker sent a large force from Granada, including 
artillery, to stop the advance of Cañas. After a fierce battle against a larger enemy, 
Cañas retreated and joined with Nicaraguan forces under the command of 
Máximo Jeréz. Together, they occupied Rivas. Later, both moved to reinforce the 
allied forces in Masaya.
303
 
 The strategy of taking the Transit Route continued in the San Juan River. 
Since the retreat of the Costa Rican forces in April, Walker had occupied some 
important points along the river to secure the Transit Route and the arrival of 
reinforcements from New Orleans and New York. On December 22
nd
, Costa 
Rican forces, under the command of Major Máximo Blanco, took over the fort at 
La Trinidad, also known as Hipp’s Point, after a short battle. For the strategy of 
taking the forts in the river, the Costa Ricans counted on the support of Sylvanius 
Spencer, an agent of Commodore Vanderbilt.
304
 Spencer used to work for the 
CAT and knew the river well, which proved helpful for the takeover of the route. 
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Vanderbilt, on the other hand, was a magnate who was cheated by some of his 
collaborators, losing his control of the CAT. Vanderbilt hired Spencer to help the 
Costa Ricans, with the goal of recovering the CAT after the war was over. His 
desire for revenge was so great that he spent large amounts of money to bribe 
some of Walker’s mercenaries to desert him. 
 On December 23
rd
, the Costa Ricans took the wharf at Punta Castilla, 
capturing four CAT steamers that had been constantly used to transport 
filibusters.
305
 On December 27
th
, the Costa Ricans, on board the steamers, took 
the fort of El Castillo Viejo. On the 30
th
, the leaders of the filibuster garrison in 
fort San Carlos were tricked into boarding one of the steamers, where they were 
made prisoners, forcing the rest of the filibusters to surrender the position.
306
 The 
most important steamer, the San Carlos, was still free, and to capture it was 
extremely important. As a Costa Rican soldier explained, “to capture the San 
Carlos means the end of this war.”307 The Costa Ricans on board the Ogden, one 
of the steamers they had taken days before, approached the San Carlos, blocking 
its passage through the river, and intimating immediate surrender. While the 
Costa Ricans had three cannons on board and were ready to confront hundreds of 
armed filibusters, the San Carlos did in fact only carry regular passengers. The 
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steamer was then escorted up to the port of El Castillo Viejo, where the 
passengers disembarked. Taking the San Carlos did not mean the immediate end 
of the war, but the Costa Ricans were now owners of the Transit Route. That 
same day, the general of the Costa Rican forces, and brother of the president, José 
Joaquín Mora, published a proclamation: 
 “Central Americans: 
The venom that gave life to the always renascent hydra of filibusterism is 
now cut. All the steamers used by the bandit Walker, and all the military 
ports on the San Juan River, are under my control, and under the custody 
of Costa Rican soldiers. From this side, you should not be afraid anymore 
of new hordes of assassins arriving to disturb your tranquility.”308 
 
Masaya and Granada 
 While Costa Ricans were taking over the Transit Route, Walker returned 
to Granada after his battle against General Cañas. There he planned his next 
move; to attack Masaya, where the allied forces were stationed. On November 
15
th
, a large group of filibusters under the direct command of Walker assaulted 
Masaya. The allied forces repelled the filibuster attack after many hours of 
fighting. At night, Walker retreated and the allied forces gathered around the main 
plaza. On the morning of the 16
th
, Walker returned to Masaya after receiving 
some reinforcements, and was able to occupy the Monimbó neighborhood of 
Masaya before the allies knew of his presence. Using artillery, Walker bombarded 
the allied fortifications while the filibusters dug trenches and barricaded their 
positions. The allies tried to hold Walker’s attack while also installing their own 
artillery and a house-by-house battle ensued. The next day, the battle continued 
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without any side gaining terrain. Finally, before dawn on November 19
th
, Walker 
decided to retreat.
309
 
 The battle of Masaya left plenty of casualties on both sides, and, as 
General Belloso from El Salvador said, there was no lack of heroic acts. In some 
way, the battle resembled the result of the second battle at Rivas, but no 
noticeable figure came out of the battle of Masaya as a symbol, much less as a 
national hero. The allies claimed a victory in the battle due to Walker’s retreat, 
but were not able to make further gains, letting the filibusters rest and prepare for 
another attack. Guatemalan historian Lorenzo Montúfar chastises the lack of 
military training and little understanding of modern warfare that the Central 
American officers showed during the Filibuster War.
310
 
 During the battle of Masaya, Walker learned that some allied forces, led 
by Máximo Jeréz where moving toward the city of Rivas. Also, he knew that the 
Costa Ricans were planning to enter Nicaragua at any moment. So, as his own 
strange omniscient narrator, he explained: “Walker, anxious about the Transit, 
resolved to retire to Granada, preparatory to an abandonment of the Oriental 
Department.”311 Walker retreated from the battle of Masaya and returned to 
Granada. The Transit Route, the vein through which Walker’s filibuster adventure 
breathed, was threatened. On the morning of November 18
th, “Walker again 
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entered Granada; and he soon after announced to Henningsen his determination to 
abandon the place.”312 
 In his book, Walker makes very clear his intentions about Granada, when 
stating that he was “determined to destroy as well as abandon Granada.”313 
Plunder of the city soon started, and on November 22
nd
 colonel Henningsen 
proceeded to burn the first buildings. The allied army attacked Granada on the 
24
th
 with three columns entering different points of the city. The most successful 
attack was delivered by the column directed to take the area close to the 
lakeshore. Walker’s retreat was thus blocked, leaving some people on the wharf 
and steamers, and others in the middle of Granada, including Henningsen. 
 The fire continued to spread, making the battle a difficult place to see, 
breathe, or walk without falling in danger. Henningsen moved out of the main 
square toward the wharf, a good decision since by the 26
th
, the whole area around 
the square was absolutely destroyed by the fire. The allies were able, in the 
meantime, to take the filibuster position at the wharf, forcing Henningsen and his 
men to take cover in the churches and houses between the plaza and the wharf. 
The battle continued for weeks, the filibusters being well fortified, but completely 
surrounded by allied forces. Two letters were sent asking for their surrender. 
Cholera reappeared, affecting both allies and filibusters. One of the victims was 
General Paredes, who died, leaving the Guatemalan forces under the control of 
General Zavala. 
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 On December 12
th
, and after having received new reinforcements from 
New Orleans, a relieving filibuster force disembarked at Granada. The troops 
under Colonel Waters started to move toward the church of Guadalupe, close to 
the shore, where Henningsen was fortified. By the 14
th
, they made contact and 
Henningsen prepared to break the allied lines to escape on the steamer brought by 
Waters. Few buildings still stood in the city, almost completely destroyed by the 
fire started by the filibusters. Before finally boarding the steamer and escaping, 
Henningsen stuck a lance on the shore with a sign that said: Here was 
Granada!
314
 
San Jorge and the siege of Rivas 
 Walker retreated to Rivas, arriving two days after leaving Granada, on 
December 16
th
. His strategy was clear: hold on to Rivas, keeping control of both 
San Juan del Sur and the Transit Route, and wait for reinforcements. Once he 
accumulated a larger force, he could counterattack either south against Costa 
Rica, or north against the allied forces. On January 17
th
, the Costa Rican general 
José Joaquín Mora arrived to Granada aboard the recently captured San Carlos. 
There he met with generals Zavala from Guatemala, Chamorro and Martínez from 
Nicaragua, and his brother-in-law, general Cañas, who had joined the allied forces 
some days before. The decision made to move against the city of Rivas to 
eliminate the threat of filibusterism. On January 28
th
, the allies arrived to San 
Jorge, a little town close to Rivas. There, the joined Central American armies 
established their camp, being able to be close to Walker to control his movements, 
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but at a distance safe enough to organize their attack. Also, the position was 
perfect in case they needed to counter maneuver any attempt to recover the 
Transit Route.
315
 
 Walker indeed tried to take back the Transit Route, while at the same time, 
attempted to push the allied forces away. In the San Juan River, battles ensued in 
the post of La Trinidad or Hipps’ Point on February 6th, 8th, and 13th, when Costa 
Rican forces had finally to abandon their defensive position taken originally on 
December 22
nd
. The Costa Ricans were able, on the other hand, to hold an attack 
to Castillo Viejo on February 16
th
. In the meanwhile, the filibusters constantly 
attacked the allied forces in San Jorge. First on January 29
th
, under the command 
of Henningsen and Sanders, the filibusters attacked the allies by surprise. The 
allies were pushed back into the center of San Jorge, but Costa Rican captain 
Tomás Guardia was able to execute a movement to one of the flanks of the 
enemy, forcing them to retreat in disorder, losing many men and weapons.
316
 
Years later, Tomás Guardia became president of Costa Rica. His connection to, 
and use of, the imagery of the Filibuster War will be analyzed in a future chapter. 
 Walker attacked San Jorge again, this time in person, on February 4
th
, after 
receiving some reinforcements from San Francisco. His attack at 4 a.m. took the 
allies again by surprise, but four hours later, once the allies recovered from the 
surprise, and after many losses, the filibusters had to retreat again. The defense at 
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San Jorge was arranged in such a way that General Chamorro and the Legitimist 
forces barricaded themselves defending the western entrance to the plaza, Cañas 
and Jeréz defended the south and east, while Zavala took the northern position. A 
small mixed Costa Rican-Nicaraguan force under General Hernández decided to 
stay in a large house outside of the town. The filibusters were unaware of this, and 
Hernández was able to get them from behind putting the filibusters between two 
fires.
317
 
 On February 7
th
, Walker bombarded San Jorge for several hours, without 
much result.
318
 March 5
th
 saw a fierce battle between forces commanded by 
Chamorro against filibusters under Sanders. Chamorro was returning to San Jorge 
after a recognition mission, when he was ambushed by Sanders in El Coyol. The 
battle ended with a complete victory for the allies. After this Honduran General 
Xatruch was able to devise the best location from where to direct a siege against 
Rivas, the hacienda “Cuatro Esquinas.” On March 16th, a vanguard force under 
Jeréz was sent to occupy the hacienda. That same day, Walker attacked San Jorge 
once more, and after a long bombardment that seriously diminished the allied 
forces, returned to Rivas.
319
   
 At this point, the command of the allied army was given to General José 
Joaquín Mora. The appointment responded to many factors. First, it was able to 
end the friction between Guatemalan and Salvadorian officers that had so far, 
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impeded the creation of a unified command. Second, it served as recognition to 
Costa Rican efforts and success, as well as way to promote a larger commitment 
of the Costa Rican government in a common effort.  After an initial unsuccessful 
attack to Rivas on March 23
rd
, J. J. Mora was able to direct his forces to take 
control of a quarter of Rivas, called La Puebla, on March 26
th, pushing Walker’s 
forces to the center of the town. The siege of Rivas had started. 
 Enclosed in the center of Rivas, filibusters started to desert. The lack of 
large attacks for almost two weeks made Walker infer that Mora was thinking on 
do so soon. In Walker’s own words, Central American inaction “led to the 
surmise that they might select the anniversary of the action at Rivas, in April, 
1856, for another general attack on American lines.”320 Walker was right, the 
assault started on the morning of April 11
th
. Reinforcements arrived from 
Guatemala the day before were immediately sent into the battle, and their lack of 
experience made them an easy target for the filibuster rifles. The battle was lost, 
but the siege continued. The filibusters continued to desert, attracted by the 
promise of the Costa Rican government to send them back to the United States 
unharmed and at no cost if they surrendered. 
 On April 15
th
, Costa Rica took over San Juan del Sur, and the last 
possibility for the filibusters to receive reinforcements was gone with that. There, 
the St. Mary, a sloop of war from the U. S. navy was stationed and its captain, 
Charles H. Davis, aware of the situation in Rivas, decided to start negotiations. 
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The Central Americans, eager to end the war, accepted Davis’s proposal: to allow 
Walker to surrender to the government of the United States, with captain Davis as 
his representative. In this way, Walker himself, and his closer officers could 
embark towards San Francisco on the St. Mary, surrendering all their weapons to 
the Central American army. The rest of the filibusters were to be considered 
prisoners of war. Mora decided also to hold his original promise, granting the 
prisoners protection and arranging for their safe passage back to the United 
States.
321
 Walker signed his surrender on May 1
st
, 1857, putting an end to the 
Filibuster War, and marking a beginning of its commemoration, memory, and 
interpretation.  
Just one more time… 
 Accounts of the Filibuster War end, traditionally, with Walker’s surrender 
on May 1
st, 1857. But Walker’s filibuster adventures and designs to conquer 
Central America continued. After his return to the United States, popular 
reception in Washington D.C., New Orleans, and New York elevated him almost 
to the level of hero, making of him one of the most popular celebrities in the 
United States at the time. Politicians, including Lewis Cass, a senator from 
Michigan and later Secretary of State under Buchanan, as well as local majors and 
representatives congratulated Walker, gave public speeches showing their support 
for his cause, and rallied to find funding to continue Walker’s war in Nicaragua. 
 On November 14
th
, 1857, Walker left the port of Mobile with 270 
filibusters arriving some days later to the San Juan River. The filibusters were 
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took the Castillo Viejo, almost abandoned by the Costa Ricans at that time, and 
fortified themselves inside waiting for reinforcements that should have arrived 
with Henningsen some days later. It was Commodore Hiram Paulding from the U. 
S. Navy who arrived instead with two well-armed war steamers, and after 
disembarking 350 soldiers, asked for Walker’s surrender, to which he agreed. As 
a reward, the Congress of the United States suspended Paulding from his 
position.
322
 
 Back again in New Orleans, Walker received support and funds to try just 
one more time. In August, 1860, he embarked for Roatán, Honduras, with the 
intention of taking over the Bay Islands to establish an independent republic. The 
islands had been under British control and were ready to relinquish their 
sovereignty to Honduras. A delay on the abandoning of the islands forced Walker 
to disembark in a beach close to the town of Trujillo, in mainland Honduras. 
Honduran troops learned of Walker’s presence and convinced a British frigate 
stationed in the islands to help them arrest him. Fearing battle with the Honduran 
army, Walker and his filibusters surrendered to the British captain Norvell 
Salmon, who sent the prisoners to Honduran authorities. After a trial that lasted 
for two weeks, Walker was condemned to the death penalty. On September 12
th
, 
1860, the filibuster was executed on the beach of Trujllo.
323
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Chapter 4 
 
BEFORE APRIL 11
TH
: RISE, FALL, AND RETURN OF THE MEMORY OF 
THE FILIBUSTER WAR 
 
 In 1895, U.S. Ambassador Lewis Baker was performing one of his 
cyclical visits to what he thought to be a peaceful and quiet Costa Rica.
324
 At 
dawn on May 1
st
, he was abruptly awakened by the sound of cannons firing. To 
his bafflement, this was soon followed by the “noise of a brass band parading the 
streets.”325 His disconcert was not alleviated until he put his hands on that 
morning’s newspapers, which explained that the noisy sunrise was a 
demonstration of celebration of the 1857 “surrender in Nicaragua of el filibustero 
Yankee William Walker.”326 That May 1st marked the thirty-eighth anniversary of 
Walker’s defeat in Rivas at the hands of a united Central American army.  
For twenty-first-century Costa Ricans this may sound surprising, since the 
national holiday that celebrates the defeat of the filibusters is celebrated every 
April 11
th
. On this day, Costa Ricans remember the feat of a young soldier, Juan 
Santamaría, who gave his life during the battle of Rivas against the filibusters on 
April 11
th
, 1856. Most Costa Ricans are unaware that April 11
th
 did not become 
an official holiday until 1915, and that before 1885, Santamaría was almost an 
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unknown figure outside of his hometown, Alajuela.
327
 
 The study of the Costa Rican commemorations of the Filibuster War is a 
non-linear one, due to the multiplicity of holidays connected to them. This chapter 
analyzes the commemoration of the Filibuster War in Costa Rica during the 
nineteenth century. During this period, May 1
st
 became the main holiday 
associated with the commemoration of the Filibuster War. This chapter explains 
the changes in the political environment of that country, and how they affected the 
consolidation of an official memory of the Filibuster War. The process of 
consolidation of the Costa Rican nation-state suffered from issues related to 
localism, as well as inter-elite strife that promoted a constant shift in the direction 
of public affairs. This chapter also analyzes the argument presented by some 
scholars in relation to the creation of national identity based on the figure of 
Santamaría. The current position among most scholars studying national identity 
in Costa Rica establishes 1885 as the moment when official nationalism was 
consolidated. According to Canadian historian Steven Palmer, that year 
Santamaría became the quintessential symbol of the establishment of the 
Filibuster War in the official discourse of Costa Rican national identity.
328
 This 
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chapter argues that the process of consolidation of Costa Rican national identity 
based on the Filibuster War is a dynamic process, and contests the inscription of a 
specific date as the birth of official nationalism. It also argues that a unilateral 
decision by the government is not enough to create a sense of national identity 
based on the events of the Filibuster War.
329
 In this manner, it contests the 
modernizing theories of nationalism that establish the state as the creator and 
enforcer of a national narrative that then evolves into national identity.  
The process of national identity creation is a complex one and in the Costa 
Rican case the Filibuster War had to overcome a series of obstacles at the local, 
national, and international levels in order to be consolidated as the main Costa 
Rican symbol of identity. Some scholars argue that during the colonial period, 
Costa Rica experienced such a degree of isolation that it had developed specific 
administrative and political features, producing a unique and distinctive 
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worldview. This Costa Rican version of the ethnonationalist argument has been 
attacked as a late construction intented to connect current national characteristics 
with an ancient background.
330
 Other scholars propose a dynamic approach 
explaining that Costa Rican national identity developed during the nineteenth 
century along with the establishment of modern political, economic, and social 
structures.
331
 Gil Zuñiga, for example, focuses on the 1820s and the process of 
independence, establishing that all structural development that allowed for the 
consolidation of the nation-state was put in place during that decade.
332
 While it is 
true that politically Costa Rica created a relatively stable system after the 1823 
civil war, the expansion of the institutions of the state and the framework 
necessary for its consolidation took decades after independence. It wasn’t in fact 
until the 1850s, during President Mora’s administration, that certain levels of state 
institutionalization finally started to take form, including a standing army, an 
export-driven transportation structure, and the creation of the first National Bank. 
Finally, as mentioned above, Steven Palmer established the year 1885 as the 
specific moment in which official nationalism was mature enough to make use of 
the images of the Filibuster War to promote a specific idea of national identity 
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among Costa Ricans.
333
 This argument presents the construction of official 
nationalism as well as the memory of the Filibuster War as a monolithic event. Its 
focus on the figure of Santamaría and April 11
th
 is an anachronism responding to 
a search in the past from the viewpoint of the present. Palmer’s assertion of 1885 
as the year in which Santamaría became the Costa Rican national hero reflects the 
importance Santamaría has in the twentieth century, disregarding the reality of the 
nineteenth century, clearly illustrated by Ambassador Baker’s experience during 
that 1895 strident morning. This chapter explores the significance of the Filibuster 
War in the creation of Costa Rican national identity, proposing a dynamic and 
progressive study of its development.  
Initial commemorations of the Filibuster War   
 The reason the Filibuster War became the cornerstone of Costa Rican 
national identity is that the victories over the invading filibusters demonstrated the 
viability of the nation as a long standing project. The process of nation-state 
building received strong support during the administration of Juan Rafael Mora, 
the second president of Costa Rica, elected in 1849. Costa Rica had become 
officially an independent republic just a year before, after being part of the 
Central American Federation for several years between 1823 and 1838. Mora’s 
administration relied on the moderate liberal ideas typical of Costa Rican politics 
since 1823, when conservatives were defeated during a civil war. During his 
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presidency, Mora promoted the modernization of the country, expanding the 
infrastructure to support growing international commerce, and creating 
institutions to expand the influence of the state. The size of the army increased in 
a scale never seen before or after, and in 1854, thanks to a large weapons 
purchase from Great Britain, transformed the Costa Rican army into the most 
modern of the region. In addition, the creation of a national bank was directed to 
establish a stronger state control of the economy. Finally, the construction of a 
road to the Pacific supported the expansion of the export economy.  
The Filibuster War served to consolidate a growing sense of national 
unity. To finance the war, Mora decreed a forced loan of 100,000 pesos from the 
richest members of society, which involved the elite in a national effort. The 
army, mostly volunteers from the main cities and towns of the Central Valley, had 
to move through areas where they had never ventured in before. First, they had to 
leave the westernmost city in the Central Valley, Alajuela, and cross a series of 
mountains before reaching the Pacific coast. From there, they had to cross the 
northern province of Moracia (today Guanacaste) to confront the enemy. Another 
part of the army was sent directly to the San Juan River through dense and barely 
explored jungles and rivers. The efforts of the Filibuster War forced both the 
mingling of soldiers from all parts of the Central Valley, and their discovery of 
parts of Costa Rica unknown for them. It also invested the support of the ruling 
class in a war and discovery of national territory. William Walker’s war had the 
effect of solidifying an interclass defense ofterritory and thrusting urban citizens 
into unexplored corners of the state. Unity came fromt this. Costa Ricans could 
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visualize country and kin, resident became loyal citizens with mutual regard for 
the nation. What had been local or regional became national. From the beginning 
of the Campaña Nacional, Costa Ricans recognized its defining effect on 
nationalism. 
 In time, of course, citizens have found new ways to remember the war and 
remind themselves of what it means to be Coosta Rican. Celebrations of the war 
have endured a series of transformations, brought on by expressions of subsequent 
generations. During the nineteenth century, May 1
st
 was the only officially 
sanctioned holiday that commemorated the Filibuster War, celebrating the day 
Walker surrendered to the allied Central American armies during the siege at 
Rivas.  
The study of the commemorations of May 1
st
 presented in this chapter fills 
a gap researchers have left in their analyeis of the memory of the Filibuster War 
in Costa Rica. The problem may be related to Steven Palmer’s groundbreaking 
work, which on one hand established an interest on national identity consolidation 
and the study of the Filibuster War in cultural terms. On the other hand, Palmer 
focuses too much on the figure of Santamaría, disregarding the study of 
development of national identity during the period before 1885. His approach may 
be related to a theoretical bias. Modernists have insisted so much on the study of 
the development of the liberal nation-state in Europe and the Americas that it 
seems almost unlogical to search on threats of nation building before the 1870s. 
This chapter studies the use of the memory of the Filibuster War during the 
nineteenth century, since the end of the war to the late 1890s. During this period, 
175 
 
the Costa Rican state established May 1
st
 as the main holiday to celebrate the 
Filibuster War. To study the development of this holiday means to study the 
earliest representations of the war in the Costa Rican imaginary, and with them, 
the initial ideological framework that tried to explain the events of 1856-1857. 
These first representations gave shape to the more modern representations, 
including the recognition of Santamaría and Mora as national hero. The process of 
nation building of the nineteenth century coincided with the development of a 
national narrative of the Filibuster War. The image of the war was therefore 
influenced by the process of consolidation of the nation-state, but also the nation-
state was influenced by the uses of the memory of the war. 
In Costa Rica, the first commemorations of the Campaña Nacional did not 
have to wait until the 1870s. The government did not waste time when it came to 
celebrating its war’s achievements. The battle of Santa Rosa, for example, 
produced the first symbol of the war to be commemorated. Costa Rican battalions 
entered the battlefield divided among four main commanders. The same soldiers 
left the hacienda as one single group now named battalion Santa Rosa.
334
 
 The next battle, at Rivas, on April 11
th
, 1856, gave the Costa Ricans the 
first date to be commemorated. The celebration of that victory happened the very 
next year, on April 11
th
, 1857, while the war was still raging. During the siege of 
Rivas, on 1857, General José Joaquín Mora (president Mora’s brother) chose 
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April 11
th
 to attack the filibusters in a clear attempt to commemorate their 1856 
victory. On March 26
th
, 1857, the Central American allies forced Walker to retreat 
from Granada to the city of Rivas, starting a siege that lasted almost 5 weeks. 
According to Lorenzo Montúfar, on April 10
th
, General Commander of the allied 
troops, José Joaquín Mora, called the main officers to a meeting to decide the 
strategy for an assault on the next day, April 11
th
, expressing that it will be a 
perfect day “to commemorate the battle of the year before.”335 In his memoirs, 
Walker wrote of the unusual movement of Central American forces encircling the 
city, stating that “the quiet of the enemy on the 10th led to the surmise that they 
might select the anniversary of the action at Rivas, in April, 1856, for another 
general attack on the American lines.”336 April 11th also presented a stage for the 
creation of symbols. In order to guard the shores and transport troops, the Costa 
Rican government rented private vessels, furnishing them with cannons necessary 
for their defense. On October 1856, President Mora decided to buy a schooner, 
arm it with four cannons, and baptize it Once de Abril (April 11
th
), honoring the 
battle at Rivas in 1856.
337
 
The first official post-war commemoration was celebrated on May 7
th
, 
1857, less than a week after Walker’s defeat. That day, president Mora issued a 
proclamation: “Filibusterism has failed in Central America. The seventh of this 
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month, at noon, a hundred and one cannon shots announced to the Costa Rican 
people that their troops had taken pacific possession of the city of Rivas on May 
1
st
. May 1
st
 will be, from today on, the most memorable day for the Patria!”338 
This was followed on October 27
th
, 1857, by the Costa Rican congress’ official 
decree making May 1
st
 a national holiday in perpetuity. The decree, in article 8, 
made clear the minimal requirements for the celebration. As Ambassador Baker 
witnessed, May 1
st
 was “celebrated in the entire Republic with as much solemnity 
as possible, saluting the national flag at dawn of said day with twenty-one cannon 
shots.”339 The decree of October 27th, 1857, in which May 1st was declared a 
national holiday, also had dispositions for the creation of a monument. Article 7 
decreed that “The supreme government would erect a monument eternalizing 
Santa Rosa’s, Rivas’, and San Juan’s victories at the center of a public fountain to 
be located in a central square in the capital, San José.”340  
 The first official holiday commemorating the Filibuster War was 
celebrated, therefore, the next year, on May 1
st
, 1858. The official newspaper, 
Crónica de Costa Rica, greeted the new day with an editorial note. The 
newspaper dedicated to the first commemoration stated that “today we celebrate 
the first anniversary of the surrender at Rivas; and the restoration of Central 
America.”341 The Crónica, one of the very few newspapers published in the 
                                                          
338
 La Gaceta: Diario Oficial. (San José: May 2
nd
, 1878), 2. 
339
 El Comercio. (San José: May 28
th
, 1887), 3. 
340
 Ibid. 
341
 Crónica de Costa Rica. (San José: May 1
st
, 1858), 1.  
178 
 
country in 1858, it was considered the voice of the government. At the time, it 
was one of the few ways by which the state could communicate with the people 
and transfer values and ideology; thus the importance of its message. The article 
revealed a strong nationalist sentiment, and, especially, a clear awareness of U.S. 
expansionist ideas. The idea that victory during the Filibuster War brought the 
restoration of Central America can only be understood in the context of the 
strategic global importance of the Central American area. The article expanded 
the significance of the victory in Central America when it claimed that Costa Rica 
preserved regional independence, and also the independence of the whole Latin 
American region. The Filibuster War was the great Costa Rican moment, in which 
the small republic was able to consolidate the freedom of the rest of Latin 
America. In this way, the government pronounced the entrance of Costa Rica into 
world politics, as it was the desire of Costa Rican elites to occupy an important 
place in the global economy and to be recognized as citizens of the modern world. 
This discourse of Hispanic-American solidarity restated the Bolivarian idea that 
the Latin American region was intimately linked and that only through 
collaboration could it defend its sovereignty. 
 Because of the amount of blood spilt in defense of freedom and 
sovereignty, the Filibuster War became a symbol of a successful and modern 
nation. Costa Rica acquired independence from Spain in 1821, but it came 
without struggle. In 1823 Costa Ricans fought among themselves to decide 
whether to join Iturbide’s Mexican Empire or to remain an independent state. The 
strife ended with the defeat for the pro-Monarchy groups, and the decision to join 
179 
 
the Central American Federation a few months later. The declaration of an 
independent republic in 1848 was a shy attempt to begin the construction of a 
nation. But the victory over the filibusters symbolized a de facto declaration of 
independence and the international recognition of Costa Rican sovereignty. While 
military casualties were not high, the cholera epidemic that the soldiers brought 
back home with them decimated the Costa Rican population. In a country of 
150,000 people, about 15% of the total male population enrolled in the army. 
Cholera killed about 15,000 Costa Ricans. The economy suffered and even the 
elites saw their personal finances seriously affected by forced loans. After such 
sacrifice, Costa Ricans adopted the military campaign of 1856–1857 as a 
substitute war for independence. The Filibuster War became the symbol of the 
survival and endurance of the nation. 
Under Mora, the Filibuster War became a symbol of nationalism. The 
initial independence, considered a gift, was defended with blood in 1856. This 
meant that, starting in 1856 Costa Rica stood as a member of modern nations and 
claimed its right to freedom and international respect. It is because of this that 
Mora started a process to transform the Filibuster War into a symbol of Offical 
Costa Rican national identity. With the installation of May 1
st
 as a national 
holiday, and the establishment of a decree to build a monument to remember the 
war, Mora was paying homage to Costa Rican resistance against the filibusters 
and installing a cornerstone of official nationalism. If this process would have 
continued, the discussion about the moment in which national identity became 
connected to the Filibuster War would not be needed. 
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New Era
342
 
May 1, 1857, came to represent Costa Rica’s achievements, but its 
commemoration lasted for only one more year. In August, 1859, president Mora 
was overthrown by members of a rival sector of the Costa Rican economic elite. 
The anti-Mora clique included Vicente Aguilar, Mora’s father-in-law and former 
business partner, as well as José María Montealegre, Mora’s brother-in-law. The 
fact that his political rivals were also his relatives is not a surprise in Costa Rican 
politics. In such a small country, as Samuel Stone demonstrated in his now classic 
book about Costa Rican political endogamy, all but two presidents since 1821 
were members of the same families and descended from three of the original 
Spanish conquistadores: Jorge de Alvarado (Pedro de Alvarado’s brother), Juan 
Vásquez de Coronado (nephew of Francisco Vásquez de Coronado), and 
Cristóbal de Alfaro.
343
 
The oligarchy that acted against Mora did so for many reasons. First, 
Mora’s forced loans during the Filibuster War were not well received among 
some members of the elite. Second, during his administration Mora demonstrated 
a strong personalistic approach to politics perceived as authoritarian. Third, the 
extreme rise of the president’s salary, from 3000 pesos in 1851 to 15,000 pesos in 
1859, and the creation of a national bank with strong ties to Mora were considered 
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signs of corruption. Since a national bank also meant that the control of the 
economy through loans to middle and small farmers went away from the hands of 
the elite, this also created resentment among the oligarchy. The reelection of Mora 
in 1859 helped to alienate other members of the elite who feared an indefinite 
Mora regime. On August 14, 1859, Colonel Salazar and Mayor Blanco, leaders of 
the army, denounced Mora, arrested him, and sent him into exile.
344
 
Juan Rafael Mora, although a successful leader in a moment of crisis, was 
not free of enemies. Most historians blame his insistence on staying in power, 
among other issues, as the factors that promoted an overthrow by an oligarchic 
faction of the elite. President since 1849, Mora won the 1853 election, and was 
reelected in 1859. Since his first government, Mora’s opposition was formed 
mostly by members of the coffee elite that profited from the loans they gave to 
small producers. The creation of a National Bank meant the end of their credit 
system, and the benefits it brought. The New Era elite also opposed the Central 
American Federation. One of the reasons was related to the large debt Costa Rica 
acquired with British banks while a signatory member of the Federation. The 
loans did not benefit Costa Rica, but years later, as an independent country, it still 
had to pay its share of it. The oligarchy also opposed the financing of the 
Filibuster War, since it meant the creation of a larger national debt. Mora’s close 
relationship with the British, and his negotiation for a large loan from that 
kingdom was anathema to the coffee elite’s objectives. Finally, the relationship of 
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Mora with some of his associates, especially Vicente Aguilar, became 
problematic, and soon Mora found himself without backers.
345
 
 On August 14, 1859, Mora woke up at dawn at his personal house with the 
news that there was a disorder in the Artillery Fort. Once he stepped outside, the 
same men that knocked on his door arrested him. Colonel Salazar and Mayor 
Blanco informed President Mora that they denounced him as President of Costa 
Rica. Both men were heroes of the Filibuster War and Mora had previously 
deposited on their hands the control of the army. Then, Mora, his brother José 
Joaquín, his brother-in-law General Cañas, and other members of his government 
were taken to the port of Puntarenas and sent to exile.
346
 
 Mora insisted on returning to power and organized a military invasion of 
Costa Rica. Mora’s replacements claimed that the invasion threatened to produce 
serious economic, social, and political damages to Costa Rica. In economic terms, 
it meant the use of resources from the state and private citizens to fight a civil 
war. Socially it would disrupted the relationship between the different factions of 
the elite, as well as the patron-client relationship with small coffee producers. 
Finally, the return of Mora to power could only mean a long dictatorship, and the 
destruction of the political balance between the factions of the elite, as well as 
between the four main cities of the country, San José, Alajuela, Cartago, and 
Heredia, where the elites lived and ruled. 
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 The New Era government defeated Mora’s invasion, and after the former 
President surrendered they executed him, an extremely rare event in Costa Rican 
politics. It is possible that the New Era government considered his death as the 
only way of dealing with a man too dangerous and difficult to control. Costa 
Rican historian Carmen Fallas describes the situation as the only solution the 
elites saw feasible to keep the social balance of the country. According to Fallas, 
Mora broke one of most important unwritten understandings among the Costa 
Rican elite. A military invasion was not an acceptable behavior. In the menatility 
of the Costa Rican elites, being overthrown was a punishment for big mistakes. 
As payback Mora should have accepted an honorable exile. Later, depending on 
the circumstances, he could have returned, become an officer in a new 
government, and even, as José María Castro Madriz did, become president again 
after a long hiatus.
347
  
 In 1859, the elite elected José María Montealegre as their new president. 
The New Era lasted ten years and represented a government centered on an elite 
based in the city of Cartago. This political faction was the enemy of a Central 
American Federation, and it was opposed to the creation of a National Bank. 
While the capital remained in San José, the old colonial elites of Cartago assumed 
a dominant role in defining the role of government, fitting it into a more 
conservative style, representative of the values of the old city. The new regime 
took a strong anti-Mora stance and tried to erase the memory of the former 
President. As soon as Montealegre came to power, systematic repression against 
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ex-moristas began. Between 1860 and 1870, they cancelled all reference to 
Mora’s military victories, disconnecting May 1st from the Filibuster War in all 
official affairs. May 1
st
 became only congressional inauguration day, a functional 
activity that celebrated the annual resuming of regular Congress activities.
348
 
During the administrations of José María Montealegre (1859–1863), Jesus 
Jiménez (1863–1866 and 1868–1870), and José María Castro Madriz (1866–
1868), a purposeful silence about the Filibuster War prevailed.
349
 This is palpable 
in the official newspaper, which during that decade constantly mentioned May 1
st
 
in relation to the Congress returning to its activities, but never to the defeat of 
William Walker. The New Era governments buried the official memory of Mora 
and the Filibuster War for more than ten years. As a holiday that commemorated 
the Filibuster War, May 1
st
 was not properly celebrated again until 1883.
350
 
Still, the memory of the Filibuster War was not totally silenced. On 
September 15
th
, 1864, the New Era government issued a relevant and 
controversial document. President Jesús Jiménez invited José de Obaldía, ex-
president of the Republic of New Granada (today, Colombia), to deliver a speech 
as part of the commemorations of Independence Day. Obaldía had been recently 
expelled from New Granada due to his support for the creation of an independent 
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Panama. He had wanted to ingratiate himself with the government that gave him 
asylum. In a speech delivered in the Costa Rican presidential palace, Obaldía 
presented a summary of his political ideas, arguing against the federal system of 
government in Latin America.
351
 In his opinion, Federalism was an erroneous and 
unnatural system for most Latin American countries, something that could be 
surely appreciated by the authorities of the New Era regime, which already 
rejected the idea of a possible re-union with Central America.
352
 Later, Obaldía 
explored the most important leaders and events of Costa Rican history since 
independence. The speaker was careful enough to skip the administration of Juan 
Rafael Mora, but the Filibuster War was an unavoidable topic. In his speech, the 
author praised the memory of the battles of Santa Rosa, Rivas, and San Juan, 
announcing that the victory over Walker was mainly a Costa Rican feat. “There is 
an event,” said Obaldía, “that should not stay in oblivion.”353 Referring to the 
battle of Rivas, Obaldía described how Walker and his filibusters had 
concentrated their forces in a building called the Mesón de Guerra, and that the 
Costa Rican lack of prevision for heavy artillery or any kind of incendiary rockets 
made it impossible to charge the building. In this account, a soldier voluntarily 
undertook the mission to start a fire in the building to force the filibusters’ retreat: 
An anonymous soldier enters that citadel, certain of finding death 
in its interior. The fire starts, but the light reveals the incendiary. 
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An enemy bullet destroys the arm in which his torch gleams. His 
courage does not fail, and the other arm does the work. The 
ammunitions explode; the building burns and consumes 
everything. The filibusters run, frightened, and victory over them is 
pronounced… Sirs, the humble hero, imitator of Ricaurte in San 
Mateo, is named Juan Santamaría, Gallego as a nickname. Honor 
to his memory!
354
 
 
This speech marked the first time the feat of Juan Santamaría was ever 
described. In fact, before Obaldía’s speech there is almost no official mention of 
Santamaría. The only document existing before 1864 was Santamaría’s baptism 
record and his mother’s request for a pension. The surviving battle reports 
described the burning of buildings during the battle of Rivas, and specifically of 
the Mesón de Guerra, but none mentioned Santamaría by name.
355
 Obaldía had no 
problem eliminating Mora from his speech, but the Filibuster War must have had 
a special meaning for the Colombian politician to risk a confrontation with the 
New Era elite. The answer may be that Obaldía’s speech reflected the importance 
the Filibuster War had for Latin America. In 1864, Latin Americans perceived the 
defeat of Walker as the arrest of U.S. expansionism. 
This speech is still a matter of controversy among scholars. Historian 
Lorenzo Montúfar argued in his 1887 study of the Filibuster War that the speech 
had a clear anti-Mora bias. According to Montúfar, the purpose of the author was 
to support the New Era’s position. By stressing Santamaría’s feat, Obaldía 
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diminished the importance of Mora as leader of the Filibuster War. According to 
Montúfar, rescuing the name of the humble soldier was aimed at obscuring 
Mora.
356
 The problem with this theory is that during the New era period there was 
not any single mention of the Filibuster War, Mora, or Santamaría other than 
Obaldía’s speech. If the New Era group wanted to eliminate the memory of Mora, 
they would have worked a little bit harder to create heroes and images to 
substitute for the President. This shows that the speech was not devised by the 
Costa Rican oligarchy as a way to replace the memory of Mora with that of 
Santamaría’s, but an idea developed exclusively by Obaldía. It is possible that 
Obaldía remembered the Filibuster War as a moment of pride for Latin America. 
After all, in 1856, New Granada, along with Chile and Perú, supported the Costa 
Rican cause against the filibusters, and politicians of these countries, like Obaldía, 
were aware of the importance of the war against Walker. The Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom already mentioned the 
possibility of teaking over the Colombian province of Panama. On the other hand, 
the image of Mora was too closely associated with the Filibuster War. The simple 
mention of the war risked the revival of the memory of the President’s name, and 
the anti-Mora elite would have definitely tried to avoid this. While creating a 
substitute hero of the war sounds clever, it was extremely unlikely to happen 
under the 1864 circumstances. In any case, the days of the anti-Mora elite were 
soon to be over.  
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On April 27, 1870, a group of military men took over the main barracks 
and forts of the country, forcing President Jiménez’s resignation. While Jiménez 
and Montealegre abandoned the country, the leader of the revolt, General Tomás 
Guardia Gutiérrez, was elected as the new president of Costa Rica. Although 
liberals had held power in Costa Rica almost without interruption since 
independence, Guardia established a new liberal regime that enforced the most 
positivistic policies related to concepts of modernity and progress. Guardia 
became the Costa Rican strongman and dictator until his death in 1882. The few 
days he was not president, Guardia was still the real power behind the throne.
357
 
During his administration, Guardia promoted a revival of the memory of the 
Filibuster War. 
 The end of the New Era also saw a shift of power from Cartago to 
Alajuela. The Jiménez and Montealegre families, as representatives of the 
traditional elite from Cartago, were now in exile. On the other hand, Guardia, 
although born in Guanacaste, married a woman from Alajuela and moved to the 
city long before becoming president. His love for the city became obvious during 
his regime. He governed mostly from Alajuela instead of San José, although the 
one was the capital of the country and the official seat of the government. This 
Alajuela versus Cartago dichotomy had defined nineteenth-century Costa Rican 
politics since independence and continued for decades.  
 
                                                          
357
 Jorge Francisco Sáenz Carbonell. Los meses de don Aniceto: Ascenso y caída de don Aniceto 
Esquivel Sáenz. (San José: EUNED, 2002), 113. 
189 
 
Localism 
 To understand Costa Rican politics during the nineteenth century, it is 
necessary to analyze the importance of localism. Independence in Costa Rica was 
not achieved by fighting against colonial powers, but bys a decision by the 
Kingdom of Guatemala (of which Costa Rica formed part) to separate from Spain 
on September 15, 1821. Following the Spanish tradition of township, Guatemala 
sent a note to all Central American towns calling them for a general assembly to 
decide the future of the region. Towns, in Spanish tradition, were autonomous 
entities that owed their allegiance to the crown, specifically to its head, either a 
king or a queen.
358
 Therefore, once its allegiance to the king was severed by a 
declaration of independence, the Province of Costa Rica received its sovereignty 
back. Furthermore, as was clarified by the municipality of San José, in 1821 it 
was not the Province of Costa Rica that received its sovereignty back; instead, 
each town in the Province was now independent.
359
  
In 1821, there were four major towns in Costa Rica: Alajuela, Cartago, 
Heredia, and San José. While there were plenty of villages, some of them older 
than most towns, they did not have administrative power to be sovereign entities 
according to Spanish tradition. Cartago was the capital of the Province and the 
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oldest town in Costa Rica. Its elite was formed mostly by an oligarchy that based 
its economic activities of a hacienda, which consisted owning large plots of land, 
production being reduced to supply local consumption. Heredia had a similar 
structure, although in a much smaller scale. San José and Alajuela emerged as 
commercial centers connected to the booming coffee export-driven production. 
By 1821, San José was a much larger and prosperous town than Cartago. Coffee, 
the most important export product, had to pass through Alajuela city, on the 
western side of the Central Valley, to be sold at the port of Puntarenas on the 
Pacific coast. Alajuela was a transportation hub for the coffee industry.
360
  
 The decision to separate from Spain became a serious problem for the 
consolidation of a new independent Costa Rican state. First, Cartago tried to 
impose its views over the rest of the towns due to its position as capital of the 
province. While Cartago declared the annexation of the province of Costa Rica to 
the Mexican Empire of Agustín de Iturbide, this was immediately rejected by 
Alajuela and San José.
361
 Heredia, on the other hand, joined the declaration of 
León which technically meant they joined the former province of Nicaragua in the 
north. Cartago decided to follow Heredia’s example.362 
 Tensions over city allegiances grew. In March, 1823, the Cartago elite, 
supported by the Church and other conservative elements took over the military 
fort of Cartago and declared, again, the annexation of Costa Rica to Iturbide’s 
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Mexican Empire.
363
 San José and Alajuela, traditionally more liberal and holding 
sympathy for republican ideals, resisted. On April 5
th
, Imperialists and 
Republicans confronted each other at Ochomogo, on the outskirts of Cartago. The 
Republicans, led by Alajuelan commander Gregorio José Ramírez, defeated the 
Imperialists and marched on Cartago. As a result, the capital and seat of 
government was moved to San José, a fact that would not be easily forgotten by 
the Cartago elites.
364
 
 In 1823, Costa Rica joined the Central American Federation as a newly 
created state. In 1834, in order to appease Cartago’s insistence that the city had 
the right to hold the capital, the Costa Rican government decreed a law creating 
an ambulatory capital. That meant that the government would change its seat 
every four years. San José assigned Alajuela, its natural ally, to be the first capital 
of the Ley de la Ambulancia period.
365
 Soon, Congress realized that instead of 
appeasing the feelings of localism, this law promoted them, and in 1835 the Ley 
de la Ambulancia was abolished. According to historian Ricardo Fernández 
Guardia, this promoted Cartago’s reaction. The colonial capital had hoped that 
once it became the seat of government again through the ambulance law, it would 
recover and retain the position of capital of Costa Rica forever. Relying on 
localist sentiments in Alajuela and Heredia, Cartago organized an insurrection 
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against San José. When the allied forces surrounded San José, Chief of State 
Braulio Carrillo tried to negotiate with the besiegers.
366
 Carrillo and 
representatives from Alajuela met and were getting close to an agreement when 
unexpectedly the forces of Cartago attacked San José. According to Fernández 
Guardia, Cartago was not happy with reaching any kind of agreement, wanting 
San José’s total defeat to reclaim the capital.367 Finally, San José won the war and 
kept its position as capital.  
Even so, localism continued to be a central issue in Costa Rican politics, 
marked by an Alajuela/San José vs. Cartago/Heredia rivalry. The fall of President 
Mora in 1859 was also promoted in part by this conflict. His overthrow was 
organized mainly by the Cartago elite, while Mora counted on strong support in 
Guanacaste and Alajuela.
368
 Between 1859 and 1870, an authoritarian coffee 
growing oligarchy with strong ties to Cartago ruled Costa Rica.
369
 The New Era 
ended on April 27, 1870 when Tomás Guardia overthrew President Jiménez. 
Guardia symbolized a shift of power from Cartago to Alajuela. Guardia, a native 
of Guanacaste, lived in Alajuela, was married to a woman from that city, and was 
its governor. This, plus the fact that he was a Morista, helps to explain his disdain 
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for the Cartago elite. Guardia’s policies redefined the state under a new liberal 
structure. During his regime, Guardia created one of the most important series of 
reforms in Costa Rica, all of them directed at the consolidation of a modern 
nation-state. Reforms included a new constitution (1871), a military code, a civil 
code, the expansion of state bureaucracy, and the construction of a railroad. These 
reforms represented an expansion of the presence of the state in political, 
economic, and social relations. Also, he gave continuity to Mora’s initial project; 
a state that appealed to the popular classes for the consolidation of official 
nationalism, rebuilding the position of the Filibuster War on official memory. 
Guardia and the Filibuster War 
 Guardia’s regime established a cult of personality, prompting some 
changes to the interpretation of the Filibuster War. May 1
st
 was not celebrated as 
it had been during Mora’s time. During Guardia’s regime, references to May 1st or 
to the Filibuster War in general, always counted on invocations to his own past as 
a Lieutenant Colonel of the Costa Rican army. Also, along with May 1
st
, Guardia 
created another holiday celebrating the coup d’état that brought him to power on 
April 27
th. Guardia’s goal was to connect the glories of the Filibuster War with his 
personal glories to claim his legitimacy to power. Guardia was not a member of 
the economic elites, and his real claim to power and legitimacy was his position in 
the military, especially as an officer and veteran of the Filibuster War. Therefore, 
he created an image of the war that established himself as a central figure. The 
connection between April 27
th
 and May 1
st
 was also important. It became a week 
of civic celebrations connecting the glorious past of May 1
st
 with the symbolic 
194 
 
revindication of the Morista liberal state on April 27, 1870. 
According to Costa Rican diplomat Jorge Francisco Sáenz Carbonell, 
Guardia’s cult of personality was enforced by members of his government, the 
Costa Rican society, and even by his enemies.
370
 The constant congratulations 
received by the General President on almost every act he performed enforced his 
sense of infallibility. Although some importance was given to the celebrations of 
Independence Day on September 15
th, Guardia’s government focused more on the 
commemoration of Walker’s defeat on May 1, 1857. Along those holidays, his 
regime developed a new one to complement them. The anniversary of the coup 
d’état, on April 27th, became the symbol of his administration, enforcing a strong 
connection between Independence, the Filibuster War, Mora, and the figure of 
Guardia. 
  Newspapers of the period report, for example, that on the evening of 
April 26, 1873, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Lorenzo Montúfar, organized a 
banquet to congratulate Guardia along with the rest of the military chiefs that 
participated in the April 27, 1870 revolution.
371
 This was followed by another 
banquet scheduled for the 27
th
. Montúfar, again, dedicated a toast to the president. 
Rafael Ramírez, one of the guests to the party, interrupted the speech by adding a 
toast to the heroes of Central American independence and to the memory of 
president Carrillo, considered the organizer of the Costa Rican state during the 
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first years after independence. Montúfar replied immediately, stating that 
“Independence, acquired on September 15th, 1821, would have perished by 
another kind of domination, had Costa Ricans not secured their heroic victories in 
the fields of Nicaragua against the filibusters.”372 The toast ended with Montúfar’s 
affirmation of the heroes of the Filibuster War, and especially of Juan Rafael 
Mora and General Cañas. The officials asked Guardia for an honorific burial of 
their remains, an idea the president seemed to approve.
373
 This speech may be the 
earliest official mention of the Filibuster War after the New Era period. It is 
important to note Montúfar’s strong reaction to the mention of Independence Day 
by superposing the Filibuster War, representing one of the earliest attempts to 
promote the Filibuster War as the real fight for independence. Without doubt, 
Guardia recognized the symbolic importance of the Filibuster War, especially 
when it was if connected to April 27
th
 and his own heroic participation in that 
war. That same year, Guardia had a unique opportunity to reestablish his 
connection with the Filibuster War. 
In August, 1873, the political situation in Central America was fragile. 
The personal relations between Costa Rica’s and Guatemala’s presidents raised 
the prospect of war. While both presidents were liberals, Barrios considered 
himself to be the natural leader of that movement in Central America, resenting 
Guardia’s lack of recognition in this respect. Allied with El Salvador, Guatemala 
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promised to form a dangerous coalition against Guardia. Buenaventura Carazo, an 
enemy of Guardia, was appointed by Guatemala and El Salvador as 
Plenipotentiary Minister in a mission to Nicaragua, with the specific goal of 
convincing that government to join the alliance against Guardia.
374
 As a response, 
a leaflet published in Alajuela announced the need to prepare for a possible attack 
from the north reminding the bravery of Costa Rican soldiers: “Our flag is holy… 
– said the leaflet – Let them come! Nothing we fear. We still remember the 
Guerra Nacional…, when we defended nothing less than Central American 
independence… then, we all fought in that same Nicaragua against 
filibusterism…”375 The leaflet conjured up the memory of the Filibuster War, for 
the first time since Mora’s fall and Obaldía’s speech. More than that, it 
established the meaning of the possible war against a Central American army in 
terms related to the Filibuster War: the defense of sovereignty. The use of the 
term Guerra Nacional acquired here a new and different meaning. Before, this 
term had been connected to the Filibuster War implying that Central America 
fought as one nation to save its sovereignty, while the 1873 leaflet shows a Costa 
Rican revision of the term putting it in a local context. In this new interpretation, 
Costa Rica existed as an entity separate from the rest of Central America, 
describing the Filibuster War as the demonstration of Costa Rica’s ability to fight 
for its own survival. This leaflet demonstrates the growing understanding of Costa 
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Rica as a separate nation, establishing the Filibuster War as the moment in which 
its sovereignty was successfully consolidated. Indeed and in the public’s 
imagination, Costa Rica had become a nation. 
The peril of an attack grew, and on September 7
th
, the Costa Rican 
president prepared his army to protect the northern border. In the large expansive 
park of La Sabana, in western San José, Guardia harangued 3,000 members of the 
army. Responding to critics that believed that the army was too small to defeat 
both Guatemalan and Salvadorian combined forces, Guardia remarked: “they 
forget that you are the sons of the defenders of national independence, back in 
1856.”376 With this speech, Guardia made clear that the Filibuster War was now 
considered exclusively a Costa Rican affair, and that its symbolism resided with 
the defense of Costa Rican sovereignty. In the same phrase, Guardia restated the 
importance of the Filibuster War as the real war of Costa Rican independence. 
The idea of the Filibuster War as a symbol of Costa Rican resistance, 
sacrifice, and victory was constantly revisited by newspapers during this period of 
tension. El Costarricense wrote that Nicaragua would not support the pretensions 
of Guatemala and El Salvador, since it was confronting plenty of internal issues, 
the worst “since the times the filibusters invaded that Republic.”377 The image of 
Guardia as leader of the nation was conjured in terms of military heroism, 
reminding the people of the president’s participation in the Filibuster War. 
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Anthems were written as elegies for Guardia, one of them stating: 
Let us raise a glorious anthem 
to the caudillo, the courageous warrior, 
that the light of his resplendent steel, 
in the most holy war spread.
378
 
 
The threat of war from Guatemala and El Salvador served as catalyst of 
Costa Rican nationalism based on the defense of sovereignty. To recover the 
Filibuster War was a natural step, since most Costa Ricans were aware of the 
events that happened just seventeen years before, in which sovereignty was 
successfully defended. Furthermore, the president of the nation happened to be a 
veteran of that war. There was no need to create the figure of a national hero, 
since there was already a hero holding the position of leader of the nation. The 
connection did not pass unperceived by Guardia and his followers, and the 
commemoration of the defeat of Walker, abandoned after the fall of Mora in 
1859, soon resumed.  
On May 1, 1877, the government ordered all public buildings to raise the 
national flag in commemoration of Walker’s defeat.379 In 1878, an official 
newspaper’s editorial commemorated May 1st by reminding Costa Ricans of the 
importance of this day: “Today we celebrate the twenty-first anniversary of the 
glorious battle of Rivas.”380 The article focused on the value the holiday 
represented: “Without diminishing the merits of the efforts of Nicaragua, 
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Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala… we can state that the army of Costa Rica 
decided the victory in favor of the holy cause of the allies.”381 The fact that Costa 
Ricans were the deciding force in the war, according to the article, is connected to 
the idea of Costa Rica’s invincibility, which helped then to state that “Costa 
Ricans fought with bravery and success during those memorable times, and sealed 
with blood the borders of the Patria to secure its inviolability and to punish the 
invaders of those and all times.”382 This phrase encompasses a recurring myth of 
the Costa Rican national narrative, that the Filibuster War provided the nation 
with an aura of impregnability against all kinds of foreign threats. 
 The 1878 editorials and efforts to resurrect the official memory of the 
Filibuster War responded to another crisis. Just a few months before, in January 
1878, Costa Rica suffered an invasion from Nicaragua with the intention of 
overthrowing Guardia’s government. Federico Mora, a nephew of the former 
president Juan Rafael Mora, was the leader of an armed group of exiles that found 
an ally in a high officer of the Nicaraguan army. The goals of the armed invasion 
were to overthrow Guardia and declare Federico Mora president of Costa Rica.
383
 
The recovery of the memory of the Filibuster War served then as a way to 
encourage loyalty among Costa Ricans. The invaders awakened some ghosts in 
the Costa Rican population. First, the initial concern that Alajuela and Guanacaste 
would support Federico Mora revealed a consciousness about localist politics in 
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Costa Rica. The cloud was dispelled when authorities of the two provinces 
expressed their support for Guardia.
384
 Second, the memory of the Filibuster War 
continued to be present, transforming any threat to national sovereignty into a 
connection with the past, and resembling any invader to a filibuster, as the 
announcement of an Alajuelan newspaper revealed when stating that “Don 
Federico Mora has invaded the territory of his own Patria followed by his 
filibusters.”385 
 The image of the Filibuster War was also exploited by Guardia in a 
proclamation against Federico Mora. In 1856, President Mora issued a decree that 
condemned to death any filibuster carrying weapons.
386
 By 1878, although 
President Guardia had already decreed the abolition of the death penalty, he 
considered invasion an act of high treason and proclaimed that the invaders “do 
not deserve forgiveness…instead, they should suffer the same luck as the 
filibusters…”387 The concept was shared by Congress, which on January 24th 
decreed that “the invaders of the Republic, in the current case, are to be 
considered as outlaws and filibusters by International Law.”388 The whole country 
backed the decision of the government. The municipality of Puntarenas gathered 
and issued a decree asserting the need to organize the population against the 
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“filibuster expedition,” which was complying with the desires of the Guatemalan 
dictator, Justo Rufino Barrios to overthrow Guardia.
389
 “The patriotism of its sons 
– said the municipal corporation – would not allow the feet of the filibusters to 
stain the heroism of the invincible flag” of Costa Rica.390 The municipality of 
Escazú acknowledged the threat that a “phalanx of adventurers” represented to 
national sovereignty and offered all resources to fight the “filibuster horde.”391 
Similar terms were used by the representatives of Alajuela, San José, 
Desamparados, San Ramón, Grecia, Puriscal, Atenas, Heredia, Cartago, La 
Unión, and Liberia, demonstrating the unity of the country against the invader, 
using imagery based on the memory of the Filibuster War.
392
 It is clear that by 
January, 1878, Costa Ricans had developed a clear connection between national 
sovereignty and the memory of the Filibuster War, establishing a strong imprint 
into Costa Rican national identity.  
 After Federico Mora’s defeat, the government continued to promote the 
connection between the Filibuster War and President Guardia. On May 1, 1878, 
the official newspaper celebrated the Filibuster War not because it represented the 
defeat of Walker and his men, but because it could be used as an example of how 
Costa Rica was able to defeat anyone who tried to invade the country. Costa Rica 
defeated Walker because it had great military leaders, said the newspaper, and 
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some of them were still around at the time. The editorial is explicit about one of 
the main actors of the Costa Rican success against Walker when it states that 
“General Tomás Guardia was one of the noble Costa Ricans that complied with 
his duties, to his own pride, and for the glory of Central America.”393 It is clear in 
the article that Costa Rica should remember the Filibuster War as proof of the 
invincibility of its troops. But more than that, it declared that while Tomás 
Guardia was in charge of the country, Costa Rica could sleep well at night. The 
celebration of the Filibuster War now had a new hero, he was alive, he was the 
protector of Costa Rica, a paternal figure; and he also was the president of Costa 
Rica. 
 To emphasize this concept, the next day, May 2, 1878, another editorial 
was dedicated to Walker’s surrender. The article established a clear connection 
between Guardia’s government and the government of president Mora. The article 
portrays the Filibuster War as a plague that stormed Nicaragua. May 1, 1857, 
explains the author, was relevant for all of Central America, but especially for 
Costa Rica, since it was able to bring triumph against the filibusters once and 
again, due to the “heroism and courage” of its soldiers.394 The article ended with 
the inclusion of Juan Rafael Mora’s original proclamation of May 1st as a 
holiday.
395
 The editorial served to validate Guardia in two ways. First, it 
connected the Costa Rican army of 1878 to the memory of an undefeated army in 
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Nicaragua during the campaigns of 1856 and 1857. Second, it allowed Guardia to 
reconnect with his past as a successful military officer during the J. R. Mora 
administration. By remembering the celebrations of May 1
st
, condemned to 
oblivion during the New Era, Guardia reclaimed the glories of the Filibuster War 
as the natural heir of J. R. Mora, Cañas, and the heroes of 1856–1857. He 
cleaverly robbed Federico Mora of any claim to family heroism and name 
association with his uncle. 
 By 1880, mentions of the Filibuster War restated its image as a substitute 
war for independence. The meanings of the Filibuster War transformed over a 
decade. First the war represented a fight for Central American unity, then it 
became a war for Costa Rican sovereignty, and in 1880, an event in which Costa 
Ricans saved Central America from another the filibuster threat, this one from 
within Central America. According to the La Gaceta article of May 1, 1880, the 
Filibuster War “signifies the glorious defense of the national independence of the 
Central American people.”396 Among the bravest of the soldiers were the Costa 
Ricans, says the article, and, as we have seen before, only Guardia’s name is 
insinuated among the thousands of possible heroes of the Filibuster War: “Costa 
Ricans…contributed a great part…among which one of the most distinguished in 
the battlefield was the current Chief of the Nation.”397 On the same page this 
article was published, there are two other articles commemorating April 27
th
, 
serving to reinforce the connection between Guardia and the Filibuster War. 
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In 1882, Guardia was extremely ill, asking his First Designate to take 
control of the Executive. At the time, there was no office of Vice President. In the 
case of the President’s absence, a list of designates was established in order to fill 
his position. On a decree signed on June 17th, Saturnino Lizano, a son-in-law of 
Guardia, became the interim president. In the meantime, Guardia’s brother-in-
law, Próspero Fernández, became the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, 
thus they split the civic and military positions normally held by the president.
398
 
This moment served to recognize the connection Guardia established with the 
Filibuster War. On May 5, 1882, a newspaper reminded the population that 
Guardia was a courageous officer during the battles of San Jorge and Rivas.
399
 
President Guardia died in Alajuela during the night of July 6
th
. Cannon shots and 
bells waking up the country announced his departure.
400
 His body was buried in 
the Cathedral of San José, but his heart, always close to the city of Alajuela, was 
given to the municipality of that city in an official ceremony, along with all his 
decorations.
401
 The obituaries in the newspapers were reminders of his twelve 
years as president, as well as the changes his regime brought to Costa Rica. But 
he was also remembered because of his connection to the Filibuster War. A 
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municipality expressed the sadness it felt for the “irreparable loss of such an 
illustrious Chief, who courageously sustained a fight against the filibusters, 
enemies of our independence and our nationality.”402 
The connection Tomás Guardia worked so hard to establish between his 
persona and the Filibuster War was soon under attack. In 1883, Cartago’s 
newspaper, La Palanca, published a short column dedicated to the celebrations of 
April 27
th
, not even a year after Guardia died. The newspaper protested against 
the commemoration: “What can be said about its celebration?” asked the note. 
“Nothing that would not be vulgar…”403 The purpose of the note was to begin to 
destroy the image of the Alajuelan leader, much in the same way the Cartago elite 
did with J. R. Mora during the New Era period. This is palpable when observing 
that in the same column, the newspaper published another note celebrating the 
festivities of May 1
st
 in terms that connected its commemoration to the city of 
Cartago. 
This dichotomy shows the malleability of commemorations and the 
political burden they carry. May 1
st
 was originally conceived by President Mora 
as a commemoration that glorified the Costa Rican efforts during the Filibuster 
War. Because of its connection with the Mora regime, the New Era group 
ostracized the holiday, transforming May 1
st
 into a mere administrative day in 
which Congress was inaugurated. The New Era regime was careful enough to not 
officially abolish the holiday, which certainly would have infuriated many 
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veterans, including New Era sympathizers, but it did not promote its celebration. 
During Guardia’s regime, April 27th gained strength because of its association 
with May 1
st, showing the President’s use of his glories during the Filibuster War 
in order to justify his military action of 1870. Official and private newspapers 
used their May 1
st
 edition to commemorate the Filibuster War as well as to 
comment on the celebrations of April 27
th
. The fact that Guardia was the first 
veteran to be in power, and the fact that he was a military man, made it impossible 
to not accept the president as a site of memory for the Filibuster War. Therefore, 
when the Cartago elite felt liberated from Guardia, they directed their energies to 
abolish April 27
th
 as a civic holiday. Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs suggests that 
resistance to a consolidated social system can only be performed inside the 
accepted social framework.
404
 The Cartago elite, who were accustomed to 
denigrating May 1
st
 because of its connection to President Mora, now used the 
holiday to despise Guardia and the Alajuelan political elite. The article of La 
Palanca described Cartago as “the ancient cradle of the Costa Ricans that 
contributed with their precious flow of blood to save the Central American rights 
from the filibuster clutches in 1856 and 1857.”405 Indeed, the forces of Cartago 
made up the majority of soldiers during the war, so their claims of multiple 
sacrifices for the Patria and the final victory was a source for their claims to the 
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center of the government.
406
 The fact that there was no comment at all in La 
Palanca about May 1
st
 in 1884, when April 27
th
 was not commemorated anymore, 
demonstrates the importance of the symbolism behind the date. The use of May 
1
st
 in the 1883 article was not a revindication of that holiday, but a tool to 
discredit the value of April 27
th
. 
 Guardia’s legacy continued after his death in 1882. The president was the 
founder of a new dynasty that lasted for another seven years. In 1882, his brother-
in-law, Próspero Fernández, was elected as president. As Guardia, Fernández was 
a veteran of the Filibuster War, and also a member of the group that assaulted the 
Artillery Barracks on April 27
th
, 1870, helping Guardia to come to power. 
Guardia, enamored with Alajuela, had prompted the city to a new place in Costa 
Rican politics. While the Presidential Palace was located in the capital of San 
José, he lived and ruled mostly from Alajuela. Guardia’s own house location lied 
across the main Fort and Barracks of Alajuela, making clear his connection to and 
supervision of the military forces.
407
 
 Próspero Fernández had closely followed Guardia’s career and learned 
from it. As Guardia before him, Fernández held the position of Commander of the 
Alajuelan Barracks, and later he became Governor of Alajuela.  Also, as Guardia, 
Fernández was a member of the Costa Rican military. Finally, to clearly establish 
the close connections between both men, Próspero Fernández was married to 
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Cristina Guardia Gutiérrez, sister of don Tomás.
408
 Power continued to be held by 
the group that established Alajuela as their personal fiefdom. 
 The government of Próspero Fernández, however, was short lived. The 
new president died after only three years in power. Another member of the liberal 
elite centered in Alajuela city succeeded him. Bernardo Soto Alfaro, as Guardia 
and Fernández, was also a member of the Costa Rican military, although too 
young to have participated in the Filibuster War. Before becoming president, Soto 
Alfaro was a congressman for Alajuela, and then, like Guardia and Fernández 
before him, became Governor of Alajuela during his predecessor’s administration. 
Before being elected president in 1886, Bernardo Soto became the interim 
President in order to finish Fernández’s term. 
 These three figures, Guardia, Fernández, and Soto, established a new 
period in Costa Rican politics that served as a counterbalance to the New Era. The 
arrival of Guardia to the presidency shifted the center of power from Cartago to 
Alajuela. During the ruling of the Alajuela dynasty or Alajuelato, members of the 
New Era elite were relegated and persecuted, especially during Guardia’s 
regime.
409
 The Alajuelato rejected most of the policies of the New Era period and 
ruled the country under a new positivistic understanding of liberalism. Between 
1870 and 1890, Costa Rica saw a process of consolidation of the nation-state, 
adorned with rhetoric full of ideas of modernization, progress, and order. The 
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Alajuela dynasty created the railroad system, abolished the death penalty, 
introduced electricity to Costa Rica, and established a strong series of anti-Church 
laws. They also created a series of education reforms, including the founding of 
several public elementary and secondary schools, the National Library, and the 
National Archives.
410
 The railroad system was such an expensive endeavor that it 
almost bankrupted the state. To finance the project, Guardia asked for a large loan 
from British companies, an idea that contradicted all efforts of the New Era period 
to stay away from foreign debt. 
 As part of the consolidation of the nation-state, a recreation of a national 
narrative became necessary. British historian Eric Hobsbawm explains that drastic 
social change creates levels of instability that can be balanced with the creation of 
traditions that establish a connection with a suitable past.
411
 As it is shown above, 
Guardia was able to revive the memory of the Filibuster War during moments of 
crisis, especially related to threats against his power. Use of the Filibuster War 
during the Alajuelato, following Halbwachs’ theory of Collective Memory, 
helped to counter the instability that the liberal reforms could have produced for 
the mostly rural population of Costa Rica. The resurgence of the Filibuster War 
started by Guardia did continue after his death. In fact, with his passing the 
celebrations of April 27
th
 waned, and May 1
st
 recovered its place in the Costa 
Rican imaginary. Guardia resurrected Mora and the Filibuster War to legitimize 
his presidency, to wrest regional authority from Cartago, and to provide a vision 
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of a modern nation to mitigate the public’s unease during a period of rapid 
change. In this new casting of Costa Rican national identity, May 1
st
 (the date of 
Walker’s surrender) replaced April 27th (the date of Guardia’s coup d’etat) as the 
most celebrated national holiday.  
Once Próspero Fernández came to power, the Alajuela elite focused 
exclusively on the consolidation of the memory of the Filibuster War without 
Guardia. After twenty-five years of being underrated or simply forgotten, May 1, 
1883 saw the resurrection of the old Mora tradition of using twenty-one blank 
artillery shots to celebrate the dawn of the holiday.
412
 During the Fernández 
administration an article published in a local Alajuelan newspaper mentioned the 
name of Juan Santamaría for the second time. This article continues to be a 
fundamental document in the study of the consolidation of Juan Santamaría as the 
Costa Rican national hero. In September, 1883, El Tambor published an article 
that followed in the footsteps of Obaldía, whose 1864 speech was the first one to 
mention Juan Santamaría’s feat. Honduran author Alvaro Contreras, a liberal 
exiled from his native country, titled his article “An Anonymous Hero.”413 In it, 
Contreras analyzed the image of what he described as a forgotten object, obscured 
by the lack of interest in Central American history. This object is in reality a 
Costa Rican soldier named Juan Santamaría, who by giving his life saved his 
comrades during the battle of Rivas, on April 11, 1856. He was an anonymous 
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hero because, says Contreras, “he is barely known even in his own country.”414 
His anonymity is also related to his upbringing, humble and poor, without formal 
education, or any attachments to a known family or institution. In his article, 
Contreras presented a narrative of Santamaría’s feat, with some differences from 
Obaldía’s account: 
On the unforgettable April 11
th
, the Costa Rican army, valiant and 
jealous defender of Central America, was being decimated in Rivas 
by the filibusters that occupied a stronghold. This could not be 
demolished because the lack of adequate tools. How could we 
triumph in such a fearful conflict? How to defeat our tenacious 
enemy, located in such an advantageous place? 
Only by the impulse of a great heart, only with the will of a 
soldier! In the middle of despair and death, a voice rose among our 
troops asking: “Who wants to make the ultimate sacrifice by 
burning the Mesón?” 
“I”, responded Santamaría, swiftly and with resolve, as if the 
mission was just a simple matter of discipline… With serenenity, 
he took the torch and went to comply with his duty under a rain of 
bullets. One of them incapacitated his arm, but then the other one 
served to crown his great attempt. Our comrades saw, under the 
reflex of the flames, a powerful transfiguration and a triumph as 
splendid as it was unexpected.  
 
 Contreras ended his article by announcing that by the end of the current 
generation, Costa Rica would see the rise of the study of Santamaría and the 
Filibuster War. His article ended with a paragraph that can be interpreted as a call 
for the building of a monument to the memory of Santamaría: “Since we cannot 
tell people from other climates: Strangers! Look there, the tomb that contains the 
ashes of a martyr, bow in front of its statue!, we should state to all Central 
Americans: Compatriots! Keep in your memory, with respect, the venerable name 
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of Juan Santamaría.”415 
 Contreras’s article followed the narrative of José de Obaldía, the first one 
to mention the name of Santamaría, in 1864. His approach was not new, but it 
needs some analysis in order to understand its importance. If we look on 
Contreras’s past, we find a Honduran journalist that was exiled from his country 
by a conservative government. When the author arrived in Costa Rica, he started 
to work in Guardia’s administration. Soon, though, he became involved in 
conspiracies against the General.
416
 In 1871, he was expelled from Costa Rica for 
this reason. Contreras participated in two more attempts to overthrow Guardia, 
including the failed invasion of Federico Mora in 1878.
417
  
The date of the publication of Contreras’s article, during the 
administration of President Fernández is not casual. Contreras died in 1882, and 
El Tambor published Un Héroe anónimo the year after. Therefore, although it is 
hard to define the date he wrote the article, it is possible to assume that he did so 
during the period Guardia was president. The newspaper in which the article was 
published was named El Tambor (the drummer), which references the position 
Santamaría occupied in the army. The fact that El Tambor was a local Alajuelan 
newspaper supports the idea that the Alajuelan elite was trying to develop the 
image of Santamaría as the hero of the Filibuster War, and therefore, as a symbol 
of Alajuelan predominance in Costa Rican politics. 
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Obaldía’s article of 1864 has been accused by some scholars of being an 
instrument to curry the favor of the New Era regime.
418
 By mentioning the 
Filibuster War without mentioning the figure of Mora, Obaldía denied the 
president’s relevance as leader of the nation. But more important is that Obaldía’s 
establishment of Santamaría as a national hero instead of Mora was directed at 
destroying Mora’s image in the collective memory of the nation. Following 
Montúfar’s claims, the narrative of Santamaría’s feat replaced Mora’s 
achievements and gave birth to a rivalry between the two figures. Although a 
conspiracy behind Obaldía’s speech is not clear, it is possible to affirm instead 
that Contreras used the same literary trick to suppress the connection Guardia 
established between himself and the Filibuster War. When invoking Santamaría, 
Contreras reminded the reader of Obaldía’s speech, not as an act of modesty, but 
as an attempt to establish a fictitious connection with the past. By repeating the 
narrative, as Hobsbawm asserts, Contreras sanctioned a precedent and created 
continuity, the basic requirements of an invented tradition.
419
 In this way, by 
solidifying the figure of Santamaría, Contreras was able to achieve his real goal: 
to neutralize any claims Guardia could have made about the past and his 
connection to the Filibuster War.  
Contreras’s article served the liberals of Alajuela well and demonstrated 
the exceptionality of Santamaría as national hero. While Contreras wanted to 
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destroy the claims of Guardia to national hero, the Alajuelan elites had to think 
how to keep their claim on political power and continue their project of creating a 
unified nation and consolidate the nation-state without antagonizing the 
opposition. The continuous use of the Filibuster War was useful to establish a 
national narrative to promote the defense of Costa Rican sovereignty, and with it, 
a sense of nationalism. But, to continue using Guardia as the national hero 
representing the Filibuster War was an affront to anti-Guardia groups. A solution 
was to rescue the memory of the original president of the Filibuster War, Juan 
Rafael Mora. The reason Un Héroe Anónimo was published after the death of 
both Contreras and Guardia was because Alajuela wanted to promote a slightly 
less threatening Alajuelan hero. Santamaría, known in local popular circles, had 
already been mentioned during the New Era period, and now by Contreras. To 
allow for the publication of Contreras’s article along with the restoration of May 
1
st
 with full regalia was just a logical move. In this way, the Filibuster War had a 
relevant and officially sanctioned holiday, and it also produced a national hero: 
Juan Santamaría. It was just a matter of waiting for the right moment to promote 
Santamaría from the ranks of Alajuelan hero to national hero, and this happened 
just two years later, in 1885, when another war threatened Costa Rican 
sovereignty, in much the same way as it did in 1873, and in 1878.  
 The fact that the two original elegists of Santamaría were foreigners 
cannot be overlooked. Obaldía was Colombian and lived in Costa Rica as an 
exile. Contreras was Honduran, and also moved to Costa Rica as a political exile. 
Obaldía lived some time in Alajuela, from where he could have learned the legend 
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about the Erizo (the hedgehog), Santamaría’s nickname. It is not clear if Contreras 
ever lived in Alajuela, but he could have just developed his article based on 
Obaldía’s speech. The fact that both of them were foreigners and that there was 
no Costa Rican writer interested in developing the image of Santamaría can be 
explained by the existence of Santamaría’s story as commonplace in Alajuela. If 
that is true, there was no need in Alajuela, or Costa Rica, to elevate a very 
familiar story to the level of legend.  
In 1856, the real Juan Santamaría must have been a familiar face in the 
streets of Alajuela, the third city in size in Costa Rica at the time, but still with a 
very strong village feeling. After the war, Santamaría’s story must have been 
considered as just one more among the many circulating in Alajuela at a 
communal level. In Pierre Nora’s terms, up to the 1880s, Santamaría was still part 
of a live collective memory.
420
 According to the French historian, the process of 
modernization was responsible for the forgetting of traditional local stories that 
gave a sense of communal identity. The only way to keep a remnant of identity 
was to create sites of memory, mnemonic objects or places that through 
symbology could encompass values and promote remembrance. Following this 
argument, only after the generations that fought during the Filibuster War started 
to pass away, or when new generations started to occupy their positions in 
society, could the Filibuster War become a lieu de mèmoire, a symbolic vessel or 
site of memory. Therefore, before the Filibuster War events stopped to be a 
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commonplace in Costa Rican culture, only a foreigner could recognize the power 
behind Santamaría’s story as equivalent of the most extraordinary stories of hero-
hood. Only for a foreigner could Santamaría become a site of memory, since the 
image of the Alajuelan soldier was never part of his collective memory. That is 
why Obaldía, a Colombian citizen, can compare Santamaría only with Ricaurte, a 
well-known Colombian hero of Independence.
421
 It is precisely the lack of 
familiarity with the story that allows Obaldía and Contreras to understand its 
importance.  
1885, a second phase of official nationalism. 
During Guardia’s presidency, the memory of the Filibuster War was 
recovered at the official level. Along with May 1
st
 Guardia developed April 27
th
 
as national holidays, associating his personal image to the Filibuster War. 
Through these holidays, and the remembrance of the Filibuster War, Guardia was 
able to raise sentiments of patriotism among Costa Ricans. That included the 1873 
crisis with Guatemala, but also the invasion of Federico Mora in 1878, both 
already mentioned above. By 1885, a new threat resulted in another step for the 
final consolidation of the official narrative of the Filibuster War in connection to 
Costa Rican national identity.  
 On March 5, 1885, the Guatemalan Congress, in accord with President 
Justo Rufino Barrios, decreed the forced union of Central America. Honduras 
agreed with the idea, but El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica declared war on 
Guatemala to defend their sovereignty. Costa Rican volunteers enlisted in the 
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army and moved to Nicaragua, where they were expected to join the Nicaraguan 
forces in order to fight Barrios, who had already invaded El Salvador. There, 
close to the town of Chalchuapa, in the battle of April 2
nd
, Barrios, who was 
President of Guatemala and the head of his army, received a mortal wound. His 
death marked the end of his bid for Central American union. 
 The Costa Rican government used this event to connect the images of the 
Filibuster War with the new military crisis, as Guardia did in 1873 and 1878. 
While President Próspero Fernández was busy organizing the army that 
confronted Barrios, an article published in the private newspaper El Diario de 
Costa Rica, talked about an unknown hero, a figure that defined the typical Costa 
Rican soldier during the Filibuster War. The article was none other than 
Contreras’s ode to Santamaría, published already in 1883. According to Canadian 
historian Steven Palmer, this article represents more than the already traditional 
use of the memory of the Filibuster War to raise patriotism in times of crisis. 
Palmer argues that this article symbolizes the moment in which Juan Santamaría 
was created as a national hero, and the Filibuster War installed as a national 
symbol. This dissertation instead argues that the recognition of Juan Santamaría’s 
feat was only part of the process of consolidation of the Filibuster War as a 
national symbol of Costa Rican unity and strength.  
Steven Palmer and Official Nationalism 
 The figure of Juan Santamaría, as well as the Filibuster War, had been 
topics of intermittent study in Costa Rican historiography. In 1993, Steven 
Palmer’s publication on Costa Rican official history became the first one to 
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analyze the rise of the national hero and the Filibuster War into the Costa Rican 
imaginary.
422
 Before him, most works had focused on specific events of the war, 
or on building historia patria.
423
 Palmer’s work is currently a cornerstone in the 
study of the Filibuster War’s memory, and his publication is basic for the work of 
many historians including David Díaz-Arias, Iván Molina, and Patricia Fumero. 
 With his article, Palmer was the first one to use the theoretical tools 
developed by Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm’s related to imagined 
communities and the invention of traditions.
424
 In his influential work, Palmer 
assures that 1885 signals the moment in which Santamaría became the Costa 
Rican hero par excellence, marking the triumph of official nationalism in the 
construction of Costa Rican national identity. Palmer argues that the decree of 
Central American unification proclaimed by Justo Rufino Barrios created an 
immediate reaction on the Costa Rican liberal elite, promoting the invention of an 
official narrative that installed the Filibuster War as the main symbol of Costa 
Rican nationalism. According to Palmer, the publication of Alvaro Contreras’ 
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article Un Héroe Anonimo on the Diario de Costa Rica on March 5
th
 and 6
th
, and 
then on the official newspaper La Gaceta on March 6
th
, responded directly to 
Barrios’ threat on Costa Rican sovereignty. Also, Palmer asserts that this was the 
specific moment in which the Filibuster War became recognized as a staple for 
national identity, with Juan Santamaría as the most prominent figure. Contreras’s 
article was therefore responsible for an immediate Santamaríamania.   
While it is true that the figure of Santamaría gained broader recognition in 
1885, in reality the Erizo had to wait another thirty years for the declaration of 
April 11
th
 as a national holiday. Contrary to what Palmer assures, Juan Santamaría 
was only one of many heroes of the Filibuster War mentioned by the newspapers 
as examples to follow. Other names constantly mentioned during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century included Juan Alfaro Ruiz, Mercedes Guillén, both 
officers of the Costa Rican army during the (second) battle of Rivas, and of 
course, President J. R. Mora. Also, the use of images and references to the 
Filibuster War during the 1885 crisis was not unique. As shown before, the 
Filibuster War was already used as a nationalist symbol in 1873 and in 1878. 
Several years before 1885, Guardia reinstated May 1
st
 as a national holiday 
commemorating the Filibuster War. Just by 1883 May 1
st
 celebrations included 
military parades, a twenty-one gun salute, and the ornamentation of public 
buildings with the national flag.  
To be fair, there were some other references to the Filibuster War during 
the war with Guatemala. But the newspaper notes of 1885 clearly resemble the 
ones published during the crises of 1873 and 1878, demonstrating that the 
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nationalist image of the Filibuster War was already part of the Costa Rican 
collective memory, and not just a fad recently constructed by the government 
based on a single article about Santamaría. On March 10
th
, the official newspaper 
La Gaceta published the answer of several institutions to Soto’s exposition 
published the day before. The Municipality of Alajuela made a slight, almost 
veiled mention to the Filibuster War. That institution said that “the pretended 
union is an act that threatens the national sovereignty, and that if it is needed, as it 
happened not long ago, the Republic of Costa Rica would show to the world that 
it knows how, and it will, defend its rights.”425 That day’s editorial article also 
makes a vague mention to a former “unfortunate day” in which the elders had to 
confront a similar situation.
426
 The municipality of Cartago was the only one that 
was a little more emphatic, asserting that “Costa Rican forces in the years 1856 
and 1857 scattered their blood on the fields of Santa Rosa, Rivas and other places 
in defense of the sovereignty of their own rights and the patria…,  (and) will 
know this time how to repel the invader…”427 
 In sum, Palmer’s articles produced an extraordinary interest in the history 
of the commemorations of the Filibuster War. The analysis above revises some of 
his most important concepts, establishing the dynamic continuity of the memory 
of the Filibuster War, and rejecting the idea that 1885 was the moment in which 
the Filibuster War became the center of Costa Rican national identity. It also 
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rejects Palmer’s idea of Santamaría’s invention and its sudden transformation into 
the Costa Rican national hero. In any case, the crisis of 1885 forms part of the 
puzzle of a growing Costa Rican official narrative based on the Filibuster War.   
May 1
st
 after Guardia 
As mentioned above, the death of President Guardia signaled a new period 
of resurgence of the commemorations of May 1
st
. In 1883, the old tradition 
inaugurated by President J. R. Mora of celebrating the dawn of the national 
holiday with twenty-one blank artillery shots was resurrected. The tradition 
continued in 1885, as the official newspaper La Gaceta described: “Today the 
artillery shots, the sounds of martial music, and especially, the zealous feelings of 
patriotism hailed the memorable day in which the unjust aggressor, seen his forts 
destroyed and his vanquished hordes, shamelessly surrendered in the city of 
Rivas; happy event for the people that struggled for its political freedom, a 
moment that in front of the world could not do less than appear as a motif for 
singular glory for the small but strong Costa Rican nation.”428 The narrative in 
this article follows the already traditional idea of Costa Rica as a nation able to 
take a place in the history of the world. Although the material progress of the 
country was not mentioned, it is obvious that the social and technological 
advances produced during the last decades of the nineteenth century (railroads, 
telegraph, street lights, national archives, national museum, etc.) were material 
tokens Costa Ricans perceived as symbols of development and modernization. In 
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some way the article considers the battle of Rivas of 1857 as the birth of the 
modern nation, the moment in which Costa Rica started to consider itself a 
member of the orchestra of civilized and prosperous nations. 
 After 1885, the celebrations of May 1
st
 did not change much, although 
newspapers showed a greater interest on the commemorations than they did 
before Guardia’s passing. This may be related to the explosion of new newspapers 
in Costa Rica, starting in 1885. The index of the Costa Rican national library 
clearly shows that independent newspapers were a rarity during most of the 
nineteenth century.
429
 Other than the official La Gaceta, the national library 
shows few independent newspapers existing between 1859 and 1885. During this 
period, independent newspapers tended to be close to the official position, and 
usually printed in the same press as the official newspaper. This is the case of 
Nueva Era, the Cartago newspaper printed during the New Era decade.
430
 From 
the years between 1862 and 1869, the national library does not hold any other 
newspaper than the official one.
431
 Between 1870 and 1880, only El 
Costarricense and El Ferrocarril competed with La Gaceta, both newspapers 
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having close connection to Guardia’s administration. By 1887, the catalog shows 
for the first time more than four newspapers listed on the catalog of the national 
library.
432
 After that year, newspaper printing increased. Education reform and 
expansion of the press surely helped to promote the consolidation of the nation-
state, especially when promoting the symbols that would help to shape Costa 
Rican national identity.  
 The celebration of May 1
st
 gathered a renewed strength after 1883, but its 
importance was contested. Since May 1
st
 was also the day in which Congress was 
inaugurated every year, the government made sure this fact did not pass 
unnoticed. Also, other dates were considered to be relevant as symbols of the 
Filibuster War. In 1886, the private newspaper La Chirimía continued the process 
of glorification of the Filibuster War. For the anniversary of the Battle of Santa 
Rosa, an article described March 20, 1856, as the beginning of the “epopee of 
Costa Rican history.”433 Interestingly enough, although the article tried to recover 
the memory of the Battle of Santa Rosa, it also asked for an “intelligent patriot” to 
write its history, since the editor did not consider himself competent for such 
endeavor, claiming a broad ignorance about an event his newspaper was 
promoting. On April 11
th
, the anniversary of the battle of Rivas, another article 
was published referring to the Filibuster War. The name of Juan Santamaría was 
attached to this date, but so were the names of Juan Rafael Mora, Juan Alfaro 
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Ruiz, and José María Cañas.
434
 Finally, on May 1
st
, another article closed the 
trilogy. In it, the editors mentioned the names of four other heroes of the war, 
“Coronel Cauty, Sargento Mayor Máximo Blanco, Capitán Jesús Alvarado y 
soldado Nicolás Aguilar.” The Chirimía confirmed that in later editions it would 
publish articles on these heroes, since they “should be considered as the saviors of 
Central America.”435 The article ended by stating that May 1st represented a 
“synthesis of all heroisms.”436 Opposed to what Plamer implies, Santamaría was 
not alone in his race to hero-hood.  
In 1886 and 1887, the use of artillery to celebrate the holiday was still in 
use.
437
 The official newspaper informed that military bands paraded throughout 
San José playing music according to the sentiments of May 1
st
. At the same time, 
at the main railroad station cannon shots were fired.
438
 In 1889, a newspaper used 
the celebration to refresh the commitment of the Costa Rican soldiers to the 
fatherland, hoping that the memory of the heroes of 1856 and 1857 served as an 
example for them if defense of the national territory was necessary.
439
 As seen 
before, the use of the Filibuster War during this period was connected always to 
the defense of national sovereignty. 
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 The importance of May 1
st
 overwhelmed that of Independence Day, 
celebrated on September 15
th
. Although there were some attempts to establish a 
connection between the two holidays, it was obvious that for Costa Ricans it was 
easier to relate to the Filibuster War than to Independence Day. After all, 
independence came almost by default, and it did not represent necessarily a 
special effort by Costa Ricans. May 1
st
, instead, was the moment in which Costa 
Rica had to stand by itself in order to defend its freedom and its right to exist. 
Moreover, the participation of Costa Rica was crucial for Walker’s defeat. It was 
easy, therefore, to relate to the Filibuster War as the real war of independence, 
one in which Costa Rica stood for Central America, and not vice versa. La Prensa 
Libre was able to encapsulate that sentiment. In an article titled September 15
th
 
and dedicated to Independence Day, this newspaper expressed the importance that 
date had for Central America. Even so, the article claimed that “a day would come 
when its true anniversary will be May 1
st
, a day in which the region accomplished 
its second and definitive autonomy.”440 The following year, La Prensa Libre 
stated on its May 1
st
 edition that “the surrendering of Walker is the real seal of 
independence.”441 In 1895, the year of the unveiling of the National Monument, 
the same newspaper insisted that “for Costa Ricans it is possibly more valuable 
May 1
st
, 1857, than September 15
th, 1821.”442 La Prensa Libre was not alone in 
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this sentiment.
443
 During the end of the nineteenth century, May 1
st
 saw its climax 
as a Costa Rican national holiday, coming to represent the Filibuster War, and 
therefore, the most important date of Costa Rican history, the day in which the 
nation became one, recognizing its individual nationality, and taking a proud 
place among modern nations. 
 In 1887, President Bernardo Soto, the last of the Alajuelan liberals to hold 
power, initiated the process for the building of a statue to Juan Santamaría.
444
 On 
June 8
th
 of that year, he decreed a subscription to collect funds to pay for the costs 
of raising the statue.
445
 The death of Guardia in 1882, and then of Fernández in 
1885, made Soto responsible for initiating a campaign to solidify the Filibuster 
War in the collective memory of Costa Ricans. In 1885, he decreed that two new 
steamers would bear the names, respectively, of Mora and Santamaría.
446
 In 1886, 
he assigned Lorenzo Montúfar to write the first Costa Rican history of the 
Filibuster War.
447
 In 1887 he assigned the sum of 5000 pesos destined to the 
building of Juan Santamaría’s statue.448 That same year, he decreed the creation of 
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a new park in downtown Alajuela as the location of the statue.
449
 In 1888, he also 
decreed the building of the National Monument in San José.
450
 His campaign 
focused on resolving two issues related to official nationalism. First, the death of 
Guardia and Fernández represented the passing of the veteran generation. Their 
physical absence left a vacuum that needed a symbolic filling, which prompted 
Soto to promote, as never before, the creation of an official discourse in relation 
to the war. Second, the publication of Carnevalini’s translation to Spanish of 
Walker’s book created the need for a response from the Costa Rican perspective, 
and with it, the creation of a narrative that could counter the dissemination of the 
filibuster version. 
 Between 1891 and 1895, the celebrations of May 1
st
 were continuously 
celebrated with a hail to the national flag and twenty-one cannon shots.
451
 The 
commemorations included the praising of several heroes of the Filibuster War, 
since May 1
st
 began to represent the war itself, without a specific hero or 
individual image. The names of Mora, Cañas, Guardia, and Santamaría resounded 
constantly, but also those of some heroes not currently well known or studied by 
most Costa Ricans, including Quirós, Escalante, Giralt, Alfaro Ruiz, Blanco, 
Fernández, and Gutiérrez.
452
 
 The end of the nineteenth century confirmed the importance of the 
                                                          
449
 Quoted in: Lemistre Pujol, 92. 
 
450
 Quoted in: Lemistre Pujol, 93. 
 
451
 La Unión Católica. April 30
th
, 1891. La República. May 1
st
, 1891. La Hoja del Pueblo. May 
2
nd
, 1893. El Diarito. May 3
rd
, 1895. 
452
 La Prensa Libre. May 1
st
, 1894. La Unión Católica. “11 de abril de 1856 en Rivas.” Published 
in three parts: April 12
th
, 1893; April 19
th
, 1893; May 3
rd
, 1893. 
228 
 
Filibuster War in the discourse of official nationalism. May 1
st
 became the most 
important day in the civic calendar. As a consequence of the majestic celebrations 
of 1891 and 1895, the euphoria about the Filibuster War spread for years. On May 
1, 1896, newspapers celebrated with strong articles the “surrender of Walker.”453 
For the first time, private businesses took the day off in order to commemorate the 
holiday.
454
 The view of Costa Rica as the main actor during the Filibuster War 
continued to be propagated, reinforcing the idea that the war was an international 
affair, and a reason for Costa Ricans to be proud when “the look of European 
powers fixated in Costa Rica admiring its virility.”455 A strong sense of patriotism 
was imbued on each yearly commemoration, reaching all corners of Costa Rican 
society. In 1897, artillery shots awakened San José, dianas run throughout the city 
while the Costa Rican flag was raised on all public buildings, even on foreign 
embassies.
456
 
 The consolidation of the Filibuster War in the Costa Rican collective 
memory was confronted with change and adaptation, showing a dynamic process 
that transformed the commemorations according to local, national, and 
international events. Juan Rafael Mora started a process of commemoration of the 
war, instituting a holiday on May 1
st
 to celebrate Walker’s surrender to the allied 
Central American army. He also decreed the building of a statue to commemorate 
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the war. After his fall in 1859, the governments of the New Era period silenced 
any celebration of the war, due to its connection to president Mora. A strong 
localism centered in a more conservative Cartago dominated for a decade until a 
veteran of the war, Tomás Guardia, overthrew the clan and imposed his own 
faction. Starting in 1870, a liberal clique centered in Alajuela dominated the 
government, starting a process of reforms that expanded and consolidated the 
state. During Mora’s government, part of the structure of the nation-state was 
already devised, allowing for Guardia’s reforms to be easier to enact. During 
Guardia’s twelve years in power, May 1st was reestablished as a national holiday, 
and references to the Filibuster War were used to promote patriotic sentiments, 
especially during the crises of 1873, 1878, and 1885 when Costa Rica’s 
sovereignty was threatened.  
 Official nationalism in relation to the Filibuster War was established 
during Guardia’s regime. His tendency to associate himself with the Filibuster 
War, as a hero in the battle of San Jorge, enforced the association between the 
state and May 1
st
, and also provided a figurehead that represented the victory 
against Walker and the defense of the nation: Guardia himself. After Guardia’s 
death, his successor, Próspero Fernández, renewed the tradition of celebrating 
May 1
st
 with twenty-one cannon shots, as urged by Mora’s decree of 1857. It was 
the third president of the Alajuelan clan, Bernardo Soto, the one that promoted a 
new phase in the celebrations of the Filibuster War. The passing away of Guardia 
and Fernández signaled the transferring of power from the Filibuster War 
generation to a new one. A new image that represented the war was necessary. 
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The phenomenon of the memory of Juan Santamaría follows Pierre Nora’s 
understanding of the creation of a lieux de mémoire, where collective memory is 
replaced by a symbol that distances itself from the real event to give it a new 
signification. Santamaría is an Alajuelan hero, showing the dominance of that city 
in Costa Rican politics, but he was not a member or partisan of any of the political 
clans, making him easy to digest as a symbol of national consolidation over local 
politics. The rise of Santamaría as national hero was a slow process that had 
several competitors, and not an automatic frenzy as Palmer believes. 
 Soto’s successor, José Rodríguez Zeledón, elected in 1890, represented a 
turnaround from the Alajuela dominance. He was a member of the opposition and 
of the Cartago elite. Moreover, he participated in a revolt against Guardia in 
1876.
457
 It seemed that the rivalry Cartago-Alajuela was to continue, but the 
process of maturation of the nation-state over localism had reached in 1889 a 
point in which the liberal project was able to form a consensus. This explains the 
continuation of the commemorations of May 1
st, and of Soto’s projects by 
Rodríguez Zeledon, allowing for the construction of Santamaría’s statue in 1891. 
This also counts for the unveiling of the National Monument in 1895, this one 
under the presidency of Rafael Yglesias, also a member of the Cartago elite, and 
son-in-law of Rodríguez Zeledón. At the end of the nineteenth century the 
Filibuster War was a cornerstone of Costa Rican national identity and official 
nationalism. The next chapter will take us to the twentieth century, when May 1
st
 
found a rival holiday in the celebrations of April 11
th
, which became an official 
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commemoration in 1915. National and international affairs continued to affect the 
evolution of each holiday, including the crisis of liberalism, the entrance of the 
working classes into politics, and the rise of anti-imperialism in Costa Rica. 
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Chapter 5 
 
THE RETURN OF THE FILIBUSTER MYTH AND CULTURAL ANTI-
IMPERIALISM: CONSOLIDATION OF THE MEMORY OF THE 
FILIBUSTER WAR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY COSTA RICA 
 
While President Guardia (1870-1882) initiated the efforts to restore the 
memory of the Filibuster War, he did so in part to glorify his personal image. It 
was the last member of the Alajuelato, President Bernardo Soto (1885-1889), who 
consolidated the process of creation of a Costa Rican national narrative. In 1886, 
he decreed the writing of a history of the Filibuster War from the Costa Rican 
viewpoint.
458
 The result was Lorenzo Montúfar’s Walker en Centroamérica, a 
large volume that included the history of the war from the clash between 
Conservatives and Liberals in Nicaragua to Walker’s execution five years later on 
an abandoned Honduran beach. Soto’s involvement in the development of a Costa 
Rican national identity based on the Filibuster War produced, along with 
Montúfar’s book, the naming of two new ships as Juan Santamaría and Mora. In 
addition, he declared the erection of two statues, one for Juan Santamaría in 
Alajuela, and the National Monument in San José.  
Soto’s strong interest on the consecration of the Filibuster War in Costa 
Rican collective memory is connected to the publication in 1883 of Fabio 
Carnevalini’s translation of William Walker’s book, The War in Nicaragua. 
According to Soto, this book presented a biased version of the events that 
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completely ignored Central American resilience.
459
 Soto’s decision to support the 
publication of a Costa Rican version of the Filibuster War was an attempt to 
confront two issues that had haunted Costa Rican politics since 1860: the myth of 
the Return of the Filibuster, and the Costa Rican stand on cultural anti-
imperialism. These concepts have never been explored before, and I would like to 
draw attention to them in this chapter.  
The myth of the Return of the Filibuster 
The myth of the Return of the Filibuster refers to the power-seeking nature 
of Walker’s invasion and its connection to U.S. expansionism during the 
nineteenth century. The several attempts by Walker to take over Central America 
between 1855 and 1860 created the perceoved need for constant vigilance against 
further invasions. Costa Ricans became very sensitive to any possibility of 
external incursions. This myth has proven to be of great importance in the Costa 
Rican national discourse since at least 1873. That year, the possibility of a 
Guatemalan invasion became almost a certainty. Since the times of president 
Guardia, references to the Filibuster War coincided with a heightening of threats 
to national sovereignty. The sense that filibuster-like foreing forces would 
continue returning until they finally achieved their goal became a staple of the 
national myth related to the Filibuster War. The fear of a Return of the Filibuster 
is ingrained in Costa Rican consciousness, and it defines its national identity. 
During his administration President Soto established a strong concern with 
cultural anti-imperialism based on the memory of the Filibuster War. Scholars 
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define Cultural Imperialism as the threat that U.S. expansionism represents to 
Latin American cultural sovereignty by means of economic interactions that 
created and reinforced Latin American dependency on the United States.
460
 The 
concept of Cultural anti-imperialism sued here opposes cultural imperialism by 
focusing on the perception of the receiver of an imperialist action, and not on the 
goal of the imperial actor. In the case of the Filibuster War, the translation of 
Walker’s book was not part of any hegemonic agenda on the side of U.S. 
individuals or government. For the Costa Rican president Bernardo Soto, 
however, the translation to Spanish of La Guerra en Nicaragua represented a 
threat to Costa Rican cultural sovereignty. In some ways it was as if the war was 
repeating itself; this time using words as the weapon of preference. Since there 
was no published Costa Rican version of the events, the book threatened to 
cement the memory of the war from the exclusive point of view and interpretation 
of William Walker. To avoid this external influence on Costa Rican collective 
memory, Soto treated Carnevalini’s translation in the same way Guardia treated 
military threats to sovereignty. The book represented a return of the filibuster, and 
Soto decided to confront it with the same weapon: another book. In this way, Soto 
initiated a tactic to combat external ideas about the Filibuster War by devising a 
weapon of cultural anti-imperialism, actively imposing a nationalist view of the 
events to answer against an external threat to Costa Rican national identity.  
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Throughout the twentieth century, Costa Rica found itself confronted with 
several waves of U.S. expansionism, and a battle largely fought in cultural terms 
awakened an anti-imperialist reaction. Soto’s clarion call for cultural resistance to 
assaults on national identity served Costa Ricans well during the twentieth 
century when confronted with Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the 
U.S. acquisition of the Panama Canal, numerous interventions in Central 
American domestic affairs, and Cold War proxy wars. Costa Rica successfully 
drove U.S. military plans from its shores without lifting a gun. Indeed, I argue that 
especially after 1948 cultural anti-imperialism helped raise the nation above 
military conflict, since Costa Ricans had prided themselves in abolishing the army 
and using peaceful methods of sorting out political differences among citizens and 
between nations. Cultural cohesion met imperialist threats by substituting fear and 
anger with collective confidence and solidarity. Often forgotten in assessments of 
national defense, I argue that cultural anti-imperialism is a fundamental element 
in drawing and defending national boundaries. The original defeat of Walker has 
created a sense of collective confidence among Costa Ricans, allowing them to 
stand their ground against threats to national sovereignty and U.S. imperialist 
manipulation and influence. 
To understand the importance of the myth of the Return of the Filibuster 
and its influence on cultural anti-imperialism reaction in Costa Rica, this chapter 
will analyze commemorations of the Filibuster War during the first half of the 
twentieth century. During this period, May 1
st
, the holiday that traditionally 
celebrated the Filibuster War, suffered several attacks. The rise of the 
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international labor movement promoted by anarchists and socialist groups 
represented a threat to the governing liberal elites. The declaration of May 1
st
 as 
International Labor Day created a fixed date in which labor organizations 
demonstrated their force while demanding social reform. In Costa Rica, the 
confluence of May 1
st
 as both the day of Walker’s surrender and Labor Day 
promoted the substitution of May 1
st
 by April 11
th
 as the national holiday 
commemorating the Filibuster War. In terms of cultural anti-imperialism, calls to 
defend national sovereignty continued to use images related to the memory of the 
Filibuster War. This is present in the reaction to U.S. expansionism during the 
twentieth century, the war against Panamá in 1921, and the opening of the Cold 
War. 
May 1
st
, the Filibuster War, Labor Day, and Arbor Day 
 During the twentieth century, May 1
st
 suffered a different fate than it had 
during the nineteenth century. While Santamaría’s image and the celebrations of 
April 11
th
 were on the rise, May 1
st
 started to decline. The fall of May 1
st
 as the 
day commemorating the Filibuster War did respond to ideological reasons, both at 
the national and at the international level. The rise of May 1
st
 as International 
Labor Day around the world made the celebration of the Costa Rican May 1
st
 
problematic. The commemoration of the Filibuster War had clear anti-imperialist 
and nationalistic meanings, and Labor Day, as a socialist celebration, promoted an 
anti-capitalist, anti-oligarchic, and anti-imperialist message. While both 
celebrations agreed on their anti-imperialist characteristics, the liberal oligarchies 
that controlled power thought it necessary to separate the meaning of Labor Day 
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and the Filibuster War to protect the nationalistic meanings of the second and 
separate from them the anti-status quo rhetoric. 
 The ascendance of U.S. imperialism and intervention in Latin America 
reminded Costa Ricans of the dangers they suffered from the same source in 1856 
and 1857. The slicing of Panama from Colombia (1903), and the invasions of 
Cuba (1898, 1906–1909, 1912, 1917-1921, and 1934), Nicaragua (1898, 1899, 
1907, 1912–1933) and Honduras (1903, 1907) made Roosevelt’s Big Stick a 
common referent of U.S. intentions for the region. The usual expressions of joy 
for the commemoration of May 1
st
 became gloomier with the news of renewed 
U.S. expansionism. On May 1
st
, 1907, an editorial titled 1 de Mayo (May 1
st
), the 
newspaper La Prensa Libre, a traditional liberal newspaper, expressed its concern 
about U.S. expansionism.
461
 In it, the war of 1856 and 1857 was defined as a 
struggle to keep the country independent from foreign powers, “because it is well 
known that Walker, a Yankee by nationality and temperament, with North 
American help… pretended to dominate this small isthmus and reinforce with it 
the Yankee Slavist Party.”462 Showing concern for the return of a new kind of 
filibuster threat to Costa Rica, the writer warned: “being Yankee filibusterism 
defeated fifty years ago, it still has not abandoned the main idea that guided it 
from the beginning. Now it takes the name of expansionism and it works, works 
without truce to reach the goal of its purposes. The danger grows larger against 
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these five little pieces of a nation…”463 Coming from a pro-liberal newspaper, the 
message contained a strong nationalistic sentiment, typical of any reference to the 
Filibuster War. At the same time, it served as an example of how U.S. 
expansionism was perceived in Costa Rica during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
The rise of International Labor Day, and its influence on Costa Rican 
politics, was responsible for a growing disconnection between May 1
st
 and the 
Filibuster War. In Chicago, on May 1st of 1886, a movement supporting the 
establishment of an eight-hour work day ended with a confrontation between 
workers and the police. Some of the protest leaders were accused of throwing a 
bomb and were subsequently tried and executed. The event, known as the 
Haymarket Affair, inspired the commemoration of this day as International 
Workers’ Day by the International Working Congress in Paris, in 1889.464 This 
influenced the nascent Costa Rican workers’ movement, which by the end of the 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century was also on the rise. By 
1905 the first Workers’ Federation was created, followed by the founding of the 
Workers’ National Confederation in 1913.465  
Workers’ demands for social justice and social reform included an 
internationalist approach to condemn imperialism. Socialists believed that 
imperialism was responsible for war. The argument was that war affected 
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primarily the working classes while supporting the oligarchy’s goals. Therefore, 
socialists considered anti-imperialism as a natural goal for workers’ organizations. 
As an example, in 1910, several protests in Costa Rica asking for higher salaries 
and the establishment of an eight-hour work day also included demonstrations 
against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.
466
 In 1912, one of the protests against U.S. 
military invasion and occupation of Nicaragua was repressed by the 
government.
467
 As a result, the next year the Confederación Nacional de 
Trabajadores established May 1
st
 as a day when workers would unite in an annual 
parade to ask for their rights, protest against the oligarchy, and demand the end of 
imperial advances in the region.
468
  
 Starting in 1913, May 1
st
 became a dual-purpose holiday, celebrating on 
one hand the past glories of the Filibuster War, and on the other hand, serving as a 
date to remember the issues confronted by the working class. Both 
commemorations shared in condemning U.S. imperialism and expansionism. The 
problem was that the original meaning behind the commemoration of May 1
st
 was 
attached to national sovereignty, while Labor Day celebrations were imbued by an 
internationalist cause for social justice. This created a problem for the traditional 
liberal Costa Rican state, which had been legitimized by using nationalistic and 
patriotic symbols derived from the memory of the Filibuster War. Now it was 
confronted by the contradiction of repressing Costa Rican workers protesting 
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against abusive labor conditions, mostly by foreign corporations such as the 
United Fruit Company, while the same day celebrating the defense of national 
sovereignty. 
That year, 1913, newspapers acknowledged the coexistence of both 
holidays.
469
 La Información, for example, published an editorial note titled 
¡Gloria a los héroes! ¡Salud al Trabajo!... (Glory to the heroes! Hail Work!...), in 
which it stated that May 1, 1913, would be recorded in history because it was a 
day to remember “the glory of the heroes that defeated the buccaneer Walker,” 
while celebrating for the first time the union of workers against traditional 
politics.
470
 This connection between labor and the Filibuster War was also used by 
organized workers. In 1913, Hoja Obrera, a labor unions’ newspaper, published a 
poem written by one of its readers, a worker named Eugenio Peralta. One of its 
verses read: 
It is just and fair to send our protest 
against the northern vulture, black plague of the world… 
William Walker is returning to the world with his stench 
of vandals and brutes that yesterday… 
just yesterday, we defeated!
471
 
 
The anarchist discourse of Labor Day, and the appropriation of May 1
st
 by 
labor organizations, represented a threat to the traditional message 
commemorating the Filibuster War alone. As a result, the connection between 
                                                          
469
 La Aurora Social. May 8
th
, 1913, p. 2. La Información. May 1
st
, 1913, p.2.  
 
470
 La Información. May 1st, 1913, p. 2. 
 
471
 Hoja Obrera. August 14
th
, 1913, p. 3. Quoted in Mario Oliva Medina. Artesanos y Obreros 
Costarricenses, 1880–1914. San José: EUNED, 2006. 
241 
 
Labor Day and the Filibuster War started to decline almost immediately, and the 
state withdrew its support for the celebration of May 1
st
. In 1917, La Información 
commented on the connection between both holidays without appealing to the 
traditional defense-of-sovereignty approach, focusing instead on a message that 
embraced the nation in a positivistic context of progress and order without class 
struggle. In its editorial article, titled “For the Nation and the Workers,” the 
newspaper described May 1
st
 as “the day when we feel the joy of freedom, 
bravely conquered by our grandparents; it is the day when all workers meet, rest, 
and contemplate the future, forgetting for a moment the pains of the past, feeling 
hope rising in their hearts.”472 
A strategy was devised by the liberal oligarchy to reestablish a holiday 
that protected the values of defending the national boundaries and sovereignty 
without threatening the liberal government’s status quo. First, there was an effort 
to dilute the importance Labor Day had been gaining. Second, the state developed 
a new, separate holiday dedicated exclusively to the Filibuster War. In this way, 
the nationalistic meanings of the war that consolidated Costa Rican and Central 
American sovereignty could be separated from any other commemoration, 
avoiding the appropriation of its patriotic message and neutralizing its use against 
the state or against international corporations allied with the oligarchy. The result 
was the state support for an innocuous Arbor Day on May 1
st
, and the 
establishment in 1915 of April 11
th
 as the new official holiday to commemorate 
the Filibuster War. 
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Arbor Day was a short-lived, invented tradition to be celebrated on May 
1
st
 and directed to divert the socialist message of Labor Day. During the first 
years of the workers’ movement, the unions existed under the strong influence of 
the dominant classes, which favored a reformist and reconciliatory attitude.
473
 
One of the most important unions, the Sociedad Federal de Trabajadores de Costa 
Rica (Costa Rican Workers’ Federal Society) or SFTCR, was successfully 
infiltrated by the government, demonstrating a close connection to it. In 1920, for 
example, the main speaker for the SFTCR celebrations of Labor Day was none 
other than the Costa Rican President, Julio Acosta.
474
 
It was precisely the SFTCR that showed the strongest support for the 
celebration of Arbor Day. Due to its proximity to the beginning of the rainy 
season, unions celebrated Arbor Day with a spring-like ceremony of the planting 
of trees. To explain the connection between Labor Day and Arbor Day, the 
president of the SFTCR expressed in his 1913 speech: “we decided to break with 
the old myths and not celebrate Labor Day with the usual meetings, but instead, to 
have a festivity useful for everybody. That is how the idea of Arbor Day was 
born.”475  
For the celebrations of May 1, 1915, the SFTCR established a clear 
message to support their joined Fiesta del Trabajo and Fiesta del Arbol 
celebrations. In a speech delivered by Luis Cruz Meza, May 1
st
 became a 
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reincarnation of the values of Ceres, the Roman goddess of agriculture.
476
 For the 
SFTCR, May 1
st
 was not an invocation of anti-imperialism, or a day to remember 
the Filibuster War. Instead, it was a moment of “confraternity and love…a 
festivity for those that sweat…that produce…not for parasites, a festivity for those 
that live for the Patria, not of those that live off the Patria.”477 Labor and nature 
condensed the values expressed in this speech. Referencing ancient Greece, the 
speaker was able to recall times when labor and nature had an intrinsic 
connection. He argued that the Costa Rican state should do well in imitating 
ancient Greece, promoting the love for land and work, “because love for nature 
translates into crops.”478 The speaker continued with this romantic view of an 
agricultural society by explaining that when men are taught to love the land they 
would be able to “live in a firm, growing community.”479 The support of the state 
for this diluted version of Labor Day was affirmed by Congressman Leonidas 
Briceño, who answered Cruz Meza’s speech by arguing that “this festivity the 
STFCR has created is the festivity of the future for our soil,” “Blessed be God for 
so much prodigy he has created!”480 
The partial success of Arbor Day is explained by the fact that in Costa 
Rica, workers’ unions and Labor Day were created under the shadow of declining 
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agricultural life. Since the 1870s, Costa Rica suffered drastic changes in its 
economy and demographics, which soon affected the traditional social 
connections with agriculture and small land-holding. That decade saw the 
inauguration of the railroad, and with it, large Italian, Spanish, West Indian, and 
Chinese immigration. The railroad was also responsible for the creation of banana 
enclaves and the funding of the United Fruit Company. The concentration of land 
by large coffee growers and the fall of coffee prices in international markets 
promoted internal immigration from rural areas to the cities, with the obvious 
threat to traditional culture and the psychological disconnection of the new urban 
inhabitants.
481
 The new immigrants, national and international, found that 
worker’s unions served as a cohesive community in which all members could 
participate. Establishing Arbor Day along with the celebrations of Labor Day can 
only be understood as a nostalgic call for past times in which labor had a strong 
connection with community and, especially, nature.
482
 
Another factor that helped to divest May 1
st
 of its symbology in relation to 
the Filibuster War was the promotion of a new holiday to commemorate it.  In 
1915, the government finally established April 11
th
 as a new official holiday to 
celebrate the battle of Rivas and the figure of Juan Santamaría. At the same time, 
the government stopped celebrating May 1
st
. As a consequence, 1916 was the last 
year that May 1
st
 was commemorated with the traditional 21 gun salute in honor 
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of the victory over the filibusters.
483
 The confusing messages surrounding May 
1
st
, and the establishment of April 11
th
 as a new holiday commemorating the 
Filibuster War produced a disengagement with the original holiday created by 
President Mora in 1857. The move was so successful that in 1921, a newspaper 
commented that some people thought about “reviving the ancient custom of 
celebrating the civic festivities in the month of May, but the idea has not found 
enough resonance.”484  
The government’s abandonment of May 1st as the holiday that celebrated 
the Filibuster War promoted a drastic disinterest in the commemoration. On May 
1
st
, 1924, there was still a mention of Walker’s defeat on the main page of the 
Diario de Costa Rica.
485
 The following year, only a very brief note was 
published.
486
 In 1925, only one school visited the National Monument. The 
government, instead, focused on the inauguration of Congress with the presence 
of military bands and the shooting of 21 gun salutes to celebrate the political 
event, but not the memory of the Filibuster War.
487
 The state had withdrawn all 
support for May 1
st
 as a celebration of the Filibuster War, and therefore 
eliminated it from the public sphere. Now, instead, May 1
st
 was used to celebrate 
the state itself in the figure of Congress. May 1
st
, as the epicenter of the memory 
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of the Filibuster War was celebrated only one more time, in 1929. The reason was 
the inauguration of a monument to president Mora in San José, corroborating 
once again the importance of official influence on the celebration of this date.
488
  
The tactic of diluting May 1
st
 worked very well. By 1921, the traditional 
dianas and 21 gun salutes were no longer in use in San José. Arbor Day also fell 
into decay; being unnecessary after it accomplished its goal of distracting the 
unions. Newly established labor organizations eliminated all references to nature, 
including the SFTCR. Instead, most unions started to focus on political issues and 
demands of social reform, and they ceased recognizing May 1
st
 as Arbor Day. 
There were no Labor Day celebrations in 1918, 1919, 1921, 1924, 1929, 1930, or 
1931.
489
 The strength Labor Day had acquired during the second decade of the 
century was soon lost and not even the newspapers were interested in mentioning 
it.  
 The potential threat that May 1
st
 and remembrance of the Filibuster War 
represented for the oligarchy was dismantled by the state in a multidirectional 
way. According to modernizing theories, nationalism is useful for the state to 
create cohesion around the goals of the dominant elites. When nationalism 
becomes a tool used by the popular classes, instead, it can threaten the relations 
the state has with either international corporations or its patron-client associations 
with other states. The coincidence of the celebrations of Labor Day and Walker’s 
surrender on May 1
st
 produced a conflict over the meaning of nationalism, 
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promoting popular requests for a nationalist support for social justice while 
pushing aside the traditional loyalty for the governing elites. To counter the 
growing importance of Labor Day, the state’s first answer was to co-opt the labor 
movement through the support of the Arbor Day celebration, with relative success 
on diffusing the class struggle message of May Day. Finally, the government 
decided to stop the support to the celebrations of the Filibuster War on May 1
st
, 
eliminating the traditional dianas, blank shots, and Te Deums.  
The value of the Filibuster War memory could not be lost, and the state 
recognized the usefulness of its nationalistic message. Luckily for the state, since 
the death of Guardia in 1882 and Fernández in 1885, a renewed interest in the 
memory of the Filibuster War brought plenty of heroes to celebrate, but, 
especially, it gave the option of a recognizable date that could substitute May 1
st
. 
It happened that April 11
th
 and the figure of Juan Santamaría were already 
celebrated on a local level in Alajuela. In 1915, the declaration of April 11
th
 as the 
new national holiday celebrating the Filibuster War responded to the need to 
disconnect the meanings of Labor Day from those related to the Filibuster War. 
Once April 11
th
 gained enough celebrity, it was not necessary to revive May 1
st
. 
Starting in 1916, April 11
th
 was officially celebrated at the national level, which 
was also the last year the government showed interest in celebrating May 1
st
. 
Requiem May 1
st
! 
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The Filibuster War During the Twentieth Century: April 11
th
 and Cultural 
Anti-Imperialism. 
 The war between the United States and Spain in 1898, and Washington’s 
subsequent takeover of Cuba and Puerto Rico, awakened an anti-imperialist and 
anti-expansionits reaction in Latin America. In Costa Rica, anti-imperialism, and 
especially anti-U.S. imperialism could only be translated into a resurrection of the 
memory of the Filibuster War. One aspect of this anti-imperialist reaction can be 
seen in the literature of this time. In 1901, the first Costa Rican short story 
focusing exclusively on the Filibuster War was published. Its author was Ricardo 
Fernández Guardia, a known intellectual, whose family already had left their 
imprint on Costa Rican nationalism. Fernández Guardia was the son of León 
Fernández, a historian, and a close friend of President Tomás Guardia. León 
Fernández collected documents in Spain, Mexico, and Guatemala that related to 
Costa Rican colonial history, and he donated them to the emergent National 
Archives. This alone was an important step for the spread of official nationalism.  
Fernández Guardia, who also became a prominent historian, was a 
member of an intellectual elite group known as El Olimpo (Olympus, due to their 
high status and inaccessibility). The group, although mostly without formal ties, 
worked to forge a sense of national identity through literature, journalism, and 
history.  Some members of El Olimpo were also members of the political elite, 
and Cleto González Víquez (1906-1910, 1928-1932) and Ricardo Jiménez 
Oreamuno (1910-1914, 1924-1928, 1932-1936), became presidents of Costa Rica 
years later. 
249 
 
Fernández Guardia’s short story, published in the book Cuentos Ticos, was 
titled Un Héroe (A hero), and focused on an obscure character that served in all 
the main battles of the Filibuster War, including Santa Rosa, Rivas, and the naval 
battle where the schooner 11 de Abril was lost.
490
 The story includes the first 
description of Santamaría’s feat in a work of fiction, based on traditional 
accounts, and possibly also on the witness accounts collected by the Municipality 
of Alajuela in 1891.
491
  
Other members of the Olimpo, writers and historians as Carlos Gagini 
Cleto González, and Ricardo Fernández, also took interest on the topic of the 
Filibuster War. In 1918, Carlos Gagini published El árbol enfermo (The sick 
tree), a novel in which a young woman, symbolizing the nation, was caught in an 
internal struggle to either stay loyal to the traditional local elite by marrying a 
Costa Rican young man or to fall into the arms of a foreign businessman.
492
 The 
novel appeals to fears of cultural imperialism, a surrender to the vibrant novelty 
and success of the U.S. economy. The conflict represented a raising doubt among 
the elites related to the remaining loyal to traditions or opening themselves to 
foreign influence to assure the benefits of an economic alliance with the United 
States. 
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 Definitely influenced by the events of World War I, Gagini answered the 
question originally raised in El Arbol Enfermo with a Vernesque science-fiction 
novel in which, in an alternative reality, an anti-imperialist alliance was about to 
change the face of the world. La Caída del Aguila (The Eagle’s Fall), published in 
1920, was set in a U.S. dominated Central America, where Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Big Stick policies transformed each country into a colony.
493
 In Costa Rica, the 
statue to Juan Santamaría was substituted with a statue to William Walker and the 
National Monument was replaced by another one dedicated to Woodrow Wilson. 
The main character of the novel was Roberto Mora, a descendant of President 
Mora, who, as his succesor, was due to become the leader of a war against the 
invaders from the north. The attack that signaled the defeat and immediate 
surrender of the United States happened, not coincidentally, on May 1
st
. The 
message of the novel was directed against all types of imperialist aspirations, 
since in it, after the United States surrendered and liberated all its colonies, France 
and England were forced to do the same. 
 The last part of Gagini’s anti-imperialist trilogy was a short novel 
published in 1922, named El Erizo.
494
 The title refers to the nickname of Juan 
Santamaría, and it is a romantic approach to the life of the Costa Rican hero. In 
the novel, Santamaría sacrificed himself in a show of love for the woman he cares 
for. To clarify the meaning behind the story, it is important to note that in these 
three novels, women represent more than just a female character. They embody 
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the nation, or, as in La Caída del Aguila, humanity. In El Erizo, Santamaría dies 
to gain the favor of the woman he loves. The image Gagini wanted to portray was 
that of Santamaría gaining a special place in the memory of the nation (the 
woman he loves) with his sacrifice.  
 April 11
th
, along with the figure of Santamaría, rose as the new symbols of 
the Filibuster War at the same time the importance of May 1
st
 decayed. There is 
clear evidence of a celebration of April 11
th
 during the early twentieth century in 
Santamaría’s native city, Alajuela, and there is a possibility that this was 
promoted by the unveiling of Santamaría’s statue in 1891. It is possible that his 
feat was also taught in local schools, since only a recognizable figure could have 
had such an easy acceptance once April 11
th
 became a national holiday. The 
survival of Santamaría’s story as part of the Alajuelan local collective memory 
definitely established him as a popular figure, making him a good choice for a 
symbol of the Costa Rican nation-state. The popularity of the young drummer 
made his image malleable and easy to embed with nationalistic and patriotic 
meanings. 
During the first decade of the twentieth century the place of Santamaría in 
collective imaginary resided outside of the official discourse, which was still 
focused on celebrating May 1
st
. In the city of Alajuela, Santamaría started to gain 
a strong position in local mythology. There is clear evidence that local authorities 
in Alajuela supported the celebration of April 11
th
 in 1901, 1904, 1907, 1908, and 
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1912.
495
 Also, in 1908, they changed the Alajuelan coat of arms, establishing a 
direct connection with Santamaría and the Filibuster War. Under a Costa Rican 
flag, the coat or arms showed a Phrygian cap that symbolized republicanism, 
representing the liberal ideas espoused by Alajuela during the nineteenth century. 
Next to the cap, the coat of arms showed Santamaría’s torch, a symbol of freedom 
and sacrifice. The motto states: Pro Patria Nostra Sanguis Noster (For our 
country, our blood), establishing Alajuela’s pride and identity based on 
Santamaría’s feat. 
 
Figure 2 Coat of Arms of the Municipality of Alajuela. Modern version. The Phrygian cap is now 
located at the head, Santamaría’s torch still takes half of the coat of arms.  (Photo Xela Cabrera 
Geserick, 2011). 
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By 1913, the Alajuelan celebration of April 11
th
 developed further. That 
year, ceremonial speeches indicated a vigorous interest in defining a specific 
meaning of the commemorations. By 1915, April 11
th
 was finally elevated to the 
rank of national holiday. On June 18
th
 of that year, President Alfredo González 
Flores signed the decree that established April 11
th
 as a national holiday for 
perpetuity.
496
 On April 11
th
, 1916, the first official holiday dedicated to 
Santamaría signaled the transformation of April 11
th
 into the main holiday 
celebrating the Filibuster War, in detriment of May 1
st
. During the 
commemorations of April 11
th
, 1916, Costa Rican Secretary of State Claudio 
González Rucavado asserted that Juan Santamaría’s feat, and therefore its 
celebration, should not have any kind of competition. “It seems as though our 
national imaginary” –  said González – “could not admit any other eagle besides 
its courageous flight.”497 For León Cortés, congressman for Alajuela and future 
President of Costa Rica (1936-1940), the Filibuster War established the right of 
Costa Rica to be recognized by the world as an independent nation. According to 
Cortés, in 1856 “Costa Rica acquired the right, established by the blood shed by 
its sons, to the respect of powerful foreigners to…the integrity of its territory and 
the efficiency of its freedoms.”498 Newspapers compared the battle of Rivas to 
Thermopylae, and authors chided the fear of a new kind of filibusterism with their 
anti-imperialistic rhetoric, specifically in the figure anyone who would “kneel in 
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front of the dollar.”499 Following this concept was the anti-imperialist diatribe by 
the young leader of the “Juan Rafael Mora” boy-scout company, Ricardo Gólcher, 
who described the filibusters as “tyrants swollen by greed that wanted to force us 
to join to their customs… Let’s love our land, do not let anybody insult its 
sovereignty. Better to die before allowing that to happen!”500 
It may sound ironic to think of a Costa Rican child dressed as a boy-scout 
talking about sovereignty. This apparent contradiction is explained by 
understanding the concept of cultural anti-imperialism. Cultural anti-imperialism 
is an analysis of the position and value of cultural expressions that opposes 
cultural imperialism, focusing not on the goals of the empire, but on how the 
periphery defines imperial expansion. The concept of cultural imperialism 
assumes that when one country (i.e., the empire) exerts economic or political 
control over another one, it forces its values and habits onto a dependent society 
through media and consumption.
501
 Following our example, cultural imperialism 
would propose that the boy-scouts, a typical U.S. cultural product, are part of an 
imperialist agenda directed to spread U.S. values throughout Latin America to 
conquer the minds of the inhabitants of that region.  This, of course, is very 
unlikely. The boy-scouts were neither the first nor the last idea Costa Ricans 
introduced into their society that were initially developed in the United States or 
Europe. After all, Latin America, as part of the West, has always considered 
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developments in the other parts of the Americas as well as in Europe as part of its 
own heritage. The concept of cultural anti-imperialism, applied here, does not see 
adaptation of cultural expressions on the possible intentions of the empire, but 
instead, it focuses on the eye of the beholder. Using cultural anti-imperialism, we 
can understand how certain actions that can be perceived as threatening for Costa 
Rican sovereignty will be naturally confronted with resistance and rejection. 
Foreign influence that does not represent an act of intervention, instead, will be 
perfectly acceptable. Since only Costa Ricans can decide what they as a society 
consider threatening, they carry the weight of interpretation. Under cultural anti-
imperialism, it is not relevant if the United States, or any other power for that 
matter, is actively trying to intervene in Costa Rican affairs, but how much Costa 
Ricans consider imperialist motives and behaviors of the hegemon a threat. In the 
case of the boy-scouts, Costa Rica adopted the organization and it reannointed it a 
Costa Rican nationalist activity.  
An example of how cultural anti-imperialism works is the development of 
the myth of the Return of the Filibuster in Costa Rica. Since the times of President 
Tomás Guardia, references to the filibusters have always showcased the defeat of 
the threat to sovereignty. This reflects the fact that Walker himself was able to 
return again and again to continue his plans to conquer Costa Rica and Central 
America. For five years (1855-1860), the name of Walker represented a looming 
menace. Every time he was defeated, he returned. President Mora knew about 
Walker’s intentions in 1855. In November of that year, he issued a proclamation 
warning Costa Ricans of the threat. In February, 1856, Costa Rica was at war, and 
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in March Costa Rica was invaded. By April, it seemed that Costa Rican forces 
were able to stop Walker, but then the cholera epidemic forced Costa Ricans to 
abandon Nicaragua. Six months later, the threat continued to grow and Costa Rica 
had to renew the war. Finally, on May 1, 1857, Walker surrendered. The filibuster 
left the region and returned to the United States. A few months later, news of a 
possible attack by Walker reached President Mora, who issued a decree informing 
the public that any person who formed part of any filibuster contingent, in the 
past, present, or future would be executed.
502
  Indeed, rumors were correct, and on 
November, 1857, Walker attacked Costa Rican positions in the San Juan River.
503
 
A month later, Walker returned to the United States after being arrested by 
Captain Paulding of the U.S. Navy. In June, 1860, Walker returned once more to 
Central America, attacking the town of Trujillo, Honduras. Finally, in September, 
1860, William Walker was captured, and after a trial, executed. The constant 
threat of Walker created the sense that the filibusters would continue to return 
until achieving their goal.  
This traumatic recurrence became a staple of the Costa Rican national 
myth related to the Filibuster War. As a Sword of Damocles, the filibuster was a 
figure that represented, and continues to represent, any kind of threat to national 
security, especially to national identity and national sovereignty. This explains the 
constant returning to the image of the filibusters every time sovereignty is 
threatened. As we saw in the last chapter, the invasions of Federico Mora, and the 
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threats of Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios, were perceived as a 
renewal of filibustering adventures, defined as such on newspapers and official 
speeches.  
During the twentieth century, a facet of the return of the filibuster myth 
was present during the border conflict that in 1921 brought Costa Rica and 
Panamá to a military confrontation. As Venita Datta mentions in the case of fin-
de-siècle France, imminent external threat is a powerful tool for nationalist 
revivals.
504
 Both countries disputed the exact position of the border, tensions 
arising since the creation of Panamá in 1903. Both countries agreed to turn the 
case over to an international commission that would help to settle the issue. In 
1921, and following the resolutions of French President Emile Loubet, and the 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Edward White, Costa Rica decided to 
take possession of the town of Coto, close to the border with Panama. 
Panamanians considered this an invasion of their territory and took the town back. 
The problem escalated and soon both countries rallied to build their armies. 
Costa Rica lacked a large standing army needed to fight the war. To fill 
the gap and to promote enrollment, newspapers became the main tool to create 
popular enthusiasm and support for the war. Following Benedict Anderson’s 
premise of the importance of media for the development of nationalism, it does 
not come as a surprise that newspapers invoked patriotism by recalling a Costa 
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Rican victory with militias.
505
 Datta points out that there must be an appeal to a 
glorious past that can be used as an example for new generations.
506
 The myth of 
the Return of the Filibuster was, of course, the main and possibly the only theme 
available to inspire Costa Ricans to go to war. Local newspapers made sure to use 
it in their patriotic calls.  
An article reporting the initial manifestations of support for the 
government already showed strong calls for patriotism. On March 1
st
, while the 
army was sent to reinforce the position at Coto, the main cities held patriotic 
demonstrations in favor of the Costa Rican militias. In Heredia, “no less than 
three hundred men walked through the streets hailing the Patria and offering their 
blood to bathe the national flag with honor.”507 In Alajuela, references to the 
Filibuster War were the main argument for patriotism. A newspaper reported that 
a crowd gathered “at the foot of the statue of the humble drummer Juan 
Santamaría, where the Alajuelans swore to offer, once again, their blood for the 
integrity of the Republic, and to repeat the feat of Rivas if it becomes necessary to 
burn another Mesón in order to expell the invader.”508 
The official rhetoric served also as an example of the use of the memory 
of the Filibuster War. In a speech given on February 28
th
, 1921, at the main 
station of the train to the Pacific, President Julio Acosta greeted the troops headed 
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to Coto, declaring: “lucky you that will exchange your miserable flesh for the 
bronze that lives (forever). This is a solemn moment. We now have the privilege 
of following in the steps of our grandparents in their heroic feats of 1856 and 
1857.”509  
Victories at the front were celebrated with more references to the 
Filibuster War. “Our young soldiers comply as their grandparents did in 1856,” 
said a newspaper, adding that: “you would see a virile and valiant people 
exchange their rough tools for weapons.”510 This is a clear reference to the 
national anthem, which, as María Amoretti has demonstrated, is based on 
President Mora’s speeches during the Filibuster War.511 The invasion of 
Panamanian forces to Costa Rican territory was in this manner easily connected to 
the filibuster invasion of 1856, reinforcing the myth of the return of the filibuster.  
President Mora’s words served as one of the main symbols used during the 
war against Panama. Another article published during the war used one of 
President Mora’s original speeches as incentive for patriotism. The speech was 
mixed with comments to redirect its meaning to the Panamanian War: 
Costa Ricans (in that manner started the vibrant proclamation by Mora 
when in 1856 the filibusters wanted to transform our Patria in a 
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dependency. Those words of the old and valiant leader acquire further 
value each time they are mentioned, and so, we hear him yell): Costa 
Ricans: peace, that virtuous peace that joined to your laborious 
perseverance has augmented our credit, our richness, and our happiness, is 
now perfidiously threatened (it seems to us that his gallant figure stands 
now with words of fire: Before from the north, today from the South… The 
words of Mora are still resonating… listen to the voice of Mora!)512 
 
 The image of Santamaría and Mora were constantly used during the short 
war. In Alajuela, voluntary forces took up arms, forming the battalion 
“Santamaría,” and the battalion “11 de Abril”, a fact so symbolic that it was 
mentioned decades later in one of the most important novels in Costa Rican 
literature.
513
 On the other hand, invocations to Mora pertain to the need of a 
mythic triumphant commander. While Santamaría serves as a figure to promote 
courageous actions, the emergence of the image of Mora provides confidence on 
the figure of the leaders of the nation.  
The leader of the battalion sent to reinforce Coto, Colonel Miguel 
Obregón, also a writer, was wrongly reported to have fallen in battle while being 
transported in a boat to the battlefront. Believing him dead, Omar Dengo, a fellow 
writer, described him in the terms in vogue at the time: “Brother: Juan 
Santamaría’s symbol is the torch, yours is the prow of a boat… There where you 
fell with your legion, the sea – as a voice of the fate of the Patria – responds the 
scream for freedom of Juan the soldier…”514 
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 The war with Panama awakened the memory of the Filibuster War, in the 
same way that any threat to sovereignty or invasion did before 1921 and has done 
since then. The first decades of the twentieth century were of constant 
commemoration, especially in connection with the Filibuster War. In 1914, the 
centenary of the birth of President Mora was celebrated. In 1916, the first official 
celebration of April 11
th
 became an event of national dimensions. In 1921, the war 
against Panamá served to renew the commitment to national sovereignty, and to 
the memory of the Filibuster War. During this period, anti-imperialism was also a 
developing sentiment.  
 By the 1920s, the figure of Santamaría had been consolidated, while, as 
we saw above, May 1
st
 was being relegated and finally abandoned by the state. 
While the intention of the government was to exscind nationalism from anti-
imperialism, the 1930s witnessed the ascendance of the figure of Santamaría as an 
anti-imperialist figure, something also recognized by international figures. In 
1930, one of the most important Latin American figures of the moment, Mexican 
politician and philosopher José Vasconcelos, participated in the celebrations of 
April 11
th
 in Alajuela. The author of The Cosmic Race and former Mexican 
Minister of Education and presidential candidate, described Santamaría as the 
Latin American hero par excellence.
515
 In a speech given to celebrate the Costa 
Rican national hero, Vasconcelos acknowledged the importance of the Filibuster 
War, declaring that April 11
th
 would be “soon celebrated across the whole 
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continent.”516 For Vasconcelos, “Santamaría was the true hero of our race: others 
fought against Spain, mother, after all, of these countries. Juan, instead, fought 
against the only enemy we have had, the filibusters. That is why El Erizo is the 
continental symbol of our race.”517 
The following year, Costa Rican newspapers mentioned the arrival of a 
famous visitor from the United States, comedian Will Rogers. While traveling to 
Panama, he stopped in Costa Rica precisely on April 10
th
, 1931. In an interview, 
Rogers commented on his fascination with Costa Rican nature and criticized the 
economic crisis in the United States as well as the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua. 
He also acknowledged April 11
th
, the celebration of the anniversary of the 
Filibuster War, by sending a telegram to about 400 newspapers in the United 
States stating: “I am in Costa Rica. Tomorrow this country celebrates the patriotic 
holiday of April 11
th
, anniversary of the definitive defeat of the filibusters. Think I 
will feel here as an Englishman could feel in the United States on July 4
th.”518 
In 1931, the city of Alajuela celebrated the centenary of Juan Santamaría’s 
birth. While April 11
th
 continued to be remembered in relation to Santamaría’s 
martyrdom in Rivas, the main celebrations focused on August 29
th
, the birthday of 
the hero. This event served to define the meaning of the figure of Santamaría. The 
celebrations of August 29
th
 also illuminate that the creation of collective memory 
is a dynamic process, in which there are several levels of meaning. Some of these 
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lines repeat well established narratives; others attempt to recover old, lost 
messages; while at the same time applying new meanings to the original concepts. 
During Santamaría’s centenary, the myth of the Return of the Filibuster continued 
to be present, while a new description of Santamaría was being developed, 
portraying him as a humble countryside teenager. This image served both to 
emphasize his connection with the national values of a rural democracy, while at 
the same time representing an attempt by the state to control the anti-imperialist 
tones associated with the hero. This reveals the growing threat that popular and 
workers’ organizations represented to the liberal political and economic elites, 
which were possibly sensing their own political crisis. The 1931 commemoration 
also helped to consolidate the sacredness of Santamaría’s image in opposition to 
mundane affairs. 
The celebrations of the centenary of Santamaría enjoyed all pomp and 
circumstance, lasting for several days. The main theme developed during the 
commemorations was the image of Santamaría as the symbol of the common 
Costa Rican citizen, wrapped in the shape of a humble countryside teenager. The 
image delivered through speeches and articles emphasized either the democratic 
nature of Costa Rican institutions, or the subordinate position of the popular 
classes. This image had a strong connection with the national anthem, which, as 
María Amoretti has analyzed, presented the typical Costa Rican as a small humble 
farmer, a prototype of a rural democracy who reacted with a sense of communal 
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defense when his land is threatened.
519
 On August 2
nd
, the editorial of the Diario 
de Costa Rica celebrated Santamaría as a people’s hero, and as a “real 
representative of the Costa Rican people, of that laborious, uncomplaining, quiet, 
humble people.”520 As representative of the popular classes, Santamaría was 
described here almost in religious terms, as a devoted son ready to sacrifice for 
the Patria and the state, never questioning it. A week later, precisely on the day of 
Santamaría’s birthday, the message was confirmed. Santamaría, said the Diario 
de Costa Rica in its editorial, was the epitome of Costaricaness, since he was part 
of a “simple, humble people like ours, without aristocracy…” a representative of 
“those humble Costa Ricans that do not talk, do not dissent, do not intervene in 
political activities.”521 This extreme approach was directed to weaken and 
delegitimize labor organizations as unpatriotic and un-Costa Rican. To understand 
the context of this description, it is important to note that 1930 saw the largest and 
best organized strike against the United Fruit Company, the largest U.S.-owned 
banana corporation in the world. Also, 1931 was the year in which the Costa 
Rican Communist Party was founded. This was a time in which, increasingly, 
unions used symbols of the Filibuster War during their manifestations. Therefore, 
April 11
th
 and the image of Santamaría became a contested space in which the 
official discourse tried to separate anti-imperialism from nationalism. 
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The idea of the humble, uncomplaining Santamaría was reinforced during 
speeches given on August 29
th
 for the inauguration of the Fuente de Libertad 
(Fountain of Freedom), a small monument raised in the place where Juan 
Santamaría’s house used to stand. The Director of the San Luis Gonzaga high 
school described the battle of Rivas as a moment in which a humble soldier, not a 
great general, defeated the enemy.
522
 Congressman Otilio Ulate, later president of 
Costa Rica, described Santamaría as a “son of the earth…a country boy, seminude 
and agile…a son of the fresh wind of the mountains…”523 A journalist of the 
Diario de Costa Rica described him as a “humble peasant” in whom Costa Rica 
could see reflected its democratic essence.
524
 But Santamaría was not a peasant. In 
fact, he was born and raised in Alajuela, now the second most populated city of 
Costa Rica. While the city was not more than a small town in the 1850s, it had 
already served as capital of the country, and had a very important place in all 
Costa Rican political and economic activities. Santamaría’s life did not involve 
farm work, but instead painting walls and running errands for local stores and 
soldiers in the barracks. The transformation of Santamaría into a farm boy was an 
attempt to connect his image to one the liberal elite of El Olimpo had been 
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creating for decades: that of Costa Rica as a rural democracy, without class 
distinctions, and a strong paternalistic approach to social relations.
525
 
At the same time, another discourse running during the celebrations was 
the myth of the Return of the Filibuster. The myth was used this time as an 
omnipresent peril that gives life to Santamaría’s image, making him a silent 
guardian illuminating with his torch the omniscient darkness of filibusterism. The 
Sociedad Bolivariana de Costa Rica, immersed in the panamericanist ideal of the 
Libertador, celebrated the centenary of Santamaría in the context of his service to 
the survival of the Latin American nations, raising hope for a future union.
526
  
 Manuel Castro Quesada, presidential candidate for the Republican Union 
Party, took advantage of the historical moment to tie himself to Santamaría’s anti-
imperialist image. According to the politician, if the hero was still alive, he would 
be a member of his party, since both cared for the defense of Costa Rican 
independence. “We use different methods, – said Castro Quesada - we are also 
confronting the invasion of foreign gold, and we see how it tries to hold its grip of 
power among us through docile governments that serve it. We follow the 
luminous path marked by Santamaría, against…the new filibusters of the Bond 
and Share (a U.S.-owned electric company).”527  
 By 1931, Santamaría had earned the necessary respect to become the 
central figure that defined Costa Rican national identity. The matter discussed 
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from this point on was the meaning behind Santamaría, and what kind of 
symbolism he represented. By August of 1931, the electoral campaign that ended 
with the election of a new president on February, 1932, was at its peak. The 
heated contest pitted Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno, a member of El Olimpo, against 
ex-president Alfredo González Flores, and Manuel Castro Quesada, mentioned 
above, in a series of insulting and furious articles published several times during 
the days preceding the celebration of Santamaría’s centenary. The dispute 
continued into the week before the celebrations, when public opinion strode to 
defend the sanctity of the national hero, asking for a political silence during the 
commemorations. Official representatives imposed a prohibition of any political 
activity in the province of Alajuela for August 29
th
, and newspapers published 
cartoons condemning the attitude of the politicians. Figure 4 is a cartoon 
published on the newspaper Diario de Costa Rica on August 30
th
, 1931. It shows 
Jiménez Oreamuno, Castro Quesada, and González Flores gagged by a humble 
Costa Rican. The title of the cartoon is “Heroic Silence,” The gags say 
“Centenary - Juan – Santamaría.” The celebrations of 1931 show that by then 
Santamaría had earned a sacred place in the altar of Costa Rican heroes. While the 
state tried to transform his image into a humble and quiet peasant, the public 
hailed him as a man willing to give his life in battle. Also, the place that 
Santamaría started to occupy in the Costa Rican imaginary represented the 
common citizen, and his distrust of traditional politicians. 
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Figure 3 Diario de Costa Rica, August 30
th
, 1931. 
While Santamaría’s image and April 11th commemorations were 
consolidated, May 1
st
 survived only in connection to Labor Day.
528
 By 1931, the 
Communist Party was founded and Labor Day became more organized. During 
the 1940s, the Communist Party formed an alliance with the governing National 
Republican Party, and most celebrations of May 1
st
 became parades showing 
support for the social reforms applied in the areas of Social Security, Universal 
Health Care, the creation of a Labor Code, and the legalization of a minimum 
wage. April 11
th
, on the other hand, became an arena where the meaning of 
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Santamaría and the Filibuster War was contested every year. The state stripped 
May 1
st
 of its connection to Walker’s surrender to separate labor and leftist 
organizations from the celebration and avoid the use of the holiday for anti-
imperialist expressions.  
The Communist Party, for example, used the image of Santamaría to 
advance anti-imperialism among its followers through its own newspaper, El 
Trabajo. The Communist Party constantly pointed to U.S. corporations like the 
United Fruit Company as a new kind of filibusterism, extending its critique to the 
liberal elites for selling out the country while hypocritically continuing to use the 
image of the national hero to disguise this fact.
529
 Indeed, the anti-imperialist 
attitude of the workers’ organizations became obvious at the national level in 
1947, when two parades organized by the Confederación de Trabajadores de 
Costa Rica, one on April 11
th
 and the second on May 1
st
, directed their critique to 
Truman’s foreign policy.530 In 1947, U.S. Sub-Secretary of State William Clay 
proposed the consolidation of the British and U.S. military zones in Germany, 
which was interpreted as a symbol of U.S. imperialism.
531
 The CTCR also 
protested against U.S. intervention in Greece.
532
 According to the banners used by 
the communists, Clayton’s plan promoted a special economic zone that affected 
Costa Rican commercial interests. Also, Truman’s policy of containment 
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threatened the sovereignty of Latin American countries, destroying the trust built 
by Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy.533 
On the other hand, those opposing the communists and their ally, the 
National Republican Party, considered that while the communists wanted to stop 
U.S. expansionism, they were more than willing to sell out the country to the 
Soviet Union. The parades of April 11
th
 and May 1
st
, 1947, were therefore not a 
commemoration of Costa Rican patriotism, but an affront to the United States 
disguised under a nationalist discourse. The parades of April 11
th
 and May 1st, 
1947, mark the recognition in Costa Rica of the beginning of a new global 
conflict, the Cold War. Interestingly enough, it also signaled the political 
radicalization in Costa Rica that promoted the civil war of 1948, defining a new 
era in the interpretation of the Filibuster War. 
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Chapter 6 
 
CELEBRATING THE AVENGING TORCH. PERCEPTIONS OF A 
MILITARY HERO IN A COUNTRY WITHOUT AN ARMY. 
 
 Under the sunny sky of an April morning in Alajuela, Costa Rican 
presidents and governmental representatives deliver a yearly speech in 
commemoration of Juan Santamaría, the national hero who, according to official 
history, gave his life in battle, consolidating the victory of the Costa Rican forces 
over an invading army of U.S. filibusters in 1856.
534
 On April 11, 2007, standing 
at the center of the square where a statue of the hero holds the avenging torch that 
illuminates the faces of thousands of students eager to start the annual parade, the 
Costa Rican president, Oscar Arias, waxed enthusiastic: “The image of the soldier 
that holds the torch under a rain of bullets fills our breast with pride.”535 The idea 
of the military hero resonated in these words. The president continued his speech 
by using more military images, warning the students against adversity: “there are 
so many strongholds that shower the shrapnel of hate over us.”536 This kind of 
official rhetoric in relation to Santamaría’s commemoration has been common. 
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On April 11, 2003, for example, Vice-president Linneth Saborío used the military 
imagery related to Santamaría to refer to social issues. Speaking from the main 
stand at the Juan Santamaría Square she harangued: “The struggle has to start in 
the heart of each family, and we, men and women that love this land, should seize 
the weapons of education . . . for our country.”537 Years before, in 1997, 
Education Minister Eduardo Doryan told the students that in order to succeed they 
“have to win the battle against pessimism.”538 The constant use of military 
rhetoric in the official discourses on each April 11
th
 raises a question: to whom 
were these politicians speaking? After all, Costa Rica abolished its army in 1948 
and most if not all those present at the Juan Santamaría Square had never 
experienced a war, nor seen an army. Therefore, these military metaphors should 
not have made any sense to the average Costa Rican present in the square. At the 
same time, April 11
th
 is a day that celebrates the feat of Juan Santamaría, a soldier 
and military hero. This chapter analyzes the contradiction between these two 
circumstances: an official military discourse in the presence of a national hero of 
military background in a country without an army. Its importance relies on the 
study of contesting cultural values and how societies cope with these 
inconsistencies, especially since, in the specific case of Juan Santamaría, his 
image defines Costa Rican national identity.  
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Figure 4 Statue of Juan Santamaría. Juan Santamaría Plaza, Alajuela. (Photo Xela Cabrera 
Geserick, 2011). 
 
In Costa Rica, the celebrations of April 11
th
 are as important, if not more, 
than Independence Day. There is no national narrative of independence, and 
instead, the heroes of the Filibuster War define the values of nationality. This 
establishes an important exception in the Americas, where independence 
commemorations traditionally represent the day the nation is celebrated. This 
phenomenon was first studied by Steven Palmer, a History Professor at the 
University of Windsor, who in 1993 published an article that shook the 
intellectual foundations of the scholarly community in Costa Rica.
539
 In it, Palmer 
asserts that the image of Juan Santamaría as the quintessential hero of the 
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Filibuster War was part of the liberal project of nation formation during the late 
nineteenth century. The purpose behind the invention of a national hero was to 
create a sense of nationalism among Costa Rican citizens so they would support 
the consolidation of the nation-state in the terms defined by the liberal elites. 
Above I discussed how this interpretation is inaccurate, and how the importance 
of the Filibuster War and Santamaría were neither inventions, nor established as 
national symbols in 1885. 
 Still, Palmer’s article promoted a very important reevaluation of the period 
by Costa Rican historians, forming the basis of the works of Iván Molina Jiménez, 
David Díaz Arias, and Patricia Fumero, among others.
540
 In 2007, Costa Rican 
historian Rafael Méndez published a new study about Juan Santamaría that, 
among other contributions, contested Palmer’s assertion about Santamaría as an 
invented tradition. In his book, Méndez argues that the image of Juan Santamaría 
existed in the memory of common citizens before 1885, especially in Alajuela, 
Santamaría’s native city.541 According to Méndez, local memory kept the story of 
Santamaría’s feat alive. This allowed for Santamaría’s image to survive long 
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enough in a local stage until, says Méndez, the Liberal State was able to recognize 
his value as a national figure, using him to form a national identity.
542
 
 Building on this work, my analysis proposes the study of the army and 
military institutions in Costa Rica and their relation to the development of a 
military culture present in symbols, discourses, speeches, and popular 
celebrations. The goal is to establish the creation of Santamaría’s image in a 
militaristic context, and to understand how the perception of the national hero has 
changed since the abolition of the army, more than sixty years ago. Since studying 
the army in Costa Rica is to study what no longer exists, scholarly work in this 
area is limited. Most of the publications focus on events related to the abolition of 
the army in December of 1948. Even so, because of the importance the army had 
during the period of consolidation of the liberal nation-state, studies of the period 
between 1849 and 1948 give a valuable insight into the army and the culture that 
developed from it.
543
 
 As seen above, militaristic culture is still present in the official discourse, 
and therefore, it makes the study of cultural change and the transformation of the 
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image of Juan Santamaría extremely difficult. The celebrations of April 11
th
 
follow the now classic style of commemorations in which the official discourse 
establishes a framework of values in which the participation of common citizens 
is necessary. With this in mind, and to find an answer to the question of the 
transformation of Juan Santamaría’s image, the work of Antonio Gramsci and 
Carlo Ginzburg on dominant and subordinate culture may prove helpful. In 
Prisoner Notebooks, Italian linguist Antonio Gramsci divides societies in two, an 
elite group and the popular classes.
544
 According to Gramsci, culture is also 
divided along the same lines, a dominant culture and a subordinate culture. Since 
the elite group controls the media, archives, recording, and official documents, it 
becomes the dominant culture of a society. The dominant culture transmits its 
ideology and perceptions to the popular classes through the control and 
interpretation of information. In this structure, the transmission of culture is 
unidirectional, from the top down, where the dominant culture defines the 
subordinate culture. Obviously, in this system the only possibility for the 
subordinate culture to control the dominant discourse is to take over society and 
establish the popular classes as the dominant culture.
545
  
In The Cheese and the Worms, Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg contests 
Gramsci’s ideas, and discovers a way to hear the voice of the popular classes by 
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scrutinizing the official discourse.
546
 In his now emblematic book on 
microhistory, Ginzburg presents the story of Menocchio, an Italian peasant of the 
sixteenth century with a peculiar view of the world, different from the dominant 
ideology. Having a particular view of the world and the universe, Menocchio is 
called in by the Inquisition for interrogation. It is precisely in this encounter 
between the Inquisition, an institution part of the dominant culture, and a peasant, 
a member of the subordinate culture, that popular culture is shown. Menocchio’s 
answers to the Inquisitors were recorded, leaving a tangible source of a view of 
reality different from the dominant culture. With this methodology, Ginzburg 
gives voice to popular culture, arguing that popular classes can have an 
independent perception of reality, different from the dominant elite and the 
official culture.
547
 Following Ginzburg’s ideas, we can infer that popular culture 
can also influence the dominant culture, establishing a bidirectional transmission 
of values. Based on this concept, this chapter explores the development of the 
image of Santamaría in the place where official and popular culture encounter 
each other, that is, the annual celebrations of April 11
th
.  
 The idea of militarism in Costa Rican culture, especially in relation to the 
celebration of Juan Santamaría, will be analyzed, focusing on both the discourse 
of official culture as well as the expressions of popular culture. In order to do so, 
this study will follow the analysis of militarism developed by Tord Høivik and 
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Solveig Aas. These Norwegian members of the International Peace Research 
Institute in Oslo identify the levels of militarization of a society by analyzing 
three indicators: size of the military, militarized behavior, and penetration of non-
military institutions by military culture.
548
 Using these parameters, it is possible to 
discern the moments in which militarization is enforced or subdued, both in Costa 
Rican society as well as in the celebrations of Juan Santamaría. The importance of 
the military in Costa Rica’s life can be traced observing the three aspects 
mentioned by Høivik and Aas as far back as 1948, but after that year, since the 
army was abolished, the analysis will focus mainly on the third area, by studying 
the penetration of military aspects into civilian activities. By analyzing military 
symbolism used during Santamaría’s celebrations after 1948, it is possible to 
understand the contradiction produced in Costa Rican society by celebrating a 
military hero in a country where the army had already disappeared. 
Militarism in Costa Rica 
Initially, the history of military forces in Costa Rica had been no different 
than in most of Latin America. Even so, it is necessary to clarify that military 
involvement in politics was short lived and more sporadic than in the rest of the 
region. The Costa Rican army reached its peak during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, which coincides with the period of consolidation of the 
nation-state.  
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 In general, Central America did not suffer the immediate spread of 
militarism after independence that most of the continent had to endure. This is due 
to the fact that Central American independence from Spain was granted without 
the need of a military confrontation of high magnitude.
549
 This does not mean that 
the region was free of militarism. During the colonial period, the Bourbonic 
reform of the militias that modernized the military forces in Spanish America, 
after the fall of Havana during the Seven Years’ War, created a new system that 
promoted social mobilization.
550
 This gave members of lower and middle classes 
the opportunity to elevate their status through a military career. As Timothy 
Hawkins demonstrates, the last ten years before independence defined a new 
militaristic attitude of Central American elites. The news of armed insurrection 
across Spanish America, the closeness of New Spain to Central America, and the 
constant threat of local rebellions resulted in an increase in military spending, 
including the size and professionalization of militias. The situation made the elites 
that would soon govern the new Central American nations focus on the 
achievement of internal control and legitimacy, substituting civil authority with 
military force.
551
  
 The conflict between Liberal and Conservative elites for the control and 
direction of the government meant that the first years of independent life were 
characterized by military struggles. In the specific case of Costa Rica, this ended 
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in 1823, when Imperialists and Republicans confronted each other to decide on 
either incorporating the country to the Mexican Empire, or remaining an 
independent nation. The incorporation of Costa Rica in the Federal Republic of 
Central America between 1823 and 1838 decreased the need for Costa Rican 
military investment. Once the Federation broke up in 1838, Costa Rica renewed 
its military development. By 1849, a new interest on the expansion of executive 
power and an early push for the consolidation of the nation-state promoted the 
modernization of the army.
552
 By 1853, the national army was already composed 
of 5,000 soldiers, divided into two main forts located in San José.
553
 
 With the arrival of Juan Rafael Mora to the presidency (1849–1859), the 
army experienced a process of modernization, including the hiring of Polish 
colonel Von Salisch and French colonel Pierre Barillier as military instructors, as 
well as the purchase of new weapons from Great Britain in 1854.
554
 As part of this 
transaction, Costa Rica acquired at least 500 Minié rifles, considered the most 
advanced of their type at that time.
555
 The importance Mora gave to the army is 
noticeable, since this purchase represented 25% of the annual national budget. By 
1856, Costa Rica had an army composed of 7,000 men. In February of that year, 
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and after the declaration of war against Walker and his filibusters, 2,000 more 
men were enlisted from the provinces of Heredia and Alajuela, the latter the city 
where Juan Santamaría was born, and of which regiment he formed a part.
556
 
 The military victories during the war of 1856 helped to consolidate the 
position of the army in Costa Rica The victory against the filibusters in Santa 
Rosa, in the northern Costa Rican province of Guanacaste, provided 
encouragement and helped to boost the confidence of the troops. The bloody 
battle of Rivas, in Nicaragua, where Juan Santamaría became a legend, saw many 
acts of heroism, becoming the center of the myth created around the war. While a 
cholera epidemic made the Costa Ricans retreat to the Central Valley, small 
forces continued fighting at the border, especially across the San Juan River, in 
order to occupy strategic positions that would impede Walker’s replenishing of 
troops from New Orleans. Finally, during the last battle against the filibusters, in 
1857, Costa Ricans formed part of a larger united Central American army. The 
Filibuster War was by then the most traumatic event in Costa Rican history, 
defining the importance of the military as part of the social structure. 
 After the war, the first indications of an interest in commemorating the 
event connected the military efforts to defend the sovereignty of the country with 
the creation of a Costa Rican national identity. In 1857, the Costa Rican Senate 
approved a motion that promoted the creation of a national “monument that would 
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eternize the memory of the triumphs at Santa Rosa, Rivas, and San Juan.”557 
Among the efforts, the war against the filibusters started to be remembered during 
the annual celebrations of Independence. It is important to note how, in 1864, a 
search for military heroes promoted the first mention of Juan Santamaría’s name 
as one of the main Costa Rican heroes by the ex-president of New Granada, José 
de Obaldía.
558
 At the same time, the fact that there was no official report of 
Santamaría’s action makes this speech even more important, since it also shows 
the importance of popular culture, which, under the veil of oral history, kept alive 
the memory of Santamaría. Since there was no written account of Santamaría’s 
feat, and his action was witnessed only by a few, there is no doubt that Obaldía 
learned this because it was a common story in the Alajuela of the 1860s. The fact 
that Obaldía lived in Alajuela for some time would explain how he was able to 
collect the story.
559
 Since there were many heroic actions during the battle in 
Rivas, for Obaldía to focus on Santamaría meant that, for some reason, his story 
was strongly imprinted in the popular memory of the war.  
 The Filibuster War marked the beginning of the peak of military 
involvement in politics. Although military support had been sought before to 
consolidate power or to overthrow presidents, the war against the filibusters 
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stimulated a militaristic period in Costa Rican history. Colonel Lorenzo Salazar 
and Major Máximo Blanco, both veterans of 1856, became the most important 
figures for years in Costa Rica, establishing a control of the military forces that 
allowed them to subtly rule the country. In 1859, they withdrew support for Mora, 
and declared José María Montealegre as the new president. A similar plot was 
repeated in 1868, when Jose María Castro Madriz was forced to resign with the 
intervention of both military leaders.
560
  
 The main transformation of the army was accomplished after 1870, when 
General Tomás Guardia, also a veteran of the Filibuster War, took control of the 
government. In 1871, Guardia established a system of Liberal reforms to modify 
the organization of the country, most of them designed to create a more efficient 
and bureaucratic government, as well as the promotion of Costa Rican exports in 
international markets. This administrative approach and his long military career 
made obvious his particular interest in reforming the army. In 1871, a military 
code was created, establishing a semi-bureaucratization of the army through the 
creation of a regulated structure of defined military duties, behavior, and 
discipline for the soldiers.
561
 Other features of Guardia’s regime included the 
constant increase of salaries for the military forces, the professionalization of the 
army, the creation of military academies, and the creation of a second military 
code in 1884. Furthermore, with Guardia’s rule, for the first time in Costa Rica 
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the executive was administered by a military, signaling the fusion of the positions 
of President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the Army. By 1877, 
when the population of the country reached 150,000 people, at least 15,000, 
representing ten percent of the population, were enrolled in the army, while 
another 10,000 served in the military reserve forces.
562
 
 The expansion of the military was prompted by internal and external 
factors. The government was aware of the importance of the army for issues of 
internal control. Police forces were not yet organized, and the military was in 
charge of public order. One of the main functions of the army was to prevent any 
threat to Guardia’s rule. Guardia’s long dictatorship provoked the reaction of 
those looking for a return to a democratic system. There were at least six different 
attempts to overthrow Guardia between 1875 and 1881, which helped to reinforce 
the importance of the military as the only force that could repress these revolts. 
The second reason for the growth of the military was the development of 
international conflicts, especially in connection to the expansionist policies of 
Guatemala and its intention of reuniting the Central American Republics under its 
rule. The former capital of Central America looked to repeat the process 
undertaken by Germany and Italy in Europe, applying the ideals of the formation 
of nation-states based on military control, forcing the cohesion of smaller states 
into larger units. The years 1878, 1879, and 1885 represented the biggest threats 
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to Costa Rican independence coming from other Central American Republics.
563
 
These threats reinforced the idea of the need for a strong military. At the same 
time, it helped to keep alive the memory of the war and the search for inspiration 
on the events and people of the Filibuster War. 
 During that period, the name of Santamaría was recalled in an article 
published by Honduran writer Alvaro Contreras, published first in 1883, and then 
again in 1885, the year Justo Rufino Barrios, Liberal dictator of Guatemala, 
officially and unilaterally declared the forced Unification of Central America. The 
article called for the Costa Ricans to remember the feats of its heroes, among 
them Juan Santamaría.
564
 A month later the government named one of its new 
vessels with the name of the Alajuelan hero, the other one with the name of 
president Mora.
565
 On April 11
th
, articles were published in the Diario de Costa 
Rica, analyzing the war against Walker and remembering Santamaría’s action in 
Rivas.
566
 
 At this time, contrary to what Palmer asserted, Santamaría was not the 
only one considered for the position of national hero. The name of Colonel 
Lorenzo Salazar was at certain point an unequivocal synonym of patriotism. As 
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one of the most important officers during the war of 1856, Salazar was nominated 
in 1860 to receive an award called the Sword of Honor. Although this kind of 
military hero has been the main object of commemoration in most of Europe and 
the Americas, as Costa Rican historian Rafael Méndez mentions, Salazar was not 
recognized as national hero because this would have implied a confrontation 
between him and other high ranking officers, like Major Blanco, who also had 
pretensions of personal glory, as well as enough political power to begin an 
internal conflict.  
 In 1887, Congress finally approved the creation of a monument to 
Santamaría. By 1888, Alajuela, his city of birth, was chosen as the ideal location 
for erecting the statue. In 1891, it was finally unveiled, and the celebrations that 
surrounded the event are a reflection of what would later become an annual 
festivity. In the context of the consolidation of the Liberal State under the rule of 
the Alajuelato, it was obvious that commemorations of Santamaría would be 
mainly a military affair. One reason that supports the idea of Santamaría as 
recognition to the military is the fact that the monument was to be originally paid 
for by funds collected among soldiers and veterans. In the end, the government 
had to donate the money to cover the rest of the costs, the main goal of getting the 
army involved in the construction of the hero’s monument was to “reinforce the 
military image” of Santamaría.567 
The commemorations of Independence Day, on September 15
th
, served as 
the perfect background for the unveiling of the statue. The celebrations followed a 
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strict program. On September 14
th
, infantry troops from San José, Cartago, and 
Heredia entered the city. At 8 p.m. the soon-to-be-inaugurated Juan Santamaría 
Square was illuminated by electric lights, an innovation that had arrived in Costa 
Rica just seven years before. This was followed an hour later by fireworks. Music 
accompanied these festivities: newly composed hymns to Santamaría were 
played, and classics by Verdi and Bizet were performed. September 15
th
 started 
with dianas (reveilles) and artillery shots to wake up the city, followed by the 
reception of the governmental officers and war veterans at the train station. At the 
square, anthems were played intermittently between a series of speeches delivered 
by the President of the Republic, Rafael Iglesias, as well as by the President of the 
Congress, the President of the Supreme Court, and municipal authorities of 
Alajuela. The army paraded and military honors were given to the statue when it 
was finally unveiled.
568
 The Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío described the event, 
mentioning that a dance open to the public was held after the official ceremonies 
ended. The municipal bands of the four major cities played for the people’s 
enjoyment until dawn of the next day.
569
 
The transformation of Costa Rican society during the Liberal period can 
explain the emphasis in the spread of Santamaría’s commemorations. The Liberal 
period was marked by two different eras. The first one between 1870 and 1902 
represented the consolidation of the military and the growth of their importance as 
an institution. The second one, between 1902 and 1948 represented a reformist 
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Liberal. After 1902, the Liberal governments started to behave more 
democratically, and the Army started to lose its importance. This happened due to 
a generational change in the Liberal ranks, but also because a series of educational 
reforms promoted by the military governments of the 1870s and 1880s. The 
transferring of investment from the military forces to education was directed to 
strength the new state apparatus created by the Liberal reforms. The consolidation 
of a bureaucratic state needed the expansion of positions of clerical and 
administrative personnel, which could only be developed by changing the 
investment from military to educational areas. On the other hand, the need for 
agricultural labor convinced the government of the necessity of reducing the 
number of soldiers in order to release workers for the coffee and banana 
plantations. The economic crisis of the 1900s also helped in this process, since the 
government needed to reduce its military budget. Since international conflicts 
were less common, police forces were employed for internal control instead of the 
military. All these factors combined to reduce the size of the army, and by default, 
its influence. Although by 1900 the army grew to as much as 49,200 soldiers, a 
decree in 1904 reduced the military forces to a mere 1000.
570
 The educational 
reforms of the Liberal period marked a new era in the commemoration of Juan 
Santamaría. The School Festivity, or Fiesta Escolar, became the new instrument 
the state used to propagate its values. Based on the French and Argentinean 
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experiences, the Costa Rican government created civic festivities where school 
children took the main role.
571
  
The tradition of connecting the Filibuster War with Independence Day 
created during the 1891 celebrations continued for a short time. In 1895, the 
inauguration of the National monument dedicated to the Filibuster War was 
unveiled on September 15
th
. Five years later, a newspaper commenting on the 
September 15
th
 celebrations in the city of Cartago mentioned the singing of the 
anthem to May 1
st
, as well as the anthem to Juan Santamaría as part of the 
program.
572
 The same day, in Alajuela, Independence Day was celebrated around 
the statue of Juan Santamaría, the anthem to Juan Santamaría was also sung.
573
 
At the same time, local authorities in Alajuela started to promote the 
celebration of April 11
th
 as separate from Independence Day. In 1901, a 
newspaper announced a masked ball to commemorate Juan Santamaría’s day on 
April 11
th
 in Alajuela.
574
 In 1904, Alajuelans played a serenade in honor of the 
hero on that day as well.
575
 In 1907, children from all local schools joined to sing 
anthems to the hero at the feet of his statue.
576
 In 1908, the governor of Alajuela 
ordered the statue to be illuminated for the night of April 10
th
, while an orchestra 
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played classical music. The next day, a student parade was organized, followed by 
speeches and patriotic anthems.
577
 In 1912, the celebrations of April 11
th
 showed 
a strong military presence. An infantry battalion, led by General Perdomo 
marched through Central Street until they reached Santamaría Square. There, as 
afterschool students and the general public arrived to the plaza, the battalion 
deposited a laurel crown in front of the statue.
578
 In 1913, the national anthem and 
the anthem to Juan Santamaría worked as introductions to a series of speeches 
closed by the presentation of a flower crown at the feet of the monument.
579
 The 
importance of Santamaría as an Alajuelan symbol was acknowledged by a 
national newspaper that mentioned that “every year the neighbors of Alajuela 
celebrate this patriotic party.”580 One curious example of the Alajuelan 
identification with Santamaría during this period is the case of a restaurant’s ad in 
a local newspaper that declared itself to be the best from the city of El Erizo, the 
nickname of the hero.
581
 Another newspaper at the national level titled a column 
dedicated to Alajuela “Erizadas,” making a clear reference to the connection 
between the hero and his native city.
582
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 The growing importance of Santamaría’s celebrations in Alajuela on April 
11
th
 promoted the adoption, by the national government, of this day to 
commemorate the war of 1856. As Rafael Méndez says, “there is no doubt that 
the Alajuelan soldier reached throughout this period a popularity that made him 
the favorite hero of the Costa Rican people.”583 It is for this reason that President 
Alfredo González Flores decided in 1915 to declare April 11
th
 as a national 
holiday.
584
 
Starting on April 11
th
, 1916, Santamaría has been celebrated each year 
without interruption. The celebrations of April 11
th
 serve to understand the 
relation between the dominant ideology and the subordinate, as used by Ginzburg. 
The official discourse represents the dominant ideology, and it is mostly 
represented by the military presence during the celebrations, due to the military 
nature of the Filibuster War. The subordinate ideology is represented instead by 
the popular participation in the celebrations, especially when the popular groups 
have some agency on the shape and style of the commemorations. During the 
González Flores administration, and to place emphasis on school participation in 
the national festivities, the army was banned from having an active role in civic 
celebrations.
585
 After the creation of the concept of the fiesta escolar and the 
involvement of school children in the April 11
th
 celebrations, this event marked 
the beginning of the disconnection between Santamaría’s image and his military 
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background. To take a glimpse into the activities of the 1916 commemorations 
provide to us the framework in which later celebrations were supposed to reflect 
themselves, as well as the ideas the government had for the use of the holiday and 
its symbolism. On April 10
th
, the organization of the activities focused in the city 
of Alajuela. Directed to attract the common citizen, music was played in several 
parks, a torch parade was organized, and an open air free movie was shown. The 
official celebrations took place on April 11
th
, beginning with the Grand Parade 
that started in the Church of the Agony, in the eastern part of the city, and 
stopping first in front of the house where Santamaría lived, where a speech was 
delivered. The parade continued then until it reached the feet of the statue of the 
hero. Again, speeches and anthems closed the event.
586
  
While the army had been banned from the organization of the celebrations, 
there was a still a strong military presence. The Grand Parade included the 
participation of the few veterans from 1856 still alive. The veterans were not the 
only representatives of the army; military bands and a company of infantry also 
walked in the parade. This demonstrates the argument promoted by Høivik and 
Aas, which points out that the process of demilitarization of a society takes 
usually small steps. Militarization permeates several levels of the society, the 
presence of the military can be felt both in physical and symbolic ways, and both 
are perceived as real.  
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 A new activity that had become very popular in Costa Rica since the 
beginning of the twentieth century was included as a motivation for the common 
citizen to participate in these celebrations. A football (soccer) match between two 
teams, called Morazán, from San José, and 11 de Abril from Alajuela, both 
possibly improvised groups, attracted the attention of the people. This can be 
interpreted as part of the official efforts to involve the common citizen in the 
celebrations of April 11
th
.
587
 The fiesta escolar, a forced inclusion of young 
students in the official celebrations can be understood as a way for the State to 
promote nationalism and patriotic values to the citizens from an early age. The 
fact that Santamaría was a hero whose memory was kept alive by popular culture, 
worked very well for the State. By incorporating his image as part of the official 
discourse, the government was able to please both local and popular aspirations. 
By assuring the participation of the people, the government ensured that the 
image of Santamaría did not become an exclusive symbol of the state, allowing 
for the popular identification with the hero. These efforts included the 
establishment of local committees in charge of the illumination of Santamaría’s 
Square, as well as convincing the neighbors to ornate their houses with flags and 
special lights. Others made sure the same happened to public buildings and 
electric poles. 
 The music played during the celebrations point to the value military 
symbols continued to have. A chronicle of the celebrations described the 
performance of the military bands at dawn as similar to “those martial plays that 
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awakened the bellicose feelings of our elders . . . . The past seemed to come to life 
again…”588 Later in the evening, the mood changed dramatically. From the eleven 
pieces of music planned to be played between 5 p.m. and 7.30 p.m., only two, 
including the anthem to Juan Santamaría, had a martial style. The rest were a 
selection of waltzes, overtures, and fantasies by European composers. This can be 
explained by the fact that military ceremonial activities are traditionally restricted 
and do not extend to the evening. The evening is a moment of relaxation, which 
could also explain the change of mood from one series of musical selections to the 
other. The attempt by the authorities to attract common citizens to the events 
played an important role on the music selection. Military and official 
representatives were long gone after the parade, and only the neighbors could 
easily hear the bands playing. If we take into account that the beginning of the 
musical performance at 5 p.m. coincided with the end of mass, and that the 
cathedral is located just a block and a half away from Santamaría Square, we can 
conclude that the intention was to captivate the common people and remember the 
celebrations in a communal mood similar to the one they had when leaving the 
church.
589
 
 The speeches given that day reflected very well the official discourse. 
Remembrance of the military victories of 1856, calls for patriotism, and 
nationalistic phrases all were clear representations of an official discourse typical 
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of the process of construction and consolidation of the nation-state. The 
government’s attempt to appropriate the image of Santamaría was made obvious 
by Claudio González, Secretary of State, who said that “Alajuela is the owner of a 
hero, who, because he belongs to her, is also from Costa Rica.”590 Of course, to be 
able to appropriate Santamaría as a symbol, the state had to first consolidate the 
image of Santamaría, bestowing it with legitimacy. The lack of official 
documentation about Santamaría’s feat had generated a controversy about his 
existence. This was especially true during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, which serves to explain why González stated in his speech that “Alajuela 
gave existence to Juan Santamaría, arming him with the shield of faith . . . and of 
patriotic love…”591 In 1916, Santamaría became a national hero, and during the 
celebrations of April 11
th
, his image was acknowledged as a local phenomenon, 
given official recognition and legitimacy, elevated to national hero and, in the 
process, offering it to popular groups as a symbol of national identity. In order to 
do so, the state had to push the army a little bit to the side. 
 Starting in 1916, Santamaría has been officially celebrated on April 11
th
. 
The centenary of the hero’s birth, in 1931, represented a special occasion that the 
state could not forget if it wanted to imprint the image of Santamaría on the minds 
of common Costa Rican citizens. That year, in addition to the celebration of April 
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11
th
, a series of special activities were held during the last four days of August to 
commemorate Santamaría’s birthday on August 31st. 
 Undeniably, the military aspect continued to be present during 
Santamaría’s commemorations. On the morning of August 29th, twenty-one 
cannon blanks were shot to announce the beginning of the parade. The schools 
were organized in military companies bearing the names of some of the heroes of 
1856. Although this time no soldiers marched during the parade, the high school 
students carried with them the original rifles used during the Filibuster War, 
which had been in storage for decades.
592
 Other military symbols included a float 
shaped in such a way as to resemble the vessel 11 de Abril, a military boat lost 
during the war in 1856. On another float, a group of soldiers guarded a young 
female student representing the nation.
593
  
 But, besides the strong military symbolism and the participation of 
governmental representatives, the commemorations were mostly a popular 
celebration, signaling a decreasing militarization of the celebrations. The program 
of activities included athletic competitions and sports directed to attract the 
crowd. For August 30
th
, a bicycle race was planned, as well as a football (soccer) 
game and a basketball game. On August 31
st
, a football (soccer) game was played 
between two of the most popular teams of the Costa Rican first division, and 
during the late afternoon, a horse race took place. Music, though, was the main 
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attraction. On August 28
th
, the local military band awakened the city while 
playing through the streets of Alajuela. That same evening, popular balls were 
organized, and the public enjoyed a special presentation of the comparsa, a 
flamboyant and colorful dancing troupe traditionally associated with carnivals. 
For the next three days, the local military band played in the Juan Santamaría 
Square, and the comparsa was in charge, again, of demonstrating the festive spirit 
of the celebrations.
594
 The lack of a military presence, already forbidden since 
González Flores’ government, confirmed once more the lack of identification of 
the population with the military.  
The celebrations of 1916 and 1931 both had a strong military symbolism, 
understandable since they commemorated a military event and they happened 
during a period in which Costa Rica continued to have an army. Still, the fact that 
the military forces were banned from the parades, and the growing interest on 
popular participation, shows a decreasing importance of the military in Costa 
Rican society, corresponding to a period in which the size of the army had been 
already drastically reduced when compared to the nineteenth century. By the early 
1940s, Costa Rica has less than one thousand soldiers, not even a quarter of the 
size of the army in 1856, and not even five percent of its size during the 
Alajuelato period. The abolition of the army, in 1948, created a different set of 
circumstances, raising the question of the position of military values in a country 
without an army. 
                                                          
594
 Ibid., 18-20. 
298 
 
 The 1930s and the rise of socialism promoted changes in the political 
arena that severely affected the destiny of the army in Costa Rica. Although the 
Liberal groups that had ruled Costa Rica since the 1870s continued to apply the 
same economic and political patterns they had for decades, a reformist attitude 
started to gain strength. In 1940, the National Republican Party won the elections. 
Although the party had been associated with the coffee producing elites, and the 
Liberal groups traditionally in power, the new president, Rafael Calderón 
Guardia, introduced to Costa Rica Social-Christian principles he possibly learned 
during his years as a college student in Belgium. Based on social values of the 
Catholic Church and a social reformist attitude based on the Rerum Novarum 
Papal encyclical, Calderón Guardia promoted an increased involvement of the 
state in the welfare of the common Costa Rican citizen. In order to reach a 
majority in Congress, the National Republicans allied with the Communist Party, 
who in exchange for their support asked for the promotion of social reforms. This 
produced a double effect: first, since the communists allied with the government, 
the need for an army as an agent of social control was weakened even more. 
Second, the expansion of expenditures in the areas of popular housing, universal 
health, and education, forced a reduction on the budget allocated to the army. The 
one thousand men that had been the core of the professional army since the 
beginning of the twentieth century were reduced in 1942 to only 324. By 1948, 
this number was reduced even more, reaching just 300 soldiers and officers.
595
 
That same year, between March and April, a civil war caused by reports of 
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electoral fraud destroyed the alliance between Liberals and Communists, and a 
new era of governments defined by Social-Democratic policies redefined the 
direction of the country. The new Liberación Nacional Party, the winners of the 
civil war, kept the reforms of the former regime and took them even deeper. One 
of the first actions of importance, and one that represents a core element of 
modern Costa Rican national mythology, was the abolition of the army as a 
standing force in December of 1948.  
The abolition of the army redefined the identity of Costa Ricans, since it 
represented the definite extinction of a traditional sector of society. Institutional 
changes promote cultural change, but this change, as expressed in the terms of 
Høivik and Aas, is gradual.
596
 The disappearance of the army as an institution 
does not represent an automatic demilitarization of a society. It can be considered 
that the abolition of the army in 1948 was just a coup de grâce to an already dying 
institution. The demilitarization of the country had a direct correlation with the 
diminishing of the participation of the army in the celebrations of the Filibuster 
War. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the participation of young 
students in the army in the fiesta escolar coincided with the reduction of the size 
of the army. In 1916 the army was expelled from the celebrations of April 11
th
, 
and only a small infantry division was allowed to march during the parade. In 
1931, some military symbols continued to be used, but the army did not 
participate in the parade, nor were there soldiers present in any other activities. 
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The demilitarization of Costa Rica is reflected in the demilitarization of the 
commemoration of Juan Santamaría. Still, the abolition of the army did not 
represent an immediate cultural transformation from a militarized to a non-
militarized society. This was possible only with the active participation of the 
popular groups, showing, as Ginzburg demonstrated, some independence of 
popular culture from the dominant ideology, and its capacity to transform society. 
In 1956, Costa Rica celebrated the first centenary of the Filibuster War, 
but eight years after the abolition of the army, not much had changed in the way 
April 11
th
 and Juan Santamaría were celebrated. On one hand, popular culture had 
the most important position in the program of activities. On the other hand, 
military culture continued to be present. The plans for the festivities started a year 
before, when the municipality of Alajuela proposed moving Santamaría’s statue 
from its current location to a square just across his place of birth. By August of 
that year, the opposition to the idea had grown so much that the committee in 
charge of organizing the celebrations decided to eliminate the project.
597
 
 Due to the importance of the commemoration of the first centenary of the 
Filibuster War, this time the celebrations lasted more than a  week, starting on 
April 7
th
 and ending on April 15
th
. Music and dance performances were a 
constant. There were two parades instead of only one, and a myriad of other 
activities were enjoyed by the crowd. On Saturday the 7
th
, the coronation of the 
Queen of the Festivities was celebrated with a ball in the Instituto de Alajuela. 
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Just one hour later a public ball started at the recently remodeled Juan Santamaría 
Square. At noon of April 8
th
, marimbas played throughout the city of Alajuela. At 
3 p.m., the Siboney Orchestra, a very popular group that performed cumbia, 
merengue, and other tropical music made its presentation at the Instituto de 
Alajuela. To close the day, the Philarmonic of Grecia performed a concert. 
Marimbas appeared again in the program twice on April 9
th
, once on April 11
th
, 
and again on April 12
th
. Orchestras playing classical music also performed in 
various places on April 9
th
, 10
th
, and 11
th
. Balls were organized for all nine days, 
sometimes more than once a day, featuring bands performing popular music. Of 
course, a football (soccer) game, “being the favorite sport” of the people, could 
not be left out of the celebrations.
598
 This time the local team and one of the most 
important in Costa Rican history, Liga Deportiva Alajuelense, confronted a 
Brazilian team that was visiting the country those days. Other activities, including 
fireworks and a horse parade, were also performed.
599
 
 The main parade, on April 11
th
, was preceded by a series of speeches, in 
which the image of Santamaría was invoked. The Minister of Education made a 
special observation in his speech in connection with the participation of students 
in the parades. In it, he remembered that he himself paraded once in front of 
Santamaría’s statue, making clear that it was the students who were now the main 
force behind the celebration, rather than the military. Between speeches, the 
official discourse was reinforced by the anthems played, performing the Costa 
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Rican national anthem, the anthem of each of the Central American Republics, the 
anthem to Juan Santamaría and a nationalistic song appropriately titled “Patriótica 
Costarricense,” an anonymous song dating from 1856 that had become recognized 
as a second national anthem.
600
 Another tradition that had its ups and downs was 
reenacted at this time, when during the evening of April 10
th
, 1957, a torch parade 
performed by elementary school students marched from the location where 
Santamaría’s house used to stand, (now the Fountain of Freedom), to the 
Santamaría Square where his statue is located.
601
 The same route was used the 
next day for the main parade.  
Some military symbols continued to be present. Most students were 
dressed in uniforms with a strong militaristic style, resembling those used by high 
school bands in the United States or by soldiers of the Napoleonic era. The 
martial attitude of the students deserved comments in the memoirs of the 
celebrations of being “like the roots of an army, but an army for peace.”602 This 
phrase shows how the contradiction between the celebrations of a military hero in 
a country without an army began to emerge.  A couple of weeks before, to 
celebrate the Battle of Santa Rosa on March 20th, hundreds of followers of the 
governing  Liberación Nacional Party gathered at the site of the Hacienda Santa 
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Rosa dressed in military uniforms and helmets. The reason for this militaristic 
attitude and the controversy it sparked will be analyzed in the following chapter.  
 In general, the Costa Rican attitude toward the army and militaristic values 
has been ambivalent throughout history. As early as 1834, just thirteen years after 
independence, influential groups in Costa Rica were already promoting the 
abolition of the army.
603
 Also, in 1844, the press pushed for a reduction of the 
army to the minimum, in order to avoid conflicts promoted by the strong localism 
affecting the country during this period.
604
 The particularity of the Costa Rican 
culture, in which the identification with the military was poor at the best, can be 
reflected by the fact that during the early period of Liberal governments, when the 
army took a preponderant position in society, was precisely the time when the 
myth of Costa Rica being a country where there were “more teachers than 
soldiers” was created.605 The contradiction is exemplified by the fact that during 
the same period this myth was being promoted, President Guardia increased the 
army to 15,000 soldiers, representing about ten percent of the population of the 
country at that time, and three decades later, it grew to be composed by almost 
50,000 soldiers and officers. 
The strength of popular culture 
 During the late nineteenth century, the topic of students and teachers as 
civil symbols of the country continued to be contrasted against the military, 
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nationalistic official discourse. The government developed a growing emphasis on 
speeches, music, and symbols that promoted a sense of cohesion typical of the 
process of nation-state consolidation, while popular participation in official 
activities was reduced to mere witnesses. The unveiling of Santamaría’s statue in 
1891, for example, helped to create an official discourse of the Filibuster War that 
emphasized institutional and patriotic involvement. There was no space for 
popular activities. The consolidation of Santamaría as national hero in 1916 
introduced an element of popular culture that, years later, changed the meaning of 
the celebrations of the Filibuster War in detriment of the official discourse.  
 While the crisis of the Liberal state during the early twentieth century was 
confronted with the elevation of April 11
th
 in detriment of May 1
st
, the figure of 
Santamaría was never easy to manipulate. By the 1940s, the Liberal state was 
substituted by a welfare state that lasted until the 1980s and 1990s. The end of the 
twentieth century and beginning of the twentieth-first century has been 
characterized by the imposition of a neoliberal state based on the Washington 
consensus, better known in the United States with the nickname of Reaganomics. 
The dismantling of the welfare state has been resisted by popular organizations, 
and the parades of April 11
th
 served as another theater in which popular culture 
protested against the betrayal of the state.  
The case of Santamaría is unique in the western world. His image and the 
manner of his rise do not fit the classic representation of a national hero. 
Washington, Bolívar, Bismarck, and Garibaldi are classic heroes that define the 
meaning of the nation-state at its birth. They fit the description of the founding 
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father, the one that establishes the initial structure and framework of the nation. 
Santamaría instead is a late hero, his feat happening thirty-five years after the 
country became independent. Therefore, he does not fit as a symbol for the 
foundation of the country. Due to the fact that Costa Rica did not have a war of 
independence, it also lacks a hero that could be defined as a founding father. The 
Costa Rican government tried to fill this gap, unsuccessfully, by connecting the 
war of 1856 with Independence Day, a movement promoted especially during the 
1890s, but this association has not developed in full in the Costa Rican mind. 
Therefore, Santamaría’s legacy cannot be connected to the specific moment in the 
past that is necessary in the definition of the birth of the nation-state.  
Also, because of his popular roots, both as a hero and as a person, 
Santamaría is a symbol that cannot represent the state in an exclusive manner. 
Santamaría was not a leader of any kind. He was not a president, nor a general, or 
a commander, the kind of material used for most national heroes. Instead, he was 
a humble drummer boy, which is to say that he was not even a full soldier. In the 
Costa Rican collective memory, this point is clearly established. One of the 
popular nicknames for Santamaría is el tamborcillo, or the little drummer. In this 
case, the nickname is a reflection of the image of Santamaría as a humble young 
man with no natural inclinations of accomplishing heroic feats in great battles. 
This understanding is reflected, among other places, in a little plaque at the old 
entrance to the Museo Histórico Cultural Juan Santamaría, which portrays a drum 
over two dates, 1831–1931, representing Santamaría in his drum, and the dates of 
his birth and its centenary. 
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Another issue created by the official adoption of the figure of Santamaría 
is the enemy he fought against, causing serious problems for the official discourse 
and the state. The Costa Rican government has usually been extremely friendly to 
the United States, when not submissive. The image of Santamaría is that of a hero 
who died fighting and defeating the advances of a growing empire: the United 
States. For this reason, an anti-imperialist image of Santamaría has been 
effectively used not only by the government, but also by non-governmental 
groups, from the communist party in the early twentieth century, to the anti-
CAFTA movement of the early twenty first century.
606
  
 The rise of the figure of Juan Santamaría as the Costa Rican national hero 
par excellence has therefore created serious difficulties for its official 
interpretation. In most speeches, Costa Rican presidents failed at their objective of 
making the people identify with their pledge, basically because the descriptions of 
Santamaría are demagogic and inconsistent. Also, the causes Santamaría memory 
is urged to defend are too abstract and usually disconnected from the Filibuster 
War and its values. On his April 11
th
 speech in 2005, for example, President Abel 
Pacheco urged Costa Ricans to be prepared to confront the new enemies of Costa 
Rica, described as “poverty, disengagement, the loss of civic and moral values, 
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the destruction of nature, and pessimism.”607 In other cases, the abuses of political 
demagogy created an open confrontation between the official discourse and the 
people. In 1999, President Miguel Angel Rodríguez was engaged in a large 
controversy related to his insistence on the privatization of state property. The 
selling of the Costa Rican Electric Institute (ICE, Instituto Costarricense de 
Electricidad) was strongly opposed by the people, promoting some of the largest 
demonstrations ever seen in Costa Rican history. In his April 11
th
, 1999 speech, 
Rodríguez expressed that the enemy this time was at home, that the “new 
filibusters” were those against the selling of national property to international 
corporations.
608
 It is obvious that such unpopular attitude of the president did not 
find a sympathetic echo in the people, and in fact it was severely criticized by ex-
presidents, congressmen, and unions alike. To declare the Costa Rican people to 
be filibusters is contradictory to any logical discourse related to the Filibuster 
War. It is especially controversial when, as in this case, the state declares itself to 
be the representative of the nation, assigning to the people the figure of the 
enemy.  
It is precisely the lack of consistency in the official discourse that has 
disenfranchised the people, impeding them to identify with the manner in which 
the state tries to define the Filibuster War and its celebrations. The meaning gap 
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produced by this cultural dissonance allowed for the people to look for a new 
manner to understand the celebrations of April 11
th
. The first step for the popular 
groups was to recover the image of Juan Santamaría as belonging to the people, 
not to the state. After that, it has re-appropriated a festivity that since its 
beginnings was always based on a popular origin. If the official culture stole the 
hero from the hands of the people, the people decided to take back Santamaría by 
eliminating the militaristic and official meanings of the celebrations.  
To understand the process of re-appropriation of the image of Santamaría 
by the people, Ginzburg’s concepts, mentioned above, prove to be useful tools. 
Since popular culture does not usually leave a printed document of its plans and 
intentions, it is possible to find its expressions precisely in the encounter between 
official and popular discourse. In the case of the Filibuster War, this is 
represented by the celebrations of April 11
th
. That day, the state commemorates 
the military victories against the filibusters, imbuing their meaning with a 
discourse that celebrates the state as well as the effort of common citizens in 
protecting the nation during the war. By analyzing changes to the performance of 
the celebrations it is possible to understand the redefinition of the 
commemorations of the Filibuster War promoted by popular culture.  
One of the first elements was disrupting the traditional framework of the 
April 11
th
 commemorations by including new elements closely associated with 
popular celebrations, not with official culture. In 1997, a newspaper published as 
a novelty the presence during the parades of the “rhythmic band of Siquirres, 
directed by Antony Wilson, which traveled from that city in order to inject a little 
309 
 
Caribbean touch to the percussion.”609 The note does not represent a revolutionary 
movement, but it is significant in some aspects. It is important to note that in 
Costa Rica, each school or high school is responsible for their own organization 
for the parades, including the design of their uniforms, music played, marching 
style, etc. Up to that point, the April 11
th
 parades had always used militaristic or 
patriotic songs, most of them following a military rhythm, the march. The 
introduction of Caribbean rhythms is, in itself, an affront to the militaristic basic 
framework of the parades. Since the main figure of the celebrations of April 11
th
 
is Juan Santamaría, it is not difficult to imagine that during the parades a young 
drummer has a stronger symbolic association with the national hero than, say, the 
President of Costa Rica. To see a drummer boy playing popular music instead of a 
military march is a signal to those standing along the parade route of the power of 
the individual over institutions. This was just the beginning. The takeover of the 
parades did not include only music, but other elements. While the bands 
traditionally had played nationalistic songs such as “Patriótica Costarricense,” the 
“Anthem to Juan Santamaría,” “Tan Linda es mi Costa Rica,” as well as other 
traditional songs as “Caña Dulce,” and “Morena de mi Vida,” by April of 2000 
we can find an article stating that: “the bands delighted the public with all kind of 
melodies, from folkloric music as “Caña Dulce,” to the 70s classic rock, or the 
most popular tropical songs of the moment. To the rhythm of each song, young 
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girls wore dresses of bright colors and fine details, moving their bodies to even 
touch the ground.”610 In just a few years, popular culture was able to change the 
cultural expressions associated with parades to transform them from a traditional 
militaristic parade into a comparsa. Marches became samba, and the traditional 
martial air of the majorettes became the colorful and sensual dance of the 
carnival. The official parade was transformed into a popular fiesta. 
Also in 2000, another tradition was broken. Usually, as the oldest and 
most traditional high school of Alajuela, the Instituto de Alajuela closed the 
parades. Its position is so closely attached to the city that its coat of arms shows 
Santamaría’s torch. That year, for the first time, and against the express desire of 
the government, the Instituto de Alajuela did not close the parade. Instead, 
workers of the Costa Rican Electric Institute, the same that president Rodríguez 
tried to sell some years earlier, received the honor. Behind them, thousands of 
members of the community walked with signs supporting the Electricity 
Company, protesting the government’s intention of privatization. Since then, 
April 11
th
 became a center of protest against the government. In an interview in 
2003, a high school teacher disgusted by the decision of the government to 
symbolically support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, said to the newspapers that “the 
government, they are the filibusters. If they join the warmongers, they are like the 
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filibusters.”611 On April 11th, 2005, a group of protestors against the government’s 
insistence on signing the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
carried signs stating “it will always be April 11th” and “today’s filibusters come 
along with dollars,” in a clear defiance against the government’s actions.612 
The people started to redefine the meaning of the celebrations, and to 
empower themselves by taking away the right to define what a filibuster was and 
what the commemoration of Santamaría was supposed to represent. In popular 
culture, a festivity is clearly a celebration, therefore, a party, and that is how 
popular culture started to redefine the celebrations. The defiance against the 
official discourse was followed by more protests, as well as other more subtle 
ways of expression. In 2003, the government, concerned by the decreasing length 
of the skirts used by the baton twirlers during the parades, forbade the use of 
mini-skirts. The ban included the use of cowboy hats or midriff-bearing blouses. 
The reason, according to the government, was that the celebrations to Juan 
Santamaría were losing its patriotic meaning. The Minister of Education failed to 
understand that the meaning of April 11
th
 did not belong anymore exclusively to 
the government. On April 12
th
, 2005 the newspapers reported that most of the 
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high schools had defied the order.
613
 With regard to the defiant attitude of the 
students against the new Manual for Celebration of Patriotic Festivities, nobody 
expressed the idea better than an article written the following day stating that “it is 
necessary to accept that no manual has the strength of reggaeton or the convincing 
power of MTV.”614 
Popular culture is dynamic, and therefore constantly changing, being 
influenced from many avenues, including foreign pop music. That explains why 
in recent parades the music played by the bands included songs by Shakira, Ricky 
Martin, and Celia Cruz. The baton twirlers are now dancing to the comparsa 
rhythm, resembling more of a carnival than a patriotic parade.
615
 The battle 
against the mini-skirts was lost by the government, and the Minister of Education 
was forced to declare in 2007 that “measures to regulate the way of dressing and 
the music played during the parades were eliminated.”616 It is true that 
expressions of popular culture can be superficial, but this is due to a flexibility 
that allows for the inclusion of a variety of ideas and influences. It does not have, 
as the official discourse, a distinctive rhetoric, and it can also be erratic.  
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The image of Santamaría has belonged, since its beginnings, to popular 
culture. Oral culture kept the memory of the humble drummer boy alive. 
Therefore, popular culture has the right to recover its meaning and use it, as it has 
been done recently, to represent popular meanings. When the people accused the 
government of being the real filibusters and at the same time defied government 
regulations disguised as patriotic and civic virtues, popular culture started 
recovering the power to define the memory of the events, and to recreate a sense 
of identity once co-opted by the state. It is not casual that Santamaría is used as a 
symbol by popular anti-imperialist movements; it has been done before, and it is 
in the very nature of Santamaría’s feat. But now, instead of military music, the 
songs played by the bands also include anti-war lyrics. An example is “La vida es 
un carnaval,” which was made famous by Cuban singer Celia Cruz. The song is a 
cry against war, describing it as a continuous carnival, criticizing anything that 
does not lead to happiness.
617
 It criticizes “all those that use weapons, all those 
that create pollution, and all those that make war.” Another example comes from 
2007, when a high school band played an old Costa Rican song called 
“Violencia.” A very popular song in the 1970s, “Violencia” is an outcry against 
all kind of abuse.
618
 The lyrics say: “violence, damn violence, why don’t you let 
peace reign, let love reign.” This is the transfiguration of Santamaría’s image by 
popular culture, from the military hero that the official discourse still wants to use 
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in a demagogical way, to an instrument of criticism from a people that defines 
itself by its immediate needs: family, friends, love, work, and peace. 
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Chapter 7 
 
SANTA ROSA, OR FAILING ON INVENTING TRADITIONS 
 
The battle of Santa Rosa, which took place on March 20, 1856, was the 
first encounter between the invading filibusters and the Costa Rican army. It was 
also the first victory for the Costa Ricans and a devastating moral and tactical 
defeat for Walker’s forces. While this battle set the course for the war, only once 
did March 20
th
 have a chance of becoming an official holiday, and it was during 
the Costa Rican celebrations of the centenary of the Filibuster War in 1956. This 
chapter analyzes the case of a failed effort to create a new holiday related to the 
Filibuster War. It studies the qualities of invented traditions as explained by 
Hobsbawm in his now classic Invented Traditions.
619
 Based on his theories, this 
chapter explores what went wrong for the government’s attempt to create a new 
holiday celebrating the Filibuster War, pointing out the political uses and abuses 
of the past in which it incurred. 
During the 1940s, Costa Rican politics became increasingly polarized. The 
elections of 1947 were stained with several denunciations of irregularities. 
Electoral fraud was even suspected. A subsequent civil war resulted in a drastic 
change to the political arena. In 1948, while a Constitutional Congress was 
assembled to create a new Constitution, a temporary Junta was selected to be in 
charge of the executive power. Its president was José Figueres Ferrer, leader of 
the military movement that contested the official result of the 1947 elections. 
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Under his leadership, Costa Rica saw a new group coming to power under the flag 
of the newly created Liberación Nacional party.  
Although the civil war officially lasted only a few weeks, political 
instability continued for years, leading to the events of 1955.
620
 In 1949, a new 
Constitution was established. The Junta, therefore having accomplished its goal, 
was disbanded, and a new president, Otilio Ulate, was inaugurated. Figueres 
decided to run in the 1953 elections, and his victory at the polls revived the 
resentment of the Calderonistas, the group defeated during the civil war.
621
 In 
1955, a group of exiled Calderonistas forged an alliance with Nicaraguan dictator 
Anastasio Somoza and invaded Costa Rica from the north. On one hand, the 
Calderonistas allied with the Communists during the 1940s to maintain political 
control of Costa Rica, something that Somoza and other U.S. backed dictators 
would not forgive. But, on the other hand, Figueres was a leader of the Caribbean 
Legion, a non-official armed movement directed to overthrow all dictators in the 
region, and Somoza was a main target for that organization. The strange coalition 
between Calderonistas and Somoza can only be explained by the fact that 
Figueres was a common enemy. 
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The invasion started in January 1955, although rumors of a possible attack 
were reported since October 1954.
622
 The land invasion started on January 10, 
1955, followed by a bombardment over San José on January 12
th
.
623
 On January 
15
th
, a battle ensued in the northern province of Guanacaste, around the site of the 
Hacienda Santa Rosa, the same place in which Walker’s filibusters were defeated 
almost a hundred years before.
624
 The battle, a victory for the Costa Rican forces 
after three days of fighting, was immediately named “the battle of Santa Rosa.”625 
To argue that the government chose the Hacienda Santa Rosa cannot be 
supported, but it is clear that Figueres did not miss the opportunity, connecting the 
battle of 1955 to the March 20, 1856 victory over the filibusters. 
By February, the invasion was stopped and the invaders were under 
control. The political use of the battle started immediately. As soon as victory was 
secured, national newspapers described the 1955 battle in direct connection to the 
Filibuster invasion with headlines such as “The battle of Santa Rosa was as 
definitive as the one a hundred years ago.”626 A few months later, during the 
celebrations of April 11, 1955, president Figueres reminded Costa Ricans of the 
                                                          
622
 The Costa Rican National Library has a great compilation of all books and newspaper notes 
related to the invasion: Biblioteca Nacional Miguel Obregón Lizano. Invasión desde Nicaragua a 
Costa Rica: Octubre 1954 – Diciembre 1955. Bibliografía. San José, 1955. Available in PDF 
format at: 
http://www.sinabi.go.cr/Biblioteca%20Digital/BIBLIOGRAFIA/Bibliografias/Bib%20Invasion.pd
f 
 
623
 Diario de Costa Rica. January13th, 1955. 
 
624
 Diario de Costa Rica. January 16
th
, 1955. January 19
th
, 1955. Diario Nacional. January 17
th
, 
1955. 
625
 La Nación. January 18
th
, 1955. 
 
626
 La República. January 18
th
, 1955. 
318 
 
recent events, naming one by one the fallen during the battle of Santa Rosa almost 
three months before.
627
 The tactic of using the Filibuster War’s legacy to 
legitimize himself while at the same time invalidating the opposition was 
common for Figueres even before he came to power, as demonstrated in several 
speeches he gave during the 1940s.
628
 In them, Figueres constantly compared his 
political struggle to the Filibuster War.  
The following year, 1956, commemorated the first centenary of the 
Filibuster War. Costa Rica prepared a special series of celebrations in advance. 
That year, the government supported the publication of several books honoring 
the memory of the Costa Rican participation during the Filibuster War.
629
 Parades 
celebrated April 11
th
 in many cities and not only in Alajuela as had been 
customary.
630
 Radio stations transmitted several hours of shows presenting stories 
about the Filibuster War. Newspapers published several articles commenting on 
the importance of the celebrations. Also, they published several interviews with 
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relatives of the veterans of the war, as well as important primary documents and 
narrations.
631
  
This anniversary was also the scenario for an unusual celebration. While 
the battle of Santa Rosa on March 20, 1856 was of extreme strategic importance 
for the final defeat of Walker, it had only been mentioned on a few occasions in 
government speeches or newspapers since 1856.
632
 Certainly, March 20
th
 has 
never been an official holiday, as April 11
th
 and May 1
st
 had It also had never 
been the reason for celebrations and parades or the motif for any monument or 
statue. In 1956 this changed. The government of Figueres, understanding that the 
connection between the two battles at Santa Rosa could serve to establish a 
positive narrative for the consolidation of his political project, decided to make 
the most of it. After all, Liberación Nacional was not just the winner of the civil 
war; it was now the government and defender of Costa Rican sovereignty. It was 
logical to assume that Costa Ricans would rally to support a national narrative 
that made Figueres the unquestioned leader of a country united around the party 
he founded. As Hobsbawm says, invented traditions “are responses to novel 
situations which take the form of reference to old situations.”633 The crisis of 1948 
was a break with the past and the moment, the Liberacionistas thought, to impose 
a new narrative of the past. In that position of power, it seemed logical that 
whatever narrative created by the government would become the national 
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narrative. By owning the possibility of creating a myth, the Liberacionistas were 
now ready to own history. 
Indeed, in January, 1956, the first anniversary of the 1955 invasion was 
celebrated with a ceremony in Santa Rosa. On January 14
th
, several veterans met 
at the Hacienda, where a message sent by President Figueres was read. In it, he 
exhorted Costa Ricans to remember the sacrifices of the past, in a subtle reference 
to both battles, one against the filibusters on March 20 1856 and the other 
between two different Costa Rica factions in January of 1955.
634
 To make this 
connection even more clear, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT – Instituto 
Costarricense de Turismo), a government institution, sent that same day a team to 
study the possibility of creating a national park in the area, which would include 
the Hacienda Santa Rosa.
635
 The goal of creating the park was to transform the 
Casona into a museum, since Santa Rosa, according to the president of the ICT, 
Fritz A. Leer, “evoked an epopee of heroism and sacrifice, tightly linked to the 
country’s most brilliant history.”636 The idea of establishing a link between both 
battles of Santa Rosa became a normal occurrence when two days later an article 
in La Nación titled “The pride of being Costa Rican” named both Juan Santamaría 
and Timoleón Morera as national heroes representing the struggle for Costa Rican 
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institutions and sovereignty.
637
 Santamaría, the national hero of 1856, was directly 
connected to a victim of the political turmoil of the 1940s. In that manner, the 
Filibuster War became a precedent for 1948, and therefore of 1955. The 
connection created in January was just a warm-up for what was to come during 
the centennial celebrations of March 20
th
 and April 11
th
. 
On March 16, 1956, the government published an ad in various 
newspapers  asking for Costa Ricans to participate in the official 
commemorations, for the first time, of the battle of Santa Rosa. The ceremony 
was scheduled for March 20
th
, and was planned to be held at the Hacienda. 
According to the ad, the idea was to celebrate the battle “in the same fields where 
the fight against the filibusters took effect, on March 20
th
, 1856, guaranteeing 
Central American independence.”638 The same ad asked for neighborhoods and 
stores to put flags on the front of their houses and buildings, and to illuminate 
their windows during the nights of March 19
th
 and March 20
th
. Also, on March 
16
th
, several other ads called veterans of the recent invasion of 1955 to gather in 
order to be transported to the Hacienda Santa Rosa on March 19
th
.
639
 It was 
obvious that the government, while celebrating for the first time in history the 
1856 Battle of Santa Rosa, in reality decided to celebrate the recent battle of 1955. 
This was a great exercise in inventing traditions, one at which Figueres’s  
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government was not as successful as those that made May 1
st
 and April 11
th
 the 
center of Costa Rican national identity. 
To support the celebration, Rodrigo Facio, President of the Universidad de 
Costa Rica, and a close ally of Figueres, organized a series of events that included 
the publication of a book about the Filibuster War and a series of conferences. 
Facio also organized a group of professors and students to be sent to the Hacienda 
Santa Rosa to join the celebrations prepared for March 20
th
.
640
  
The Liberacionista use of the Filibuster War centennial celebration to 
commemorate a partisan event soon received criticism from the opposition. On 
March 17
th
, the day after the ads were published, the Ulatista newspaper Diario de 
Costa Rica accused the government of denaturalizing the commemoration of the 
battle of Santa Rosa.
641
 By including a commemoration of the 1955 invasion, 
argued the daily, the government threatened to transform the celebration of the 
centenary into a political and demagogic act. The Diario rejected as pure 
propaganda the comparison of what it called a small confrontation between 
brothers to the glory of the Filibuster War, admonishing that with its attitude the 
government was creating a larger gap between the two political factions that had 
divided the Costa Rican family.
642
  
On March 18
th
, La Nación, a traditionally anti-Figueres newspaper, 
published an editorial that summarized the critiques against the government’s 
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plans. The article, titled “The centenary of the Patria” corroborated, once again, 
the Costa Rican belief that while the nation became independent from Spain in 
1821, it was through the fight for survival and sovereignty during the Filibuster 
War that the nation became a viable project. It was understood that 1956 was a 
moment to remember and honor the sacrifice of past generations. Therefore, to 
join the celebrations of the Filibuster War with a commemoration of the invasion 
of 1955 was, simply put, nonsensical. The newspaper was careful to explain that 
the fallen in the battle of 1955 in Santa Rosa deserved respect, but: 
(T)o risk a bias on the commemoration of the centenary of the date 
that has a universal character for Costa Ricans, we cannot agree in 
any way to simultaneously remember the national heroes of the 
1856 campaign and those that lost their lives in 1955. To join both 
historical events imply, among other things, to limit the 
commemoration to a small group… The Patria was configured by 
those that made us free and sovereign, and does not understand of 
political differences, neither of temporary party divisions.
643
 
 
The newspaper La República, with close ties to the government, 
disregarded instead the critique and continued to promote the celebration of 
March 20
th
 with a series of articles connecting the battles at Santa Rosa of 1856 
and 1955. In an editorial titled “Centenary and Anniversary,” published on March 
18
th
, the newspaper declared the official position of the commemoration.
644
 The 
article started by reminding the reader of the importance of the battle of Santa 
Rosa in 1856, as an event that signaled Walker’s demise and the Costa Rican 
struggle for sovereignty. Then, it promoted the commemoration organized for 
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March 20, 1956, as a moment in which the new generations could renew their 
commitment to the nation, originally acquired and assumed by their grandparents 
and great-grandparents. Independence and sovereignty were established in that 
Hacienda, said the article, “there, our right to be free has been confirmed.” The 
end of the third paragraph shows a smooth shift in the narrative, starting to 
connect 1856 and 1955: 
There, there are the heroes of 1856, and next to them, underlining 
the heroism of their grandparents, the sacrifice of their successors. 
God wanted to give Santa Rosa the double honor of being the 
scenario of two battles in which, with a hundred years distance, 
Costa Ricans fought for the same goal and achieved the same 
success.
645
 
 
The only difference between the filibusters and the Calderonistas, 
according to the author, was that the first were foreigners and the second “saw the 
light under the national sky.”646 In this article, not only did La República equaled 
the Calderonistas to the greatest Costa Rican nemesis, but the euphemism used 
portrayed them not as real Costa Ricans, but as accidental residents of the country 
without a connection to the nation.  
The attitude of the government was too dangerous for the sake of national 
unity, but on the other hand, to pursue a political project, the new elites would 
have to destroy the traditional connection with the past by establishing a new 
interpretation of it. Following Hobsbawm’s formula seems easy: the 
establishment of a new holiday has the purpose of inculcating “values and norms 
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of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.”647 If the real connection with the past is irrelevant, says Hobsbawm, what is 
important is the establishment of a link that portrays a new norm or value as 
having a clear precedent in the past. This is easier to perform when a society is 
passing through a moment of crisis or radical change. Maurice Halbwachs argues 
that, indeed, memory legitimizes power, and that memory is malleable. Social 
frameworks, rites, and ceremonies define our understanding of the context we live 
in.
648
 Crises and periods of social change are moments in which those frameworks 
are shaken, sometimes broken, and therefore, moments in which the establishment 
of new values and norms are easier to accomplish. In order to do so, says 
Halbwachs, we can either distort the past by creating precedents to the new values 
we want to impose, what Hobsbawm called an “invented tradition.” or limit the 
field of memory to encompass only a very short and recent period.
649
 Traumatic 
events, such as a civil war, make this possible, since remembering the past can 
bring unresolved pain and disillusionment.  
The Liberacionista celebration of March 20
th
 was an attempt to 
incorporate all these elements. First, the establishment of a new official holiday 
signaled the intention of creating a new set of values and norms. Second, the fact 
that March 20
th
 was already recognized as a day of great significance for the 
creation of the nation and the defense of sovereignty made it easier to connect it 
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to the new battle of Santa Rosa of 1955. Not because of the date coincidence, but 
because of the geographical coincidence. The fact that there was, in both battles, 
an invading side that came from the north helped to create the condition of a 
precedent established by Hobsbawm. Third, Costa Rica had recently suffered a 
severe political crisis that ended in civil war, making the social frameworks more 
flexible. More importantly, as Halbwachs asserts, the Liberacionistas could expect 
a limiting of the field of memory centered on the traumatic memories of the war 
and its consequences, making it easier to impose symbols connected to those 
events. 
On March 20
th
, the activities to commemorate the battle of Santa Rosa 
clearly showed the purposeful conflation of images of 1856 and 1955. At 8 a.m., 
the event started with a ceremony to remember those fallen in 1955, followed by 
homage to Alvaro Monge, a veteran of 1955, by the Municipality of San José, 
where he used to work. The events included the unveiling and inauguration of two 
monuments directed to establish an immediate and direct connection between 
both battles at Santa Rosa. First, President Figueres lighted the Flame of 
Patriotism, a torch shaped monument dedicated to those fallen in 1955. This was 
followed by the unveiling of a monument commemorating the centenary of the 
battle of 1856. The fact that no monument at all had been constructed on the 
Hacienda in a hundred years also served to connect the two events of 1856 and 
1955. In his speech, the president of the Costa Rican Historical Academy, 
Francisco María Núñez, described the 1856 battle of Santa Rosa, examining the 
strategic importance of that victory and its meaning for future generations. Then, 
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he proceeded to promote the objective established by the government: “fields of 
Santa Rosa, so many times watered by Costa Rican blood: blessed you will 
always be, because here were written glorious pages and here our political 
independence was ratified.”650 
The government seemed to have gained the upper hand on the 
controversy. After March 20
th
, only a few comments were directed by the 
opposition to chastise the decision of the government to celebrate the battle of 
1955. But then, on March 22
nd
, the newspaper Diario de Costa Rica published a 
photo of the commemorations of March 20
th
 on its front page (see figure 5). The 
image is titled “more soldiers than students,” showing how the holiday was 
directed at celebrating the veterans of 1955, all of them dressed in military 
uniforms, and not the nation as had been usual during past Filibuster War 
commemorations. This photo represented a strong critique against a government 
that usurped and distorted the traditional ideal of a peaceful and hardworking 
Costa Rica.
651
 It also showed a great contradiction. Just seven years before, 
Figueres, as President of the Junta, had abolished the army during a ceremony in 
which he personally defined this new symbol for the nation while smashing a 
huge sledgehammer into the walls of the main military fort and barracks in San 
José. As seen in Chapter 3, by 1956 the image of military institutions in Costa 
Rica was receding and in decay. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
military had been pushed aside when it came to civic and patriotic celebrations, 
                                                          
650
 Diario de Costa Rica. March 22
nd
, 1956. 
 
651
 Diario de Costa Rica. March 22
nd
, 1956. 
328 
 
favoring instead students of primary and secondary education. The process was 
natural for the expansion of the nation-state. While the army originally gave a 
strong patriotic meaning to the celebrations, the inclusion of students was directed 
to establishing a straight connection between the state and the inhabitants of the 
nation through the institution that had stronger ties to the Costa Rican population. 
The photo in figure 5 portrays the main house of the Hacienda Santa Rosa 
standing on the top of a hill. President Figueres and other speakers appear on the 
top, talking from the balcony. The crowd is composed almost absolutely by 
veterans of the 1955 invasion, which are all dressed in military uniforms, some of 
them wearing U.S. World War II-like helmets. Under the photo, the scene is 
described merely as a political and military celebration, instead of one that is 
related to the festivities of the Filibuster War centenary. While the abolition of the 
army represented a drastic change of the social framework of Costa Ricans, it was 
a welcomed one, since it contrasted with the recent events of the civil war and 
was an obvious conclusion of a process already in development since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The strong militaristic presence at the March 
20
th
 celebrations contradicted the newly accepted values, and was therefore 
immediately rejected.  
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Figure 5 Diario de Costa Rica. March 22nd, 1956. Title: “More soldiers than students.” 
The government continued on the offensive to consolidate a connection 
between the events of 1856 and 1955. On March 20
th
, Francisco J. Orlich, 
presidential candidate for the Liberación Nacional party (president of Costa Rica 
between 1962 and 1966), criticized the March 18
th
 editorial published by La 
Nación, defending the joined commemoration of both events, stating that “the 
heroes that in 1955 had defended national sovereignty were not less than those 
that in 1856 had done the same.”652 Another article published on May 25th 
defended the decision of celebrating 1955 along with 1856, arguing that in both 
cases sovereignty and the Costa Rican democratic tradition were at peril. This last  
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article mentioned that 1955 was a consequence of the struggle started in 1948 to 
defend Costa Rican institutions and values.
653
 
The narrative created by the government was not very successful, though, 
due to the biased purpose of connecting the most important event in the 
construction of Costa Rican national identity to a historic moment that was still 
perceived as an unresolved social trauma. A cartoon appeared on those days 
depicting the ceremony held at Santa Rosa, stating that not all of those at Santa 
Rosa were in fact real heroes.
654
 As shown above, the press initially reacted with 
criticism against the way in which March 20
th
 was celebrated. After that day they 
changed their course by simply ignoring the government’s pretenses and 
refocusing on the commemorations of the Filibuster War as if March 20
th
 never 
happened.
655
 The general reaction of the population was diminished support for 
the general celebrations planned for that year. While there were still celebrations 
in the larger cities, such as Heredia and Alajuela, most people simply did not 
participate in the commemorations. On March 25
th
, the Diario de Costa Rica 
commented about this phenomenon, describing the government’s behavior as 
resulting in the confusion and disinterest of the public. The newspaper assured  
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that the disrespect for the “real and only history the people understood” promoted 
their indifference.
656
 
The creation of a Santa Rosa celebration in 1956 relied on a concept that 
perceived Costa Rica as a nation broken by the civil war. In order to heal it, the 
government thought that the country needed new symbols to establish a sense of 
continuity with the past. This coincides with Pierre Nora’s findings about the use 
of history, in which the creation of new symbols is pertinent to moments of crisis 
in which a narrative of the nation suffered an unrecoverable break.
657
 Nora refers 
to moments in which the community dynamic experiences a shift, as when 
peasant societies were threatened by industrialization, or when democratic 
regimes established a new relationship between the governed and the 
governing.
658
 While war can create such a break in continuity, and the Costa 
Rican civil war definitely deserves to be classified as a national trauma, the civil 
war was not directed at destroying the nation. In fact, it was the opposite; it was a 
war for national consolidation. For example, the U.S. civil war, in which one side 
wanted to establish a new separate nation, explains why some of the symbols of 
the South, such as the Dixie flag, are still used to represent non-conformity 
against the national government. The Costa Rican civil war followed instead the 
path of redirecting the nation. As traumatic as it was, the goal was to establish (or 
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to keep) a specific political or economic path for the nation that was just starting 
to develop after the crisis of the traditional Liberal state. While there were 
casualties, the goal of the war was not the annihilation of the opposition. 
Therefore, it was a mistake to consider, as Figueres’s government did, that Costa 
Rican society was experiencing an identity vacuum, and that new symbols and a 
new narrative could be easily established. 
The critiques to the commemoration of the battle of Santa Rosa in 1956, 
instead, were based on the premise that the celebrations were not directed to 
reinforce national unity, but that the government focused on the creation of a 
specific narrative that appealed only to the winners of the civil war. This was 
easily questioned by the losing side, which claimed that they were as Costa Rican 
as the current government, and had therefore as much right to interpret the 
symbols of the Filibuster War as anyone else. The Santa Rosa celebration of 1956 
did not help to consolidate a narrative of national unity. Instead, it reinforced the 
feeling that Costa Rica was divided, reopening very fresh wounds while most 
Costa Ricans were looking for healing. The trauma of 1948 was painfully revived 
in 1955, but the Santa Rosa celebration of 1956 was not a remedy; instead they 
were mocking the nation. The Calderonistas saw it as an inappropriate insult, and 
even some Liberacionistas found it extremely rude and unnecessary, especially 
when the main symbol of the nation became a cheap political tool. It is not a 
strange occurrence to associate traditions with new concepts and meanings, after 
all, memory is a dynamic process. But in this case, the March 20
th
 celebrations 
were considered by many as a blatant desacralization of the most important Costa 
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Rican lieu de mémoire: The Filibuster War. This symbol is the strongest vessel of 
Costa Rican national identity. The Filibuster War established the Costa Rican 
imagined community; it was a war for the survival of the nation, for its 
sovereignty. The Santa Rosa celebration of 1956 implied that some Costa Ricans 
were not real Costa Ricans for the simple fact that they took a different 
ideological stand. It threatened the sense of community by tearing apart the 
national fabric. Resistance to the new national narrative was just an obvious 
reaction.  
It will always be April 11
th
 
Still, there was April 11
th
, and with it a new controversy sparked. By 1956, 
the figure of Santamaría was well established as the main popular image of the 
Filibuster War.
659
 Therefore, and especially after the March 20
th
 fiasco, the peak 
of the centenary celebrations was focused on the festivities surrounding April 
11
th
. The Juan Santamaría park was remodeled; a literary contest was opened for 
poets, historians, and writers to celebrate the national hero; a beauty contest 
crowned the Queen of the centenary; Congress held on April 9
th
 a special session 
dedicated to speeches celebrating the sacrifice of Juan Santamaría; a radio 
corporation broadcasted a special show dedicated to the battle of Rivas in three of 
the most important stations around the country, including the playing of the 
national anthem and other patriotic songs related to the memory of 1856, 
speeches, poems, and a dramatization. Several parades were celebrated, mostly in 
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Alajuela, on the days previous to April 11
th
, including a military parade and a 
student’s parade. On the night of April 10th thousands of children carried self-
made torches in a parade that started in the location where Juan Santamaría’s old 
house, now the Fountain of Freedom, used to stand, ending at the Juan Santamaría 
Park. A soccer match pitted the local team, Liga Deportiva Alajuelense against 
the Bon Sucesso of Brazil, in which the Queen of the centenary was honored by 
performing the initial kick.
660
 It seemed like a patriotic effervescence was directed 
to put aside the Santa Rosa disaster.  
The militaristic and politically biased approach of the government on 
celebrating March 20
th
 had already created some resentment among Costa Ricans 
in general. Still, April 11
th
 continued to be used by the government to spread the 
same propaganda. Military parades, abandoned decades before, became favored 
by the government, and speeches were used to congratulate members of the 
governing party. On April 10
th
, the governor of Alajuela gave a speech at the Juan 
Santamaría Park celebrating the official presidential candidate, Francisco Orlich; 
his remarks were considered to be in poor taste.
661
 The worst scandal, though, 
came from the speech given by none other than president José Figueres on April 
11
th
, at the Juan Santamaría Park just before the parades started. First, while 
looking back to the statue of Santamaría, he compared himself to the national hero 
calling him “brother Juan.” Then, he celebrated himself by stating that while 
Santamaría burned down the Mesón, he was continuing his liberating efforts by 
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burning down the “Mesón of the oligarchy.”662 Finally, he compared, once again, 
the Filibuster War to the events of the civil war in 1948 and 1955.
663
 Critiques 
rose immediately. Some called him a hypocrite by defining himself as a fighter 
against the oligarchy while being himself a millionaire. Second, a nativist attack 
against the president reminded the public that while Santamaría was a model of 
the noblest Costa Rican values, Figueres was instead the son of two Spanish 
immigrants, and therefore did not share a drop of blood with the common citizens 
of the country.  
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Figure 6 Diario de Costa Rica, April 15
th
, 1956. 
Figure 6 shows a cartoon published in a newspaper reflecting the 
indignation against the speech of president Figueres. In it, president Figueres 
holds a weapon while looking back to Santamaría’s statue, stating “we are also 
burning mesones.” Santamaría responds: “Careful, do not get burned,” in a clear 
reference to the president’s faux pas.664 
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Newspapers continued to critique Figueres for several days, accusing him 
also of doubting the existence of the national hero by questioning during his 
speech if he was not just a myth.
665
 A letter sent by a reader to the newspaper La 
Nación, and published on April 15
th
, described the government as full of neo-
filibusters promoting foreign militaristic symbols. Looking like soldiers 
everywhere, students were dressed as “Prussians and French…with so many 
military decorations and ornaments that they looked like colorful guacamayas.” 
The letter described a fictional encounter between the reader and Santamaría, in 
which the hero expressed his disgust and impotence, threatening to take up again 
his torch and rifle, knowing that by doing so he would certainly be abolished by 
the government as a patriotic symbol.
666
 Possibly recognizing the mistake of 
trying to impose a new meaning over the Filibuster War for political gain, the 
government remained silent against the new wave of critiques, abandoning the 
efforts of inventing a new holiday. Indeed, March 20
th
 and the battle of Santa 
Rosa were never again celebrated as official holidays, and the comparisons 
between 1856 and 1948–1955 were soon forgotten. 
The new official narrative created by the government of Figueres about 
the Filibuster War raises the question of its failure. After all, several cases have 
been analyzed in which new invented traditions have been developed and 
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accepted.
667
 The representation of the past is by definition a debate about the 
present, and a battle of readings of the past by two or more groups.
668
 The 
problem with Figueres’s approach was that he tried to establish an openly political 
invented tradition, and “people do become indignant when history is taken over as 
an integral part of politics,” as Claudio Pavone recently stated.669  
The first issue with Figueres’s attempt to connect the Filibuster War with 
the 1948 civil war was that he confused his own rhetoric about a restoration of the 
Republic with reality. The Filibuster War delivers a clear and simple message for 
Costa Ricans: it was the moment in which the nation gained a place as a viable 
project. That is why the main topic related to the memory of the war relies on the 
concept of sovereignty. That simple word encompasses all the other concepts of 
Costa Rican national identity: nation, independence, anti-imperialism, negotiation 
with the powers, and recognition of diverse views of the world, solidarity, social 
order, respect, and support for institutions. There is a marked difference between 
the Filibuster War and the civil war of 1948: the Filibuster War threatened to 
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destroy the system of ideas that Costa Ricans were applying to their imagined 
community; it was a moment of national crisis. Instead, the civil war of 1948 was 
a struggle for the consolidation of institutions.  
Figueres’s mistake was based on a view of the world based on his Spanish 
background: the creation of a Second Republic. For him, military victory meant a 
rupture with the past, which granted him the ability to create a new sense of 
national identity based on the values of a new system. Figueres failed to realize 
that his project was in fact not a break with traditional values, but part of a 
national dynamic. He may, throughout the years, helped to redefine certain 
policies and institutions, but some of the changes were already happening, as is 
the case of the abolition of the army, an institution was already at the fringe of 
disappearing, as we saw in chapter 3. The new constitution of 1949 was in reality 
a modernization, and very modest by the way, of the constitution created during 
the times of President Tomás Guardia, during the 1870s. Figueres’s social policies 
followed most of the reforms created during the government of his two nemeses, 
President Calderón Guardia and President Teodorico Picado during the 1940s. 
Second, Figueres misread the support he had among Costa Ricans as a 
referendum on his personality. By connecting the two battles of Santa Rosa, the 
President appealed to his supporters, not realizing that what most Costa Ricans 
were looking for was reconciliation. After all, most Costa Ricans were still licking 
the wounds of the civil war of 1948 when the invasion of 1955 happened. A more 
humble Figueres could have used the centenary of the Filibuster War to  
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consolidate cohesion among Costa Ricans, focusing on the nation. Instead, he 
thought he could redefine the nation with a politically biased discourse. 
These two mistakes summarize one of the reasons why March 20
th
 did not 
become an official holiday after 1956 and why there is no established connection 
in the Costa Rican collective memory between 1856 and 1955 (and 1948 for that 
matter): lack of repetition. To explain this it is important to refer to Eric 
Hobsbawm’s work, which created in the 1980s a blueprint for invented 
traditions.
670
 Hobsbawm argues that sudden or drastic social transformation can 
weaken or destroy “the social patterns for which old traditions had been designed, 
producing new ones.”671 In other words, a social or national crisis can produce a 
vacuum that has to be filled with new representations and explanations, leading to 
the creation of new traditions and symbology. In this sense, Figueres tried to 
redefine the meaning of the Filibuster War to fill the void left by the trauma of 
civil war. He definitely believed that Costa Rica had experienced a break with the 
past in 1948, and that therefore a new narrative was needed to create a new 
society. While the civil war was a moment of national crisis, it did not represent a 
schism. The Costa Rica of the 1950s was in most ways a natural product of the 
social changes experienced since the 1920s, and not an exclusive result of the 
civil war. 
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The establishment of invented traditions, such as the one Figueres tried to 
incur in 1956, “seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by 
repetition,” says Hobsbawm, and this repetition “implies continuity with the 
past.”672 By connecting 1856 to 1955, Figueres tried to establish a link with the 
past to create continuity between the values of the Filibuster War and the new 
values he wanted to associate with the civil war. The problem was that his 
approach produced such a negative reaction that to try to repeat the message in 
1957 would have been a political disaster for his party. It can be argued that 
democratic governments have a harder time establishing new paradigms than 
authoritarian regimes. The media, for example, was one of the most important 
actors rejecting Figueres’s new traditions, something he could have controlled if 
he had the power to do so. Instead, it is clear that the failure to establish a new 
invented tradition relied on two issues connected to the social trauma that the civil 
war represented: the lack of understanding by Figueres and his party of how the 
invasion of 1955 was perceived by Costa Ricans, and the lack of political capital 
needed to create institutional support for a new national narrative. 
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Conclusion 
 The Filibuster War is considered in Costa Rica to be a substitute war of 
Independence, a moment in which the nation came together and sacrificed in 
order to save itself from foreign intervention and conquest.  With its triumph over 
Walker and his filibusters, Costa Rica demonstrated to be a viable project 
deserving international recognition.  This was possible due to President Mora’s 
policies of modernization and expansion of the army as part of an initial process 
of consolidation of the nation-state.  This process included the state’s ability to 
demand the support of the general population, including the economic elites for 
the defense of national sovereignty.  Mora was also responsible for establishing 
the first commemorations of the war, including the decree of a national holiday on 
May 1
st
 and the building of a statue in memory of the fallen.  With Mora, official 
nationalism took the first serious steps to establish the Filibuster War as the 
symbol of the nation. 
 This early period of modernization presents challenges to traditional 
theories based on a central European understanding (mostly French and German) 
of the creation of nationalism.  In fact, when it comes to Latin America, Costa 
Rica was a late comer, developing national symbols and national narratives during 
the 1850s; decades after nations like Argentina had done so already.  The problem 
is that Costa Rica did not become a separate nation until the declaration of the 
Republic in 1848.  Therefore, the narrative based on the independence movement 
of the 1820s responded to a Central American national narrative, and not 
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exclusively a Costa Rican development.  The Filibuster War, in 1856, filled a 
vacuum on Costa Rican identity.   
 Latin America developed an initial process of expansion of the nation-
state immediately after Independence.  Several national museums were created 
during the 1820s and 1830s in Latin America.  They formed part of a modernizing 
project representing a symbol of the goals of the early liberal republics.  National 
museums, in general, have been part of the modernization project associated with 
the consolidation of the nation-state during the late nineteenth century, which 
demonstrates that nationalism in the region enjoyed a different process than in 
Europe. 
 The Costa Rican case is exceptional in that it challenges modernizing 
theories based on the European chronology, while at the same time it does not fit 
with the regular Latin American efforts of early nationalism during the 1820s.  In 
fact, as a national symbol, the Filibuster War creates a totally different set of 
values than the Independence movement, making Costa Rican nationalism 
different from the rest of the Americas.  There are no founding fathers, neither a 
hate-love attitude against the former colonizer. 
 Even so, the importance of modernization theories cannot be denied.  In a 
second round of official nationalism during the rule of the Alajuelan liberal 
dynasty (Guardia, Fernandez, and Soto, between 1870-1889) coincides with the 
period of liberal modernization in Europe and the Americas of the early 1870s.  
This period was characterized by the consolidation of the nation-state and the 
expansion of institutionalization.  Positivistic ideas or order and progress 
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promoted the adoption of railroads as new transportation systems, and 
introduction of technological advances as telegraphs and electricity, which were 
accompanied by the development of institutions to spread ideological instruments 
to coalesce the nation around the liberal project: expansion of the education 
system, creation of national museums, national archives, national literature, and a 
national narrative. 
 The adoption of national symbols definitely grew with the consolidation of 
the liberal project, which made Steven Palmer assure that by 1885, the state was 
mature enough to create and spread a national narrative based on the Filibuster 
War.  In reality, the Filibuster War had been the center of official nationalism 
since 1856.  With the only exception of the ten year hiatus between 1859 and 
1870, May 1
st
 was continuously celebrated in Costa Rica after the war for more 
than 60 years.  During the 1870s, national flags adorned all public buildings 
during the commemorations of Walker’s surrender.  In 1883, the original tradition 
of shooting 21 blanks was reinstated.  The threat of war against Guatemala in 
1885 revived, once again, as it did in 1873 and 1878, the fears of the return of the 
filibuster under a new mask.  Palmer also argued that 1885 signaled the definitive 
establishment of Santamaria as national hero.  In fact, Santamaria was not 
recognized as the main symbol of the war until much later, and the myth of the 
return of the filibuster proves to be a constant that was only activated when a 
threat to national sovereignty seemed imminent. 
 The image of Santamaria was invoked in two occasions before 1885.  In 
1864, Jose de Obaldia mentioned his name as the main symbol of the Filibuster 
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War in a speech commemorating Independence Day.  In 1883, a local Alajuelan 
newspaper published an article that followed Obaldia’s early discourse.  This 
same article was reprinted in 1885, and is considered by Palmer as proof of the 
crowning of Santamaria as national hero.  That same year, though, several names 
were mentioned as relevant during the war.  The erection of Santamaria’s statue in 
1891 definitely shows his unique position, but only because it was imbued by a 
strong local taste and as a result of the promotion given to the Filibuster War by 
the Alajuelan dynasty.  Until 1916, the Alajuelan soldier was sporadically 
celebrated, and only in his native city.  
The Alajuelan dynasty directed a major liberal project to eliminate the 
traditional strife between Cartago and San Jose/Alajuela.  This confrontation, 
based on strong localist sentiments, threatened the stability and unity of the 
nation.  The liberal project devised a national narrative to coalesce the nation 
focusing on the glories of the Filibuster War.  The effort included the naming of a 
ship with the name of President Mora, and the unveiling of the National 
Monument in 1895.   
 By the early twentieth century, April 11
th
 substituted the traditional 
celebrations of May 1
st
.  Since 1913, May 1
st
 started to develop a strong 
connection to the commemoration International Labor Day.  Anarchist and 
socialist ideas of social justice collided with the traditional nationalistic meaning 
of the Filibuster War.  For decades, May 1
st
 had been associated with the national 
liberal project, and therefore with the status quo.  Labor Day claims of social 
reform under an internationalist anti-imperial agenda used a nationalist message 
346 
 
that was anti-oligarchic and anti-liberal.  The presence of a competing nationalist 
discourse was deemed problematic.  The state directed efforts to disconnect any 
possible nationalist symbolism attached to the Filibuster War from Labor Day 
commemorations.  Arbor Day was used to confuse the meanings of May 1
st
, while 
April 11
th
 took over the meanings related to the Filibuster War.  The massive 
celebrations of Santamaria in 1916 and 1931 confirmed the position of the 
Alajuelan drummer as the undisputed symbol of the Filibuster War.   
As a symbol of national sovereignty, the Filibuster War was constantly 
recalled during the early twentieth century.  During that period, U.S. imperial 
advances and expansionism were perceived as a threat, resulting on a anti-
imperialist reaction present in nationalist literature, newspapers, and popular 
protests.  The war against Panama in 1921 also helped to revive the memory of 
the Filibuster War, becoming a central theme on government speeches, newspaper 
articles, poetry, and in the naming of the battalions sent to defend the southern 
border. 
 During the 1940s, Costa Rica became severely polarized.  The alliance 
between the ruling National Republican Party and the communist Vanguardia 
Popular promoted the reaction of the most traditional sectors of society.  The right 
accused the government of being filibusters for giving away national sovereignty 
to the designs of Moscow, while the communists protested against Truman’s 
expansionist intentions in the international arena using references to Santamaria’s 
feat and Walker’s surrender as symbols of anti-imperialist resistance.  1948 
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marked the end of a cycle in Costa Rican history.  A civil war redefined politics, 
and with it, developed a new economic model for the country.   
The winning faction of the war, grouped under the banner of the 
Liberacion Nacional Party won the 1953 elections.  In 1955, a group of exiles 
organized a military invasion to Costa Rica with the support of the Nicaraguan 
dictator Anastasio Somoza.  The Costa Rican government organized the 
resistance and was able to gain a definitive victory at the site of the Hacienda 
Santa Rosa.  In 1956, the year of the centenary of the Filibuster War, the 
government promoted the celebration of a new holiday, on March 20
th
, 
anniversary of the victory over Walker at Santa Rosa in 1856.  The celebration 
also commemorated the battle of 1955, in an obvious move to connect the 
government to the glories of the past, while condemning the opposition and 
reducing it to the level of filibusters.  The commemoration received a strong 
rejection by members of the opposition, some members of the Liberacion 
Nacional group, and the general public.  The disapproval responded to a need for 
national reconciliation, while the commemorations of Santa Rosa were a symbol 
of division and polarization.  This episode demonstrates the importance of the 
existence of a critical moment when it comes to create new traditions.  Hobsbawm 
and Nora argue that collective memory created during the late nineteenth century 
was successful because European societies were suffering a general crisis.  Social 
transformation promoted by modernization severed the ties with traditional 
values, either by dislocation or by cultural influence.  The vacuum left was filled 
by new values attached to symbols and traditions designed to establish a fictitious 
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connection to the past.  The Costa Rican civil war was such a moment of crisis. 
The result was the adoption of a new economic system, stronger 
institutionalization, expansion of social reforms and the consolidation of 
democracy.  In 1956 the government attempted to introduce a new tradition that 
proved to represent dividing instead of uniting values, and therefore, discarded by 
the population. 
As part of the new set of values created after the civil war, the Liberacion 
Nacional group abolished the army.  The goal was to reduce military costs in 
order to finance social and education projects, as well as to eliminate a possible 
source of political instability.  Social transformation, like the elimination of a 
traditional institution as the army, creates a gap on the social dynamic that 
reshapes some of the basic values of a nation.  The abolition of the army 
diminished the value of the Filibuster War due its strong militaristic imagery.  
This affected the representation of Santamaria, who after all was a soldier and was 
a hero because he participated in a military event.  Official nationalism continued 
to use military rhetoric to refer to Santamaria’s heroism, but as new generations 
substituted those that remembered the existence of an army, these speeches 
became irrelevant.  The end of the twentieth century and beginning of the 
twentieth-first century are periods of social transformation promoted by the 
entering of Costa Rica into the globalized economy following a neoliberal 
economic system.  The Filibuster War, as the symbol of the nation, was revised 
and resurrected by this crisis.  As the welfare state eroded and the government 
was seen less and less as a protective entity, and more as a corrupt one, the 
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rhetoric used by the government became suspicious and dissociated from the 
sense of national unity derived from social justice.  During the 1990s, the 
traditional parades celebrating Santamaria experienced changes designed not by 
the authorities, but by students participating in the parades.  Music and uniforms 
started to lose their martial aspect and the parades became a popular festivity.  
The parades were also used to accuse the government of selling out the country 
and betraying the values of peace that became a staple of national identity for 
decades.  The peak of these demonstrations was present during the debates about 
the signing of CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement) between 2003 
and 2007.  The Treaty has been considered by many as a threat to national 
sovereignty.  During the campaign before a referendum on the issue was held, the 
Filibuster War became the main symbol used by those opposing the agreement.  
This is a topic that complements this dissertation and still needs analysis.  It is 
clear that Costa Rica is suffering a new process of social transformation and that 
the following years may provide plenty of new symbols, traditions, and values, 
altering the meaning of what is to be a Costa Rican. 
The Filibuster War continues to be the symbol of the nation because 
continuous threats to national sovereignty:  the threat of Walker’s invasion (1856-
1860), the threat of Federico Mora’s Invasion (1873), the conflict with Guatemala 
(1878), the forced unification of Central America (1885), U.S. expansionism in 
the Caribbean (1898-1933), the war with Panama (1921), the ALCOA issue 
(1970), the CAFTA referendum (2003-2007), border issues with Nicaragua 
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(2010-2012).  The lack of direct threats to national sovereignty, or a redefinition 
of the nation may promote a loss of interest in the Filibuster War. 
This dissertation proves that national identity is a dynamic construct 
shaped by several social actors.  While official nationalism has an important place 
on defining a national narrative, it is for the popular groups to decide which 
values to accept and hold.  The influence of official nationalism on popular 
groups depends on receptivity.  Social transformation may open a gap that can be 
filled with new official traditions, but also, when official nationalism does not 
respond to social changes, popular groups may develop their own values and 
transform symbols and their meanings in order to make them fit new social 
narratives.    
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